Monetary policy: Germany - DBB

Graph: daily DBB interest rate data

Deutsche Bundesbank monetary policy instruments and operating targets

Operating procedures

The Bundesbank reformed its money market procedures in February 1985. Several instruments were used to influence money market interest rates. First, credit institutions had access to two traditional standing facilities. Rediscount credit was provided through buying of bills of exchange or Treasury bills with remaining maturities of no more than 3 months. The discount rate was set at a low, subsidy level and therefore needed to be accompanied by volume quotas. The quotas were set annually for each individual bank, but at times the Bundesbank changed the rediscount quotas to facilitate its monetary policy operations. Lombard credit consisted of overnight loans against collateral. In principle, Lombard loans were extended only to bridge temporary liquidity needs and carried a high, penalty rate. However, before 1985, use of the Lombard facility had become persistent and provision of Lombard credit was sometimes suspended or replaced by Special Lombard loans. The second main money market instrument was open market operations under repurchase agreements (Wertpapierpensiongeschafte). Between April 1973 and February 1985, repurchase agreements in both bills and securities had been used intermittently but with increasing fequency. From February 1985, a system of regular securities repurchase transactions gradually replaced discount credit as the principal instrument for the provision of central bank money to credit institutions. Repurchase transactions were offered in the form of fixed rate and sometimes variable rate tenders (using either uniform (Dutch-style auction), or individual (US-style auction) bidding rates). Frequency and maturity of the repurchase transactions varied over time (from October 1992 weekly tenders with two-week maturity). At the end of November 1988 the Bundesbank supplemented its traditional securities repurchase transactions by adding so-called quick tenders for day-to-day money market management (same day settlement, with maturities of two to ten days). The third main money market instruments was the continuous sale of Treasury bills (Schatzwechsel Abgabe). From February 1985 the Bundesbank provided credit institutions with this effectively third standing facility, consisting of banks' buying 3-day Treasury bills from the Bundesbank at a fixed rate. Before 1985, this instrument had been used intermittently. This facility allowed banks to deposit any excess central bank money and thus created a floor in money market interest rates.

Figure: Representation of the German market for bank reserves

Key characteristics Bundesbank reserve requirement system

Note: The reserve averaging facility means that the demand for reserves is relatively flat with respect to temporary shocks in the market and interest rates relatively stable.

Bundesbank operating targets

Bundesbank monetary policy strategy

The Bundesbank responded to the rising inflation in the early 1970s, and the failure of the fixed exchange rate system, by adopting a strategy of targeting money growth. The first targets were announced in December 1974. Initially, the monetary aggregate chosen for targeting was the German specific central bank money stock (CBMS), the sum of currency in circulation and a weighted average of bank deposits held by residents. In 1988 the Bundesbank adopted the conventional simple-sum M3 as its targeted money aggregate, because it deemed that the CBMS put too much weight on the rapidly growing currency component and thus overstated monetary ease. Money targets were announced annually in December and reviewed at mid-year. The formula for calculating target ranges explicitly took into account the Bundesbank's inflation goal, estimated potential output growth, and the expected trend of money velocity. These were combined using the quantity-theory equation to determine the desired money growth rate.

The Bundesbank freely acknowledged that one purpose of specifying target ranges, rather than single numbers, was to give itself some scope for short-run discretionary activism. The size of the target range varied over time, indicating changes in the amount of short-term flexibility the Bundesbank expected to need. The Bundesbank also showed a willingness to accept money growth outside of the target ranges for periods of two to three years. In principle, deviations of money growth from targets were supposed to be reversed subsequently, so that short-term considerations would not detract from the preeminent goal of low and stable inflation in the long run.

Many commentators have criticized the Bundesbank's strategy for its many target misses. The targeted money aggregate ended up outside its target range in 12 of 24 years. Moreover, in 11 of the 12 misses money growth ended up too high. However, there is logic to these facts. It should be noted that in 8 years of money growth misses the overall macroeconomic goal of inflation was on target or below target, and 3 years relate to the problems of German unification (1991-93). Thus, only in 1975, the first year of targeting, did money growth and inflation both exceed their target values.

Germany did not experience the degree of instability in relationships between targeted money aggregates, price level and income that a number of other countries did (for example, the U.S. and the U.K.). One substantial reason for this is that from the outset monetary policy did not rely on highly distorting measures of direct control such as interest rate controls, credit controls, etc. The German emphasis on reserve requirement ratios and rediscount quotas caused much less evasive behaviour from financial institutions and markets. In the U.S. and U.K. monetary targeting regimes coincided with the abolishment of various direct controls which complicated monetary policy greatly.

The monetary targeting framework continued until 1998, when, as of 1 January 1999, the European Central Bank assumed responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro area.

Bundesbank: Legislation, decision-making, transparency

In July 1957 the Deutsche Bundesbank (DBB) succeeded the Bank deutscher Länder, which was established by the western Allies on March 1, 1948 to execute a currency reform. The DBB is a public institution, whose capital is owned by the Federal Government. The Deutsche Bundesbank Act (Gesetz über die Deutsche Bundesbank) of 1957 determined that safeguarding the currency is the fundamental task of the central bank. The Act also required the DBB to support the general economic policy of the government, with two qualifications: a) the support ends when its own goal (price stability) is in danger, and b) the DB decisions are to be made independent of the government. Some observers have stated that the DBB was also subject to 1967 Stability and Growth Law (Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft). This law required all public institutions to contribute to economic stability.

DBB and the government were required to consult each other with respect to substantial monetary matters. Meetings of the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank could be attended by members of the government, who had no right to vote, but could propose motions. More importantly, decisions of the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank can be deferred, at the request of members of the government, by up to two weeks. Such a request to delay Council decisions has as yet never been resorted to.

The supreme policy-making body of the Deutsche Bundesbank was the Central Bank Council, composed of the President and Vice-President of the Bundesbank, the other members of the Bundesbank Directorate (max. 6), and the Presidents of the Land Central Banks. The Central Bank Council generally met every two weeks, usually Thursday. Decisions on discount rate, lombard rate changes and securities repurchase transactions were announced immediately following these meetings, usually during the morning. There was not a definite target value for the money market (day-to-day) rate, although in practice, from February 1985 the day-to-day market rate closely followed the repurchase rate and before 1985 the day-to-day rate closely followed the (Special) Lombard rate.

HISTORICAL DATA, TABLES, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Historical interest rate data

Below is a selective survey of key current and historical market interest rates and official interest rates.

PR = policy rate, indicator of policy stance and changes; SF = standing facilities (SF1 lending, SF2 depositing) available to banks and to be used on their initiative; OMO = open market operations or interbank interventions used bythe central bank on its own initiative.

Table Presidents of the Deutsche Bundesbank (and its predecessor)

Bank deutsche Lander

Karl Bernard (Zentralbankrat)

Wilhelm Vocke (Directorium)

Deutsche Bundesbank

Karl Bernard / Wilhelm Vocke

Karl Blessing

Karl Klasen

Otmar Emminger

Karl Otto Pohl

Helmut Schlesinger

Hans Tietmeyer

Ernst Welteke

Tenure

20 May 1948 - 31 Jul 1957

01 Jun 1948 - 30 Jul 1957


01 Aug 1957 - 31 Dec 1957

01 Jan 1958 - 31 Dec 1969

01 Jan 1970 - 31 May 1977

01 Jun 1977 - 31 Dec 1979

01 Jan 1980 - 31 Jul 1991

01 Aug 1991 - 30 Sep 1993

01 Oct 1993 - 31 Aug 1999

01 Sep 1999 -16 Apr 2004

Table Exchange rate official/informal targets

Effective date parity rate / central rate comment

U.S. dollar (1USD= ...)

Bretton Woods / IMF (IMF member since 27Dec1945, Article VIII 15Feb1961)

21Jun1948 3.33333

18Sep1949 4.20000 20.6% devaluation DM

06Mar1961 4.00000 5% revaluation DM

27Oct1969 3.66000 9.3% revaluation DM

Smithsonian Agreement

21Dec1971 3.22250 new central rate

14Feb1973 2.90030 10% devaluation US dollar

19Mar1973 EEC countries float against the USD

Dmark (100DM= ...)

European 'snake' currency arrangement

19Mar1973 3% revaluation DM (ie 1USD=2.81580DM)

European Monetary System

13Mar1979

Note: 15Aug1971 Nixon announces closure of U.S. "gold window". 18Dec1971 signing of Smithsonian Agreement: USD to devalue from $35 to $38 per ounce gold (7.9% devaluation) and in addition some countries revalue against the USD (overall appr. 10% devaluation of USD). Most markets kept closed Mo 20Dec1971, effective date Tue 21Dec1971. 12Feb1973 US Treasury announces USD devaluation to $42.22 per ounce gold (10% devaluation).

Note: From 10May1971 DBB withdrew its official dollar buy and sell rates. Bundesbank stopped buying USD from 02Mar1973.

Note: Under Bretton Woods system currencies were allowed to move within a band of 1% above/below the parity rate, but in practice important countries maintained a band of 3/4%.

Note: From 12Feb1973 currency markets were closed for several days (dollar crisis). From 02 through 16Mar1973 currency markets were again closed.

Note: The Basle Accord of 10Apr1972 created the European currency snake, starting 24Apr1972. From 19Mar1973 the European currencies float against the USD.

Note: The EMS started 13Mar1979 and its official reference rate was the Ecu, but in practice the Dmark was the major currency. Currencies allowed to move within a band of 2.25% above/below the Ecu rate, or 1.125% for all bilateral currency rates. [Some currencies had a 6% margin].

Table Intermediate targets Germany

Money growth and target CBMS for 1975 through 1987, M3 from 1988.

Complementary Q4-Q4 targets for 1977: 6-7%, for 1978: 5-7%. Between 1996Q4-1998Q4 additional two-year target of 5% money growth.

Actual outcomes are from data available at the end of the target period to avoid subsequent data revisions. Actual inflation is the annual-annual percentage increase in cost of living index all households and CPI all households. West Germany through 1994 and Germany from 1995.

Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, Annual Report;

Values on targeted or projected inflation reported by Bernanke/Mihov (1996, Table 3), with some corrections.

Values on normative inflation, potential output and velocity assumptions reported by Bofinger (2001, Table 8.1); with some corrections. Note: DBB initially added expected change in output gap (or capacity utilization) to the underlying potential output growth rate. For 1976 expected output growth: 2.5+2=4.5%, for 1977 3+2=5%, for 1978 3+0.5=3.5%.

NOTE: DBB AR1995 p.71 with respect to setting monetary target for 1996. "The medium-term price assumption was set - in line with the Bundesbank's pratice since the mid-eighties - at a maximum of 2%.... Moreover, the 2% norm should definitely be regarded as an upper limit, and not by any means as a short-term target in the event of the actual rate of inflation being lower. [Note: GDP deflator used in formula tends to increase somewhat faster than the cost-of-living index, which is actual target.]

Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank, http://www.bundesbank.de/stat/zeitreihen

DBB, The Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank 1994, 1995. DBB, Monthly Bulletin. DBB, Annual Report, Record of economic policy measures.

Deutsche Bundesbank Bundesbank Homepage

Central Bank

Monetary policy tactics

Monetary policy strategy

  • DBB, Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank, October 1995 (German only)
    • Von Hagen, J., Money growth targeting by the Bundesbank, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. () 1999:
    • Von Hagen, J., Inflation and monetary targeting in Germany, 1995
    • Neumann, M.J.M., Monetary targeting in Germany, 1996