At any given time, only some of my in-progress projects have shareable manuscripts. But if something looks interesting,  email me a request, and I will send you a draft either immediately or when one is completed. Papers not promised to volumes are described, rather than named, in order to facilitate both blind review, and last-minute changes in title. 

Papers with drafts linked here: 

• Moral Concepts, Inefficacy, and Collective Action under review at Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics; argues for a novel conceptual ethics approach to certain ethical questions connected to collective action and inefficacy

Papers where I probably have a shareable draft (email me if interested!): 

• Authoritative Normativity (with David Plunkett) forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (2nd Ed) Eds. David Copp and Connie Rosati

• A paper using Hilary Kornblith's account in Knowledge and its Place in Nature as a foil to explore different ways that inquiry into our thought and talk interacts with inquiry into non-linguistic reality (e.g. "knowledge itself") (with David Plunkett)

• Strong AI and the Foundations of Ethics (with David Plunkett) promised to Communicating with AI: Philosophical Perspectives (Eds. Rachel Sterken and Herman Cappelen)

Projects where I likely do not yet have a shareable draft: 

• Elusive Value in a Natural World (a planned monograph)

Metanormative realists think that the world provides objective standards for our reasoning, beliefs, and action. This book explains what I take to be the three hardest challenges to the realist program. First, there is the challenge of epistemic modesty: ethical inquiry is hard, but most realist metanormative views suggest that it should be in certain respects much easier than it is. Second, there is the challenge of alternative normative concepts: the apparent possibility that concepts with different extensions could play the same role as standards for reasoning, beliefs, and action. Finally, there is the challenge of naturalistic credibility: to explain how normative facts and properties could fit into the broad picture of reality that we have independent reason to accept. The book develops a novel systematic metanormative view that I dub joint-carving normative realism, and show how it is a promising means of addressing the three challenges sketched.   

• A book project on conceptual ethics and normativity (with David Plunkett)

• A paper arguing that expressivists face a dilemma concerning how many of our ordinary commitments about ethics they can accommodate

• A paper challenging the ability of expressivists to address metaphysical challenges (like a supervenience challenge) or epistemological challenges (like the reliability challenge) (with David Plunkett) 

• A paper on the ethical significance of complicity

• A paper explaining the significance for metaethics of the contrast  between a theory's being intuitively revisionary, and that theory's requiring revision to the meanings of our ethical words (with David Faraci)

• A paper on ethical theorizing with non-epistemic aims (possibly with David Plunkett)

• A paper on the nature of epistemic normativity (with David Plunkett)

• Two papers about the philosophical significance of debates about topic continuity (with David Plunkett)

• A paper about conceptual ethics and the aims of inquiry (with David Plunkett)

• A paper about the political philosophy of engaging in conceptual ethics work (with David Plunkett)