"Moral Characters: Social Media and Elections in the US", joint with J.S. Morales, and A. Moresi
Abstract
We study how politicians' adoption of social media, and the use of moral language, affect electoral returns. We compile a new dataset covering over 4,000 Twitter accounts and almost five million tweets by US House candidates over 2008-2018. We document several descriptive facts: social media use rises and falls with electoral cycles, politicians' use of moral rhetoric increased over the period of study, and moral rhetoric is strongly associated with higher social media engagement. Using a regression discontinuity design on close primary elections, we find that social media use by candidates has a positive but imprecisely estimated effect on vote shares. This effect is strongly heterogeneous depending on the use of moral rhetoric, and is large and statistically significant for candidates with above-median moral language use. A complementary design using only candidates with Twitter also reveals a causal effect of moral language on vote shares. We also document that relative to other social media features (negativity, out-group animosity, toxicity) moral rhetoric drives more positive engagement. Finally, we show that increased coverage from mainstream news media and campaign donations are important mechanisms.
"Public procurement and the risk of severe weather events", joint with A. Bafundi, R. Camboni, and P. Valbonesi
Abstract
We study the role of relational contracts in public procurements when public buyers (PBs) are exposed to severe weather events (SWEs). We develop a theoretical model where PBs select the firms that participate in procurement procedures and use this discretion to reduce the losses SWEs cause. Drawing on Italian public procurement data, we find support for the existence of relational contracts linked to SWEs. PBs that were exposed to SWEs use invitation-only procedures more often; and invitation-only procedures won by firms that have previously worked for the same PB experience less often time overruns in work execution.
"Building Trust in Government: The Opportunities and Challenges of Adverse Shocks", joint with A. Acharya, H. Pei
Abstract
How do adverse shocks that align the interests of state and society shape a government's ability to build and maintain the trust of its citizens? We focus on the case where citizens cannot tell whether an adverse shock that warrants government action has hit, unless the government mishandles the crisis. We show that: (i) increasing the frequency of shocks has no impact on the scope of trust if shocks are severe, but reduces the scope of trust if shocks are mild; (ii) increasing the severity of shocks lowers social welfare but increases the extent of trust; and (iii) the opportunity to build a reputation for being trustworthy enhances both the government's payoff and social welfare beyond what is achievable when citizens know that the government is strategic.