PHIL 59803, Seminar: Signals, Conventions, and Common Knowledge (Fall 2026)
Prof. Funkhouser
Wednesdays, 3:00-5:15
Course Description: In this seminar, we will investigate the role that signals, conventions, and common knowledge play in solving coordination problems and manipulating people’s behavior. More than anything, our focus will be on signaling. We will examine an eclectic sampling of applications in these different areas: philosophy of language, philosophical psychology, social philosophy, and ethics. While these applications are diverse, they are unified by the role that strategic considerations play in developing signaling systems.
We will cover these more particular topics:
· The role that common knowledge, conventions, and signals play in David Lewis’s explanation of coordination problems and their solutions.
· Subsequent investigations of signals in dynamical systems and with mixed incentives, especially in the work of Brian Skyrms.
· How social conventions naturally emerge – and are exploited – to solve social problems like the division of labor.
· Ways in which thought itself is shaped by pressures to communicate messages that further coordination and manipulation.
· Moral qualities signaled for both personal and societal advancement.
Unit: Coordination Problems & Conventions
Aug 19: Background on Coordination Problems
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Chapters 3-4) *Notes*
Aug 26: Lewis Day #1
Lewis, Convention (Chapters 1-2) *Notes*
September 2: Lewis Day #2
Lewis, Convention (Chapters 3-5) *Notes*
September 9: Common Knowledge?
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk III, Pt II, Sec II (excerpt) *Notes*
Binmore, "Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge?"
Sillari, "Common Knowledge and Convention"
Unit: Skyrms
September 16: An Evolutionary Alternative to Lewis's Rationality-Based Account of Meaning
Skyrms, "Correlated Convention" *Notes*
Skyrms, "The Evolution of Meaning"
Skyrms, "Evolution of Inference"
September 23: Communication Without Common Interest
Spence, "Job Market Signaling"
Zahavi, "Mate Selection -- A Selection for a Handicap"
Skyrms, "Cheap Talk"
September 30: Signals, Evolution, and Deception
Skyrms, Signals (Introduction-Chapter 2, Chapters 4-8)
Unit: Social Categories
October 7: Gender and Social Coordination
O'Connor, The Origins of Unfairness, Introduction - Chapter 4
October 14: Division of Resources
O'Connor, The Origins of Unfairness, Chapters 5-8
October 21: Communicating Social Norms
Bicchieri, "Covenants Without Swords: Group Identity, Norms, and Communication..."
Bicchieri et al., "Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm Compliance"
Unit: Signaling Minds
October 28: Beliefs as Signals
Funkhouser, "A Tribal Mind: Beliefs that Signal Group Identity or Commitment"
Williams, "Socially Adaptive Belief"
November 4: Costly Cognition
Williams, "Signalling, Commitment, and Strategic Absurdities"
Blancke, "Objectify and Commit: How Reasons Bring About Cultural Change..."
Van Leeuwen, Religion as Make-Believe, Chapter 6
November 11: Other Signals
Ganapini, "The Signaling Function of Sharing Fake Stories"
Westra, "Symbolic Belief in Social Cognition"
Unit: Virtue Signaling
November 18: Virtue Signaling: Individual Advancement
Tosi & Warmke, "Moral Grandstanding"
Berio, "What's My Motivation? Reputational Motives, Virtue Signaling,..."
November 25: No Class -- Thanksgiving Break
December 2: Virtue Signaling: Societal Advancement
Levy, "Virtue Signaling is Virtuous"
Westra, "Virtue Signaling and Moral Progress"
Sauer, "Conspicuous Compunction"