I am working on a book project in which I apply signaling theory to the mind. The idea is that various mental states possess signaling functions as a result of our biological evolution, cultural evolution, social learning, or individual learning. My main application is to belief: some beliefs primarily function as signals, either to others or to oneself. These are both genuine beliefs and literal signals.
The book in progress is The Signaling Mind: Belief as Social Manipulation. [NEW] Here are links to previews of advanced drafts of Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3. I will have a complete draft by the end of summer 2025.
A series of articles have helped shape this project. The best introduction to my belief signaling theory is found in "A Tribal Mind: Beliefs that Signal Group Identity or Commitment." I also recommend this "popular" piece: "Thoughts for Sale."
I think that I have a decent sense of the path that led me to belief signaling. Sharing that story might clarify the view and also make explicit connections that otherwise could be missed...
In the late '90s, as a graduate student at Syracuse University, I took a seminar on irrationality. Self-deception was the primary focus. The professor, Tamar Gendler, favored a conception of belief that I would describe as intellectualist. Namely, belief must be earnestly and strongly beholden to reason and evidence. This pretty much ruled out non-epistemic functions for belief. But she and others (e.g., Velleman) allowed that many arational attitudes (which might superficially appear to be irrational or belief-like) can nevertheless guide our actions. These attitudes include pretense, imagination, and (eventually) the specially constructed psychological state of alief. I always agreed that there are these epistemically carefree attitudes that guide our behaviors. I just thought -- even more so now -- that many of these attitudes are beliefs nonetheless.
Over the past two decades, I published a fair bit about self-deception and the nature of belief. A big theme of this work has been that motives can strongly influence belief, and we often rely on unconscious mechanisms to help us believe things for non-epistemic purposes. Belief is responsive to a range of incentives and mechanisms, and there is no reason to think that epistemic concerns are overriding.
I eventually confronted Robert Trivers' theory that the primary function of self-deception is to enable us to better deceive others. I liked his insight that others detect our self-deceptive beliefs and can come to have them as well. This transmission of self-serving beliefs benefits us. But I also saw a more general point here. Not only are our beliefs sometimes detected and transmitted to others, but people also detect our beliefs and treat us differently whether or not they actually acquire those beliefs themselves. This is where the idea of belief signaling enters the picture. Beliefs can have social value merely as advertisements that cause people to treat us and our interests differently.
For better or for worse, I am largely "self taught" when it comes to signaling theory. For those who are interested, I'd like to share some of the resources that were most helpful to me as I tried to understand the logic of signaling.
General:
Searcy and Nowicki, The Evolution of Animal Communication
Maynard Smith and Harper, Animal Signals
Zahavi, "Mate Selection -- A Selection for a Handicap"
Guilford & Dawkins, "Receiver Psychology and the Evolution of Animal Signals"
Spence, "Job Market Signaling"
Sosis, "Why Aren't We All Hutterites?"
Irons, "Religion as a Hard-to-Fake Sign of Commitment"
More technical stuff:
Enquist, "Communication During Aggresssive Interactions with Particular Reference to Variation in Choice of Behavior"
Grafen, "Biological Signals as Handicaps"
Philosophy:
Lewis, Convention
Skyrms, Signals
Social Functions of Belief:
von Hippel and Trivers, "The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception"
Mercier and Sperber, The Enigma of Reason
Williams, "Socially Adaptive Belief"