Post date: Oct 20, 2012 9:27:14 AM
Is representation grounded in predictive-control mechanisms?
A key tenet of grounded, embodied and motor theories is that all cognition is realized using modal symbols originated from situated interaction, rather than by processing amodal symbols using brain processes that are completely segregated from perception and action processes.
Within this grounded cognition framework, I am developing an action- and prediction-based view of representation. In this view, representations develop from the results of action-control mechanisms that project different courses of action into the future. They are realized through emulation loops (Grush, 2004). For instance, a sponge is (among the other things) understood in terms of anticipated softness when squashing it (Roy, 2005). Furthermore, representations retain the same embodied format even in their more sophisticated forms, when they are “detached” from the ongoing action and perception loops (Pezzulo, 2008, 2011).
My selected pubs:
Pezzulo, G. (2011). Grounding procedural and declarative knowledge in sensorimotor anticipation. Mind and Language, 26(1):78–114. [pdf]
Pezzulo, G. (2008) Coordinating with the Future: the Anticipatory Nature of Representation. Minds and Machines, 18, 179-225 [pdf]
See also:
Grush, R. (2004) The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2004, 27, 377-96
Roy, D. (2005). Semiotic Schemas: A Framework for Grounding Language in Action and Perception. Artificial Intelligence, 167(1-2):170-20