Research
Publications
Superstar exclusivity in two-sided markets, joint with Leonardo Madio and Shiva Shekhar, Management Science, Vol. 70(2), February 2024, pages 991-1011
Price Signaling with Salient-thinking Consumers, joint with Andrea Mantovani and Antonio Minniti, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 138, March 2023, pages 238-253
Technology adoption and specialized labor, joint with Marco Delogu and Giuseppe Pulina, International Economics, vol. 173, May 2023, pages 249-259
Business models for streaming platforms: content acquisition, advertising and users, joint with Dimitri Paolini, Information Economics & Policy, vol. 52(C), September 2020
Bring a friend! Privately or Publicly? joint with Paolo Pin and Simone Righi, Management Science, vol. 66(5), May 2020, pages 2269-2290
The price of discovering your needs online joint with Luca Ferrari and Simone Righi, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 164, August 2019, Pages 317-330
Poaching in media: harm to subscribers? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 27, Summer 2018, Pages 221-236. Featured article online
Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination with cross-group Externalities Journal of Economics, Volume 125, Issue 2, October 2018, Pages 137–157
Competitive Customer Poaching with Asymmetric Firms International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 48, September 2016, Pages 173–206
Local University Supply and Distance: A Welfare Analysis with Centralized and Decentralized Tuition Fees joint with Berardino Cesi and Dimitri Paolini Italian Economic Journal, July 2016, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 239–252
Papers (close to be) submitted
Does costly persuasion signal quality? joint with Luca Ferrari and Giuseppe Pignataro
(Revise and Resubmit, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Last Version)
Abstract
We present a buyer-seller setup in which seller type is private information and buyer utility is state contingent. States of nature are commonly unknown and the seller can design information through a Bayesian experiment on the state by facing a cost based on Shannon’s entropy. Costly experimentation is a signaling device whenever it makes the optimal experiment type-dependent. We show that the seller of high type has an incentive to design more precise information and is willing to bear a higher cost. Hence, separation can occur without price distortions unless the experimentation cost is excessively high. In the latter case, a high price signals high quality, but the consumer does not receive information on the state.
Persuasion in Physician Agency joint with Giuseppe Pignataro and Luigi Siciliani
(Under review, Last Version)
Abstract
We revisit the physician-patient agency problem in a model where patients differ in their preferences for treatment and the physician decides whether to recommend a treatment based on the results of a diagnostic test. We show that, in equilibrium, some patients who could benefit from treatment remain untreated, while others receive unnecessary treatment. We explore several policy interventions. A policy that does not authorize tests with high false positives increases health and welfare. Instead, mandatory testing increases health but the effect on welfare is ambiguous. Last, financial incentives increase health by reducing the number of untreated patients but reduce welfare.
Monopolistic Duopoly joint with Emanuele Bacchiega and Alessandro Fedele
(Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series 101/2023, SSRN SSRN here)
Abstract
We delve into the Hotelling price competition game without assuming full market coverage, and derive three equilibrium configurations. Two of them are well-known: Hotelling duopoly, where firms set the prices with the aim of stealing customers from the rival, and the market is fully covered; Local Monopolies, where firms avoid strategic interaction and business stealing, and the market is partially covered. In the third, firms interact strategically to keep the market covered, while at the same time avoiding business stealing. We define it as Monopolistic Duopoly (MD) because it combines the features of the other two scenarios. Despite the existence of few contributions on MD, this equilibrium configuration has been substantially ignored. By spelling out the economics of MD and emphasizing its intriguing properties, we establish that MD has, instead, relevant implications for the Hotelling literature.