Current Projects
Book Manuscript
The Signaling Mind: Belief as Social Manipulation
In this book I argue that some beliefs, as well as other mental states, possess signaling functions. These are genuine beliefs that are also literal signals. This theory explains our tendency toward certain pro-social beliefs and attitudes, many beliefs that seem irrational or detached from our utilitarian interests (but might indicate our group affiliations), certain biases of self-assessment, and some cases of self-deception. These beliefs are acquired through a process of motivated or incentivized reasoning. The book rigorously formulates the conditions for social signaling, makes an initial case that belief meets these conditions, and then offers empirical support for particular examples.
Articles in Progress
"LLMs, Alignment, and Self-Deception"
"Reckoning with Socially Adaptive Belief"
"Belief Signaling, Persuasion, and Manipulation"
Incentivized reasoning paper
Published Articles
27. "Are the Religious Make-Believing, or Are They Making Themselves Believe?" Religion, Brain & Behavior (forthcoming)
26. "Mindshaping for Belief Signaling," Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping (forthcoming)
25. "Self-Handicapping and Self-Deception: A Two-Way Street," Philosophical Psychology (2024)
24. "Interactive Self-Deception in Digital Spaces," Philosophical Topics (2023)
23. "Determinate/Determinable," Routledge Handbook of Properties (2023)
22. "Dangerous Beliefs, Effective Signals," Philosophical Psychology (2023)
21. "The Natural, the Fundamental, and the Perfectly Similar: Unraveling a Metaphysical Braid," Metaphilosophy (2022)
20. "Evolutionary Psychology, Learning, and Belief Signaling: Design for Natural and Artificial Systems," Synthese (2021)
19. “A Tribal Mind: Beliefs that Signal Group Identity or Commitment,” Mind & Language (2020)
18. “Framing Temptations in Relation to the Self: Acceptance and Alienation,” (with Jennifer C. Veilleux), in Surrounding Self-Control, ed. Alfred Mele (2020)
17. “Detection, Not Perception: A Reply to Glazer,” Philosophical Psychology (2018)
16. "Reply to Doody," (with David Barrett), Philosophical Psychology (2017)
15. "Beliefs as Signals: A New Function for Belief," Philosophical Psychology (2017)
14. "Is Self-Deception an Effective Non-Cooperative Strategy?" Biology and Philosophy (2016)
13. "Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception: Strategic and Flexible," (with David Barrett), Philosophical Psychology (2016)
12. "A Call for Modesty: A Priori Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problem," New Waves in Philosophy of Mind (2012)
11. "Practical Self-Deception," Humana Mente (2012)
10. "Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination," Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2009)
9. "Imagination and Other Scripts," (with Shannon Spaulding), Philosophical Studies (2009)
8. "Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology," Social Theory and Practice (2009)
7. "Multiple Realizability," Philosophy Compass (2007)
6. "A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability," Philosophical Studies (2007)
5. "On Privileging God's Moral Goodness," Faith and Philosophy (2006)
4. "The Determinable-Determinate Relation," Nous (2006)
3. "Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want?" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2005)
2. "Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth," Philosophical Studies (2003)
1. "Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2002)
Published Books
(Routledge, 2019)
This book offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophical problems of self-deception, as well as a critical examination of some of the relevant psychological investigations.
Review: Philosophy
The Logical Structure of Kinds
(Oxford University Press, 2014)
In this book I develop a property theory, which I then apply to issues in philosophy of mind – multiple realizability, reduction, and autonomy. This property theory gives special attention to the determination relation. The determination relation is found to contain two components – what I call determination dimensions and non-determinable necessities – which structure kinds at the same level of abstraction into property spaces. In turn, these property space models of kinds lead to conditions for individuating properties.
Fundamentally, the book is about the logical structure underlying the distinction between genuine differences in kind and mere differences in degree. Only with the former do we have autonomy. For example, do cognitive psychological taxonomies and explanations merely differ in degree from those of neuroscience, or do they differ in kind? If they differ in kind, then cognitive psychology is autonomous with respect to neuroscience. I argue that neuroscientific kinds likely realize psychological kinds, rather than serving as their determinates.
Reviews: Mind, Analysis, NDPR, Philosophical Quarterly, AJ P
Past Grant Projects
Reasoning in the Digital Age
Chancellor's Grant for Humanities (University of Arkansas)
In December 2019, our interdisciplinary team was awarded a $45,000 Chancellor’s Grant for Humanities (University of Arkansas), with supplemental financial support pledged by the University of Arkansas Philosophy Department. Research concerns include: (i) Epistemology for the information age: How can we best assess the reliability of information sources? What are the potential psychological pitfalls of interacting with a largely opaque, highly user-responsive, potentially manipulative internet environment? (ii) Ethics for the information age: What are the rights and responsibilities of information producers, publishers and/or forums, and users? (iii) What are the practical options for safeguarding individual and societal welfare? Projected outcomes include: an interdisciplinary conference of international prominence, bringing together prominent practitioners across relevant disciplines; interdisciplinary research yielding conference presentations, publications, and further grant proposals; and curriculum development in data ethics and the epistemology of digital environments.
Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project
"Temptation and the Self" (with Jennifer Veilleux)
We received a generous grant from the Templeton Foundation (administered through Florida State University) to conduct a series of psychological studies on how self-control is affected by how a person thinks of her temptations. People frequently speak of resisting their desire for cake, fighting the urge to smoke, or being overcome with anger, as if these temptations are external enemies to battle. But is this a healthy and effective attitude? We describe those who think of their temptations as external intruders as alienating their temptations. An alternative mindset is to accept temptations as part of the self. Such acceptance amounts to taking responsibility for these wants as one’s own. We tested whether alienation or acceptance of temptations is a better mindset for exercising self-control.
We focused specifically on dieters and those wanting to quit smoking. We gathered data from adults across the United States to discover the extent to which people view their temptations as either alien or accepted, as well as how their views relate to their success at self-control. Additionally, we ran a pair of laboratory studies. In one, we guided smokers and dieters to think of their temptations as either an accepted part of their self or something external. We then exposed them to a temptation – like a snack cake – to test which mindset is more effective. Our second laboratory study attempted to tease apart two possible ways in which a person may accept a temptation. If a temptation is accepted as part of the self, is it better to think of oneself as in a battle against temptation or in a position to choose between a better or worse part of ourselves? We guided dieters and smokers to accept their temptations but think of themselves as either in a battle or choice situation, and tested which mindset is more effective in a temptation situation. For both of these laboratory studies we included a persistence task to test for more general fatigue. Overall, our focus was on self-control in practical situations in which people are vested and identify goals as part of their true self.