Publications 

"Exit Dilemma: The Role of Private Learning on Firm Survival" (with Chiara Margaria) AEJ:Microeconomics (Forthcoming) (Online Appendix)

"Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves" (with Can Urgun and Leeat Yariv) Journal of Political Economy (2023) (Online Appendix) 

"Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting" (with Felix Feng and Can Urgun) Journal of Economic Theory (2023) 

"Uncertainty-driven Cooperation" (with Ilwoo (Iru) Hwang and Ayca Kaya) Theoretical Economics (2020) (Best TE Paper Prize 2022)

"Implementing Equal Division with an Ultimatum Threat" (with Emin Karagozoglu) Theory and Decision (2014)

Working Papers

"Leader-Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism" (with Gonzalo Cisternas, Aaron Kolb, and S. "Vish" Viswanathan) (2024) (Reject & Resubmitted Journal of Finance)

Motivated by the rise of hedge fund activism, we consider a leader blockholder and a follower counterpart who first trade in sequence to build their blocks and then intervene in a firm. With endogenous fundamentals and steering dynamics, the leader ceases to trade in an unpredictable way: she buys or sells to induce the follower to acquire a larger block and thus spend more resources to improve firm value. Key is that the activists have correlated private information—initial blocks, firms’ fundamentals, or their own productivity—so that prices either overreact or underreact to order flows. We link the model’s predictions to observables through deriving measures of “abnormal” prices analogous to those documented in empirical studies. The model explains how trades and prices can be used to coordinate non-cooperative attacks, and how block interdependence can be a key factor in the success of multi-activist interventions.

"Efficiency in Repeated Partnerships" (2021) (Online Appendix)  R&R Review of Economic Studies (new version coming soon)

Two partners contribute to a common project over time. The value of the project is determined by the aggregate effort of the partners and by a common productivity parameter that each partner is privately informed about. At each instant, the two partners observe a noisy public signal of total effort. An equilibrium of this game is Markov if effort choices of agents depend only on the beliefs about the value of the project and on calendar time. I characterize the linear Markov equilibrium as the solution to a nonlinear boundary value problem. Equilibrium is unique if agents are symmetric. The equilibrium features a mutual encouragement effect, as agents exaggerate their effort in order to signal their private information, which counteracts free-riding incentives. Indeed, if the project lasts sufficiently long, the diffused information structure approximates the first-best in terms of welfare. If, instead of distributed private information, one agent has all the information about the productivity parameter, the excessive signalling effect is accentuated. As a result, the centralized information structure can yield output levels above the first best.

Work in Progress

"Dynamic Contracting with Competitive Search" (with Mayur Choudhary and Emre Ozdenoren) 

"Optimal Project Management" (with Alessandro Bonatti and Juuso Toikka) 

"Dynamic Signaling in Wald Options" (with Chiara Margaria) 

"Meditation in Dynamic Contracting" (with Dino Gerardi, Lucas Maestri, and Ignacio Mónzon)

"Knowledge Transfers" (with Chiara Margaria, Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova)