Embedded Files
For many years I have studied leadership and the role that leadership can play in fostering cooperative behaviour in small groups. Here are some of the key themes in my work with a selection of articles.
Who makes a good leader?
Who makes a good leader?
Our work has looked at how a leader by 'setting a good example' can increase overall cooperation in the group. Por-social leaders tend to be the 'best' leaders. But, we have found that it can be enough for leaders to just say they are pro-social for this to have a positive influence on cooperation in the group.
Cartwright, E., Chai, Y. and Xue, L. (2024). Leadership in a social dilemma: Does it matter if the leader is pro-social or just says they are pro-social? Economic Inquiry, 63(1), 160–180.
Cartwright, E. and T. Singh (2018) 'Observation and contagion effects in cooperation: An experimental investigation', Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 74, 151-160
Cartwright, E. (2015) 'Strategic delay and information cascades,' Journal of Economics 114: 53-74.
Cartwright, E. and A. Patel (2010) 'Imitation and the incentive to contribute early in a sequential public good game', Journal of Public Economic Theory 12: 691-708.
Leadership and framing
Leadership and framing
I have a long standing interest in how framing can influence cooperation in groups. For instance, do people contribute more if they are told that contributions help others, or if they are told that not contributing harms others. We have also explored how framing influences the behavior of leaders. For instance, recent work shows that leaders contribute more with a Wall Street frame than a Community frame.
Cartwright, E., & Drouvelis, M. (2024). Social framing effects in leadership by example: Preferences or beliefs? Economic Inquiry.
Cartwright, E. and A. Ramalingam (2019) 'Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities', Economics Letters 179: 42-45
Cartwright, E. and D. Lovett (2014) 'Conditional cooperation and the marginal per-capita return in public good games', Games 5: 234-256.
Servant leadership
Servant leadership
Who chooses to be leader? Leadership in a public good game typically comes at a cost because leaders earn less than followers. We have some evidence that pro-social individuals are more likely to choose to lead. This is good because they are also more likely to set a good example as leader.
Cartwright, E., J. Gillet, and M. van Vugt, (2013) 'Leadership in a weak-link game', Economic Inquiry, 51: 2028-2043.
Gillet, J., E. Cartwright and M. van Vugt (2011) 'Selfish or servant leadership: Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games', Personality and Individual Differences, 51: 231-236.
Google Sites
Report abuse