Publications and Forthcoming Papers
"Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests", joint with A. Acharya, T. Sugaya and E. Turkel. Forthcoming at the Journal of the European Economic Association.
Abstract
We develop a model of electoral campaigns as dynamic contests in which two office-motivated candidates allocate their budgets over time to affect their odds of winning. We measure the candidates’ evolving odds of winning using a state variable that tends to decay over time, and we refer to it as the candidates’ “relative popularity.” In our baseline model, the equilibrium ratio of spending by each candidate equals the ratio of their initial budgets; spending is independent of past realizations of relative popularity; and there is a positive relationship between the strength of decay in the popularity process and the rate at which candidates increase their spending over time as election day approaches. We use this relationship to recover estimates of the perceived decay rate in popularity leads in actual U.S. subnational elections.
"Theories of Democratic Backsliding", joint with Z. Luo, M. Nalepa, and C. Prato. Forthcoming at the Annual Review of Political Science.
Abstract
We review recent contributions to the modeling of democratic backsliding. We organize these theories according to (a) the source of constraints on the executive (vertical or horizontal restrainers) and (b) the target of backsliding (electoral manipulation or executive aggrandizement), and then use these concepts to build a scaffold for a meta-model of democratic backsliding. This meta-model allows us to describe and compare the premises and insights of this scholarship. We further apply our two-dimensional classification to more than 30 empirical papers and show how these theories can guide research design. We conclude by highlighting open issues for future research.
Reference Points and Democratic Backsliding, joint with C. Prato. American Journal of Political Science. 2023. 67(1), pp. 71-88.
Abstract
We propose a theory of democratic backsliding where citizens' retrospective assessment of an incumbent politician depends on expectations that are endogenous to the incumbent's behavior. We show that democratic backsliding can occur even when most citizens and most politicians intrinsically value democracy. By challenging norms of democracy, an incumbent can lower citizens' expectations; by not doubling down on this challenge, he can then beat this lowered standard. As a result, gradual backsliding can actually enhance an incumbent's popular support not despite of, but because of citizens' opposition to backsliding. This mechanism can only arise when citizens are uncertain enough about incumbents' preferences (e.g., owing to programmatically weak parties). Mass polarization, instead, can reduce the occurrence of backsliding while simultaneously increasing its severity.
"The Perils of Friendly Oversight", joint with D. Gerardi and I. Monzón. Journal of Economic Theory. September 2022, 204.
Abstract
Decision makers often rely on experts' evaluations to decide on complex proposals. Proponents want the approval of their proposals and can work to improve their quality. The scrutiny of experts ought to push proponents to work harder, leading to high-quality proposals. Experts, however, have their own agendas: they may favor or oppose the proposals under their scrutiny. We study how the expert's agenda affects the likelihood that proposals are approved and their quality. We show that an expert in favor of a proposal can be detrimental towards its approval. This happens when it is easy to incentivize the proponent to work and when the status quo alternative is not too attractive.
Sanctions and Incentives to Repudiate External Debt, joint with C. de Bassa and F. Passarelli. Journal of Theoretical Politics, April 2021, 33(2), pp. 198-224.
Abstract
Often foreign countries levy sanctions in the attempt to foment discontent with a hostile government. But sanctions may provoke costly reactions by the target country. Empirical evidence suggests that sanctioned countries are more likely to default on external debt and, conditional on defaulting, their internal political conflict declines. Starting from this evidence, this paper presents a model in which sanctions exhaust the target country economically and impair its government's fiscal capacity. Then, an office-motivated leader may find it convenient to repudiate foreign debt in order to free resources that she can invest to regain internal political support. The default thus becomes a defensive tool to partially dampen the political conflict a sanction generates.
Economic and Social-Class Voting in a Model of Redistribution with Social Concerns, joint with A. Gallice. Journal of the European Economic Association, December 2020, 18(6), pp. 3140-3172.
Abstract
We investigate how social status concerns may affect voters' preferences for redistribution. Social status is given by a voter's relative standing in two dimensions: consumption and social class. By affecting the distribution of consumption levels, redistribution modifies the weights attached to the two dimensions. Thus, redistribution not only transfers resources from the rich to the poor, but it also amplifies or reduces the importance of social class differences. Social status concerns can simultaneously lead some members of the working class to oppose redistribution and some members of the socio-economic elites to favor it. We prove that these effects result in an increase in polarization concerning redistributive policies. They also give rise to interclass coalitions of voters that, despite having different monetary interests, support the same tax rate. We fully characterize these coalitions and discuss the conditions that ensure the existence of a political equilibrium of the game.
A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns and Inequality, joint with A. Gallice, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, October 2019, 121(4), pp. 1620-1646.
Abstract
We consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains, signaling power, and social status. The latter depends on the agent's relative achievement in one of three dimensions: (i) innate skills, (ii) level of schooling, and (iii) income. We study the three scenarios separately and characterize the conditions under which social concerns increase or decrease educational and income inequality. Inequality increases (decreases) if education lowers the stigma suffered by low skilled workers less (more) than it boosts the prestige enjoyed by high skilled workers. We discuss the expected results of some policies in light of these findings.
A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs, joint with A. Acharya, The Quarterly Journal of Political Science, April 2019, 14(2), pp. 159-190.
Abstract
We provide a behavioral foundation for audience costs by augmenting the standard crisis bargaining model with voters who evaluate material outcomes relative to an endogenous reference point. Voters vote to re-elect their leader when their payoff is high, and vote to replace him when their payoff is low. Leaders value re-election but also care about the outcome of the crisis. Backing down after a challenge may be costly to a leader because initiating the challenge has the potential to raise voters' expectations about their final payoff, generating the possibility that they suffer a payoff loss from disappointment when their leader backs down. Whether it is costly or beneficial to back down from a threat - and just how costly or beneficial it is - depends on the value of the reference point, which is determined endogenously in equilibrium.
The Hidden Cost of Raising Voters' Expectations: Reference Dependence and Politicians' Credibility, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, October 2016, 130, pp. 126-143.
Abstract
Two politicians compete to get elected. Each politician is characterized by a valence, which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values: high or low. The representative voter prefers politicians with high valence, but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low-valence politician. Politicians make statements concerning their valence. If the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer, politicians' statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place. By introducing reference dependence and loss aversion, we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise. Intuitively, these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one's valence as overstatements may shift the electorate's preferences toward better skilled opponents.
War with Crazy Types, Political Science Research and Methods, 3(2), May 2015, pp. 281-307, joint with A. Acharya.
Abstract
We introduce a model of war and peace in which leaders believe that their adversaries might be crazy types that always behave aggressively, regardless of whether it is strategically optimal to do so. In the model, two countries are involved in a dispute. The dispute can end in a peaceful settlement, or it can escalate to "limited war" or "total war." If it is common knowledge that the leaders of the countries are strategically rational, then the only equilibrium outcome of the model is peace. If, on the other hand, a leader believes that there is some chance that her adversary is a crazy type, then even a strategically rational adversary may have an incentive to adopt a "madman strategy" in which he pretends to be crazy. This leads to limited war with positive probability, even when both leaders are actually strategically rational. We show that despite having two-sided incomplete information, our model has a generically unique equilibrium. Moreover, the model identifies two countervailing forces that drive equilibrium behavior: a reputation motive and a defense motive. When the prior probability that a leader is crazy decreases, the reputation motive promotes less aggressive behavior by that leader, while the defense motive pushes for a more aggressive behavior. These two forces underlay several comparative statics results. For example, we analyze the effect of increasing the prior probability that a leader is crazy, as well as the effect of changing the relative military strengths of the countries, on the equilibrium behavior of both leaders. Our analysis also characterizes conditions under which the madman strategy is profitable, as well as conditions under which it is not, thereby contributing to a debate in the literature about the effectiveness of the madman strategy.
Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, March 2011, 11(1) Advances, page 6, joint with P. Battigalli, A. Di Tillio and A. Penta.
Abstract
We use an interactive epistemology framework to provide a systematic analysis of some solution concepts for games with asymmetric information. We characterize solution concepts using expressible epistemic assumptions, represented as events in the canonical space generated by primitive uncertainty about the payoff relevant state, payoff irrelevant information, and actions. In most of the paper, we adopt an interim perspective, which is appropriate to analyze genuine incomplete information. We relate Delta-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, 2003) to interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris, Theoretical Economics 2, 2007) and to rationalizability in the interim strategic form. We also consider the ex ante perspective, which is appropriate to analyze asymmetric information about an initial chance move. We prove the equivalence between interim correlated rationalizability and an ex ante notion of correlated rationalizability.