Glossary
Across-the-board approach: The approach to assessing permissibility whereby normative principles are applied directly to minimal acts, maximal sets of acts, and everything in between. (Contrast top-down approach and bottom-up approach.)
Act: Something that an agent does because she intends to do it.
Act alternative: See alternative act.
Act-consequentialism (AC): The view that an act’s deontic status is determined by the agent’s reasons for and against preferring its outcome to those of the available alternatives, such that, if S is morally required to perform x, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about, S has most (indeed, decisive) reason to desire that x’s outcome obtains. (Contrast personal value teleology and impersonal value teleology.)
Act-set: A set of one or more acts that are all jointly performable by a single agent.
Act-token: A particular act performed by a particular agent at a particular time. (Contrast act-type.)
Act-type: A universal that can, in general, be instantiated by a number of distinct act-tokens. (Contrast act-token.)
Actualism: The view that it is, as of ti, objectively (morally or rationally) permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, the maximal set of actions that S would actually perform were S to perform αj is no worse than the maximal set of actions that S would actually perform were S not to perform αj. (Contrast securitism and possibilism.)
Agent-centered constraint: A constraint on maximizing the good that it would be wrong to infringe upon even in some circumstances in which doing so would minimize comparable infringements of that constraint. Examples include special obligations and agent-centered restrictions.
Agent-centered option: A moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for oneself (or others) or to act so as to make things better for oneself (or others) but worse overall. Examples include agent-favoring options and agent-sacrificing options.
Agent-centered restriction: A type of agent-centered constraint that prohibits agents from performing certain act-types (such as murder) even in some circumstances in which performing the given act-type is the only way to minimize comparable performances of that act-type. (See also special obligation.)
Agent-favoring option: A type of agent-centered option that provides one with a moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for oneself or to act so as to make things better for oneself but worse overall. (Contrast agent-sacrificing option.)
Agent-identical: Having the same agent.
Agent-sacrificing option: A type of agent-centered option that provides one with a moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for others or to act so as to make things better for others but worse overall. (Contrast agent-favoring option.)
Agglomeration Principle (PAC): The principle according to which permissibility agglomerates over conjunction, such that: [P(S, ti, x1), P(S, ti, x2), . . . , & P(S, ti, xn)] → P[S, ti, (x1, x2, . . . , & xn)], where “P(S, ti, xi)” stands for “S is, as of ti, permitted to perform xi.” (Contrast distribution principle.)
Aggregate utility of an act: The sum of all the utility it produces minus the sum of all the disutility it produces.
Alternative acts: Acts that are agent-identical, time-identical, mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive.
Asymmetric relation: A relation, R, is asymmetric just in case: if xRy, then ~yRx.
Available: That which is a relevant option. Possibilities for what constitutes a relevant option include: that which is securable by the agent, that which is scrupulously securable by the agent, and that which is personally possible for the agent.
Basic belief: The belief that, in most typical choice situations, the relevant reasons do not require performing one particular alternative, but instead permit performing any of numerous alternatives.
Best alternative: See optimific alternative.
Better for: For all subjects S and all states of affairs p and q, it is better for S that p is the case than that q is the case if and only if the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer, for S’s sake, its being the case that p to its being the case that q is weightier than the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer, for S’s sake, its being the case that q to its being the case that p (Schroeder 2008b).
Better that: For all states of affairs p and q, it is better that p is the case than that q is the case if and only if the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer its being the case that p to its being the case that q is weightier than the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer its being the case that q to its being the case that p (Schroeder 2008b).
Blameworthy: Being worthy of moral blame. S is blameworthy for performing x if and only if it is appropriate (i.e., fitting) for S to feel guilt about having performed x and appropriate for others to feel indignation in response to S’s having performed x and, if they were thereby wronged, also to resent S for having performed x.
Bottom-up approach: The approach to assessing permissibility whereby normative principles are applied only to minimal acts and the agglomeration principle is used to assess the permissibility of non-minimal acts. (Contrast top-down approach and across-the-board approach; see also agglomeration principle.)
Carries out: S carries out an intention to perform αi if and only if S performs αi.
Commonsense consequentialism (CSC*): The view according to which all the following are true: (a) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, that involves S’s performing αj; (b) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, if and only if, and because, MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; (c) MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, MSAi’s prospect is not, on S’s ti-relative evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; and (d) MSAi’s prospect is not, on S’s ti-relative evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, there is no alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S whose prospect S has at ti both more requiring reason and more reason, all things considered, to desire. (See also prospect and more reason to desire.)
Commonsense utilitarianism (CSU): The view according to which all the following are true: (a) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, that involves S’s performing αj; (b) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, if and only if, and because, MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; (c) MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, MSAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; and (d) MSAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, there is no alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S whose outcome contains both more constraint-adjusted utility and more comprehensively adjusted utility than MSAi’s outcome does. (See also constraint-adjusted utility and comprehensively adjusted utility.)
Compound act: An act that has two or more simpler acts as parts. Examples include (1) assembling a model airplane and (2) chewing gum while walking. (Contrast minimal act.)
Comprehensively adjusted utility: The sum of the constraint-adjusted utility added to the product of S’s utility times ten. (See also constraint-adjusted utility.)
Consequentialism: See act-consequentialism.
Consequentialist prudence: The view that S’s performing x is prudent if and only if S’s performing x would maximize S’s utility.
Consequentialize: To construct a substantive version of consequentialism that is deontically equivalent to some nonconsequentialist theory. (See also deontically equivalent.)
Constraining right: A potential victim, V, has a constraining right against being φ-ed (e.g., murdered) if and only if V has a right not to be φ-ed even in some circumstances in which the agent’s φ-ing V would minimize comparable commissions of φ by herself or others.
Constraint: See agent-centered constraint.
Constraint-adjusted utility: The sum of the utility for others, adjusted by multiplying any disutility (or loss of utility) resulting from S’s infringements of any agent-centered constraints by five hundred.
Counterfactual determinism: The view that, for any event e (including actions, sets of actions, and the formations of intentions), there is some determinate fact as to what the world would be like if e were to occur.
Decisive moral reason: S has decisive moral reason to φ if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make S objectively morally required to φ. (Contrast sufficient moral reason.)
Decisive reason: S has decisive reason to φ if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make S objectively rationally required to φ. (Contrast sufficient reason.)
Defeat: To say that the reasons that favor φ-ing defeat the reasons that favor ~φ-ing is to say that the reasons that favor φ-ing prevail over the reasons that favor ~φ-ing, such that the agent has decisive reason to φ. (Contrast successfully counter.)
Deontic equivalence thesis (DET): The thesis that, for any remotely plausible nonconsequentialist theory, there is a substantive version of consequentialism that is deontically equivalent to it.
Deontic moral value: A measure of how much (objective) moral reason there is to perform an act.
Deontic status: All acts have one of the following two deontic statuses: (1) permissible or (2) impermissible. Additionally, all permissible acts have one of the following two deontic statuses: (a) optional or (b) obligatory. And all optional acts have one of the following two deontic statuses: (i) merely permissible or (ii) supererogatory.
Deontic value: A measure of how much (objective) reason there is to perform an act.
Deontically equivalent: Two theories are deontically equivalent if and only if they agree about the deontic status of every (actual or possible) act. That is, for any deontic predicate (such as, permissible, impermissible, optional, obligatory, or supererogatory), both theories are in perfect agreement as to the set of actions that are in the extension of that predicate.
Deontological theory: A nonconsequentialist moral theory that includes at least one agent-centered constraint.
Direct consequentialism: The view that the deontic status of an individual action is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking of outcomes. An example is act-consequentialism. (Contrast indirect consequentialism.)
Distribution principle (PDC): The principle according to which permissibility distributes over conjunction, such that: P[S, ti, (x1, x2, . . . , & xn)] → [P(S, ti, x1), P(S, ti, x2), . . . , & P(S, ti, xn)], where “P(S, ti, xi)” stands for “S is, as of ti, permitted to perform xi.” (Contrast agglomeration principle.)
Disutility: A measure of whatever it is that diminishes a subject’s welfare. (Contrast utility.)
Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC): The view that S’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and because, there is no available alternative that would produce an outcome that S has both more moral reason and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain than to want x’s outcome to obtain.
Effectively intend: S can at ti effectively intend to do x at tj (ti < tj) if and only if S would do x at tj if S were to intend at ti to do x at tj.
Egoism: See ethical egoism.
Egoistically adjusted utility: That which includes everyone’s utility but adjusts the overall total by giving S’s utility, say, ten times the weight of anyone else’s.
Ethical egoism: The view both (1) that act-consequentialism is true and (2) that an act produces an outcome that S has optimal reason to want to obtain if and only if it maximizes S’s utility. (Contrast rational egoism.)
Evaluative ranking: A ranking of outcomes (or prospects) in terms of the agent’s reasons (or some subset of her reasons—e.g., her moral reasons) for preferring each to the others.
Expectably best: That which has the highest expected deontic value.
Expectably morally best: That which has the highest expected deontic moral value.
Expected deontic moral value: That which is determined by multiplying the subjective probability that some practical moral comparative is true by the deontic moral value of that action if it is true, doing the same for all of the other practical moral comparatives, and adding up the results (Sepielli 2009, pp. 7 and 11). (See also practical moral comparatives.)
Expected deontic value: That which is determined “by multiplying the subjective probability that some practical comparative is true by the objective [i.e., deontic] value of that action if it is true, doing the same for all of the other practical comparatives, and adding up the results” (Sepielli 2009, pp. 7 and 11). (See also practical comparatives.)
Explanatory reasons for action: The facts that explain why an agent performed an act. Examples include motivating reasons for action. (Contrast normative reasons for action.)
Fittingness reasons: Those reasons that are relevant to determining whether, and to what extent, an outcome is valuable/desirable (i.e., fitting to value/desire).
Follows: S’s intentions follow a certain schedule of intentions, I, extending over a time-interval, T, just in case, for every time ti belonging to T, S has at ti all and only the intentions that I specifies for ti (J. Ross Forthcoming).
Freely performs: S freely performs x if and only if S performs x having the relevant sort of control over whether or not she performs x—that is, the sort of control that is necessary for her being an appropriate candidate for praise or blame with respect to her having performed x.
Good: A state of affairs, p, is good if and only if it is better than most of the states of affairs in some contextually supplied comparison class (Schroeder 2008b).
Good for: A state of affairs, p, is good for a subject, S, if and only if it is better for S than most of the states of affairs in some contextually supplied comparison class (Schroeder 2008b).
Imperfect reasons: Reasons that do not support performing any specific alternative, but instead support performing any of the alternatives that would each constitute an equally effective means of achieving the same worthy end.
Impermissible: That which is not permissible.
Impersonal-value teleology: The view an act’s deontic status is determined by the impersonal value of its outcome, such that, if S is morally required to perform x, then S’s performing x would produce the most good, impersonally construed. (Contrast act-consequentialism and personal-value teleology.)
Indirect consequentialism: The view that the deontic status of an individual action is determined by whether or not it, say, accords with the ideal set of rules (rule-consequentialism), stems from the ideal set of motives (motive consequentialism), or is included in one of the MSAs in the ideal set of scrupulously securable MSAs (securitist consequentialism), where the ideal set of rules, motives, or scrupulously securable MSAs is in turn selected on the basis how their associated outcomes rank relative to those of the alternatives on some evaluative ranking. (Contrast direct consequentialism.)
Infringement: If there is a constraint against performing a certain act-type, then any commission of an act of that type constitutes an infringement of that constraint. (Contrast violation.)
Inter-agent cases: Cases in which the agent can, by infringing upon a set of constraints, C1, prevent more numerous others from comparably infringing upon C1.
Intra-agent cases: Cases in which the agent can, by infringing upon a set of constraints, C1, prevent herself from more extensively infringing upon C1.
Involves: S’s φ-ing involves S’s ψ-ing just in case it follows from S’s φ-ing that S ψs, in the sense that, necessarily, if S φs then S ψs (J. Ross Forthcoming).
Judgment-sensitive attitude: An attitude that is sensitive to one’s judgments about reasons for and against it.
Knowledgeably performs: S knowledgeably performs x if and only if S performs x knowing all the relevant facts—the relevant facts being the facts the ignorance of which would otherwise either inculpate or exculpate S for performing x.
Maximal set of actions (MSA): A set of actions, αj, that is, as of ti, available to S (i.e., available either in the sense of being personally possible for S or in the sense of being scrupulously securable by S) is a maximal set of actions if and only if there is no other set of actions, αi, that is, as of ti, available to S such that performing αi involves performing αj but not vice versa.
Maximizes: S’s φ-ing maximizes X if and only if there is no available alternative that would produce more X than φ would.
Maximizing act-utilitarianism (MAU): The view both (1) that traditional act-consequentialism is true and (2) that an act maximizes the good if and only if it maximizes aggregate utility.
Maximizing possibilist utilitarianism (MPU): The view according to which all the following are true: (a) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, that involves S’s performing αj; (b) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, if and only if, and because, MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, personally possible for S; (c) MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, personally possible for S if and only if, and because, MSAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, personally possible for S; and (d) MSAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, personally possible for S if and only if, and because, there is no alternative MSA that is, as of ti, personally possible for S whose outcome contains more aggregate utility than MSAi’s outcome does.
Maximizing securitist utilitarianism (MSU): The view according to which all the following are true: (a) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, that involves S’s performing αj; (b) it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, if and only if, and because, MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; (c) MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, MSAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; and (d) MSAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, there is no alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S whose outcome contains more aggregate utility than MSAi’s outcome does.
Merely permissible: That which is optional but not supererogatory.
Merely sufficient reason: S has merely sufficient reason to φ if and only if S has sufficient, but not decisive, reason to φ—that is, if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make it both objectively rationally permissible for S to φ and objectively rationally permissible for S not to φ. (Contrast decisive reason and sufficient reason.)
Meta-criterion of rightness: A criterion that provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for an act’s being morally permissible in terms of both moral and non-moral reasons.
Minimal act: An act that, once begun, cannot be stopped by its agent short of completion. Examples include all instantaneous actions, such as placing a bet, as well as some non-instantaneous actions, such as beheading by guillotine (J. H. Sobel 1976, p. 198). (Contrast compound act.)
Minimally fulfills: In φ-ing, S does thereby only minimally fulfill some positive duty, D, if and only if S’s φ-ing fulfills D and there is no more moral reason for S to φ than to do anything else that would fulfill D. (See also positive duty.)
Modified Schefflerian utilitarianism (ModSU): The view according to which all the following hold: (1) dual-ranking act-consequentialism is true; (2) S has more moral reason to want oi to obtain than to want oj (j ≠ i) to obtain if and only if oi contains more constraint-adjusted utility than oj does; and (3) S has more reason, all things considered, to want oi to obtain than to want oj to obtain if and only if oi contains more comprehensively adjusted utility than oj does.
Moral dilemma: A situation in which there is no way for an agent to satisfy the dictates of morality (Vallentyne 1989, p. 301). Examples include obligation dilemmas and prohibition dilemmas.
Moral enticer: See morally enticing reason.
Moral justifying strength: One reason, R1, has more moral justifying strength than another, R2, if and only if both (i) R1 would make it morally permissible to do anything that R2 would make it morally permissible to do and (ii) R1 would make it morally permissible do some things that R2 would not make it morally permissible to do. (Contrast moral requiring strength.)
Moral option: An instance in which an agent is morally permitted to perform more than one alternative.
Moral rationalism (MR*): The deontic status of αj is determined by the agent’s reasons for and against performing αj, such that, if S is, as of ti, morally required to perform αj, then S has at ti most (indeed, decisive) reason, all things considered, to perform αj.
Moral reason: A reason that, morally speaking, counts in favor of an agent’s φ-ing. Such a reason would, if unopposed and sufficiently weighty, be capable of making φ either morally obligatory or morally supererogatory. (Contrast morally relevant reason.)
Moral requiring strength: One reason, R1, has more moral requiring strength than another, R2, if and only if both (i) R1 would make it morally impermissible to do anything that R2 would make it morally impermissible to do and (ii) R1 would make it morally impermissible do some things that R2 would not make it morally impermissible to do. (Contrast moral justifying strength.)
Moral securitism (MS): The view that it is, as of ti, objectively morally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, at least one of the objectively morally permissible maximal sets of actions that are, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S involves S’s performing αj. (Contrast securitism.)
Morally best alternative: The alternative that the agent has most moral reason to perform. (Contrast optimific alternative.)
Morally blameworthy: See blameworthy.
Morally enticing reason: A reason that, morally speaking, counts in favor of φ-ing but that does not have any moral requiring strength. (Contrast requiring reason.)
Morally overriding: Moral reasons are morally overriding if and only if, for all y, S would not be morally permitted to perform y if there were some x (x ≠ y) that S had more moral reason to perform. (Contrast rationally overriding.)
Morally relevant reason: Any reason that is relevant to determining an act’s deontic status. Examples include moral reasons as well as any non-moral reasons that have some moral justifying strength. (Contrast moral reason.)
More reason to desire: S has at ti more (requiring) reason to desire the prospect of her performing α1 (viz., p1) than to desire the prospect of her performing α2 (viz., p2) if and only if ∑i[Pr(oi/α1) × Ds-t(oi)] is greater than ∑i[Pr(oi/α2) × Ds-t(oi)], where αi is some set of actions, Pr(oi/αi) is the objective probability of oi’s obtaining given S’s performance of αi, and Ds-t(oi) is the S-relative ti-relative desirability value of oi, which is just a measure of how much (requiring) reason S has at ti to desire that oi obtains. [But see "Errata" for how this should be corrected.]
More requiring reason: “S has more requiring reason to φ than to ψ (ψ ≠ φ)” is short for “the set of all the reasons that S has to φ has greater moral requiring strength than the set of all the reasons that S has to ψ (ψ ≠ φ).”
Most reason: See optimific reason.
Motivating reasons for action: The facts that motivated an agent to perform an act—that is, the facts that the agent took to be her reasons for performing the act. These are a subclass of explanatory reasons for action. (Contrast normative reasons for action.)
Motive consequentialism: The view that the deontic status of an action is determined by whether or not it stems from the ideal set of motives, where the ideal set of motives is in turn selected on the basis how their associated outcomes rank relative to those of the alternatives on some evaluative ranking.
Multiple-option case: A case in which there is optimal reason to achieve some end and more than one equally attractive means to achieving that end.
Murder: The act of intentionally killing an innocent person.
Negative act: The intentional omission of some physical act. (Contrast positive act.)
Negative duty: A duty that can be fulfilled only by refraining from performing some set of actions. (Contrast positive duty.)
Nonconsequentialism: A moral theory that is not act-consequentialist. An example is rule-consequentialism.
Non-moral reason: A reason that is not a moral reason. (Contrast moral reason.)
Non-requiring reason: A reason that has absolutely no moral requiring strength. (Contrast requiring reason.)
Normative reasons for action: A fact that counts in favor of an agent’s performing an action. (Contrast explanatory reasons for action and motivating reasons for action.)
Objective ought: S objectively ought to perform x if and only if performing x is what a normatively conscientious person would do if she faced S’s choice of alternatives and was aware of all the relevant reason-constituting facts. In other words, S objectively ought to perform some alternative if and only if it is the best alternative—the alternative that she has most reason to perform. (Contrast subjective ought.)
Objective rationality: The objective rational status of an act is purely a function of the (objective) reasons there are for and against performing it, irrespective of whether or not the agent is aware of them. (Contrast subjective rationality.)
Objective reason: See reason.
Objectively morally impermissible: That which there is decisive moral reason to refrain from.
Objectively morally permissible: That which is not objectively morally impermissible.
Objectively rationally impermissible: That which there is decisive reason to refrain from.
Objectively rationally permissible: That which is not objectively rationally impermissible. (See also objective rationality.)
Obligation dilemma: A moral dilemma in which two or more of the agent’s positive act alternatives are obligatory. (Contrast prohibition dilemma.)
Obligatory: That which is the only permissible available alternative.
Optimal alternative: The alternative, φ, is optimal if and only if there is optimal reason to perform φ. (Contrast optimific alternative.)
Optimal reason: S has optimal reason to φ if and only if there is no alternative, ψ, such that S has more reason to ψ than to φ. (Contrast optimific reason.)
Optimific alternative: The alternative, φ, is optimific (or best) if and only if there is optimific reason to perform φ. (Contrast optimal alternative.)
Optimific reason: S has optimific (or most) reason to φ if and only if S has more reason to perform φ than to perform any other available alternative. (Contrast optimal reason.)
Optional: That which one is permitted both to perform and to refrain from performing.
Outcome: The outcome associated with S’s φ-ing is the outcome that would obtain were S to φ—that is, the possible world that would be actual were S to φ.
Overridingness: To say that one type of reason, say, m-reasons, overrides another, say, n-reasons, with respect to a certain kind of normative status, N, is to say that, in any situation in which both types of reasons are present and an act, x, has a certain N-status, no modification of the situation that involves affecting only what n-reasons there are will change x’s N-status. That is, if m-reasons override n-reasons with respect to an act’s N-status, then even the weakest m-reason overrides the strongest n-reason in the determination of that act’s N-status.
Partially fulfills: In φ-ing, S does thereby only partially fulfill some positive duty, D, if and only if S’s φ-ing is a proper subset of some set of actions by which S minimally fulfills D. (See also minimally fulfills and positive duty.)
Performs a set of actions: S performs a set of actions, αj, if and only if S performs every act in that set.
Permissible: That which is not impermissible, or, in other words, that which one is not obligated to refrain from.
Personal-value teleology: The view that an act’s deontic status is determined by the personal value of its outcome, such that, if S is morally required to perform x, then S’s performing x would produce the most good for S. (Contrast impersonal-value teleology and act-consequentialism.)
Personally possible: A set of actions, αj, is, as of ti, personally possible for S if and only if there is some schedule of intentions, I, extending over a time-interval, T,beginning at ti such that the following are all true: (a) if S’s intentions followed schedule, I, then S would carry out all the intentions in I; (b) S’s carrying out all the intentions in I would involve S’s performing αj; (c) S has just before ti the capacity to continue, or to come, to have the intentions that I specifies for ti; and (d) for any time tj in T after ti (ti < tj), if S’s intentions followed I up until tj, then S would have just before tj the capacity to continue, or to come, to have the intentions that I specifies for tj (J. Ross Forthcoming). (Contrast securable and scrupulously securable; see also follows, involves, carries out, and schedule of intentions.)
Plan: An intention to perform some act or set of actions in the future. For instance, one might plan to spend tomorrow morning playing golf.
Policy: An intention to perform a certain kind of action in certain potentially recurring situations—for example, to buckling up one’s seat belt when one drives (Bratman 2007, p. 27).
Positive act: The intentional performance of some physical act. (Contrast negative act.)
Positive duty: A duty that can be fulfilled only by performing some set of actions. (Contrast negative duty.)
Possibilism: The view that it is, as of ti, objectively (morally or rationally) permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, at least one of the optimal maximal sets of actions that is, as of ti, personally possible for S involves S’s performing αj. (Contrast actualism and securitism.)
Practical comparative: Anything of the form: the balance of reasons favors S’s doing x as opposed to y.
Practical moral comparative: Anything of the form: the balance of moral reasons favors S’s doing x as opposed to y.
Pragmatic reasons for S to φ: Reasons that are provided by facts about the consequences of S’s φ-ing.
Present deliberative control: S’s φ-ing at some later time is under S’s present deliberative control if and only if whether S φs at that later time depends on the immediate outcome of S’s present deliberations—that is, depends on which attitudes she forms directly in response to her present deliberations.
Principle of normative invariance: The view that an act’s deontic status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.
Prohibition dilemma: A moral dilemma in which all of the agent’s positive act alternatives are impermissible. (Contrast obligation dilemma.)
Proper subset: One set of actions, αj, is a proper subset of another, αi, if and only if every element in αj is also an element in αi but not every element in αi is an element in αj—that is, if and only if αj Ì αi.
Prospect: The prospect of S’s performing some set of actions, αi, is a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes associated with S’s performing αi. (See also more reason to desire.)
Rational control: S has rational control over whether or not she φs only if both (1) she has the capacity to recognize and assess the relevant reasons and (2) her φ-ing is at least moderately responsive to her assessments concerning these reasons. (Contrast volitional control.)
Rational-desire teleology: See act-consequentialism.
Rational egoism: The view that S has sufficient reason to perform x if and only if, and because, S’s performing x would maximize S’s utility. (Contrast ethical egoism.)
Rational justifying strength: A reason, R1, has more rational justifying strength than another, R2, if and only if both (i) R1 would make it rationally permissible to do anything that R2 would make it rationally permissible to do and (ii) R1 would make it rationally permissible do some things that R2 would not make it rationally permissible to do. (Contrast rational requiring strength.)
Rational requiring strength: One reason, R1, has more rational requiring strength than another, R2, if and only if both (i) R1 would make it rationally impermissible to do anything that R2 would make it rationally impermissible to do and (ii) R1 would make it rationally impermissible do some things that R2 would not make it rationally impermissible to do. (Contrast rational justifying strength.)
Rational securitism: See securitism.
Rationally overriding: Moral reasons are rationally overriding if and only if, for all y, S would not be rationally permitted to perform y if there were some x (x ≠ y) that S had more moral reason to perform. (Contrast morally overriding.)
Reason: There is a reason for S to φ if and only if there is some fact that counts in favor of S’s φ-ing, where φ is some judgment-sensitive attitude.
Reasons for action: See normative reasons for action.
Requiring reason: A reason that has some moral requiring strength. (Contrast non-requiring reason.)
Resolution: An intention that one has resolved not to reconsider even in the face of anticipated temptation to do so. On one plausible view, a resolution involves both a first-order intention to perform a certain action and a second-order intention not to let that first-order intention be deflected by anticipated contrary inclinations—see Holton 2009, pp. 11–12.
Restrictions: See agent-centered restrictions.
Rule-consequentialism: The view that the deontic status of an action is determined by whether or not it accords with the ideal set of rules, where the ideal set of rules is in turn selected on the basis how their associated outcomes rank relative to those of the alternatives on some evaluative ranking.
Schedule of intentions extending over a time-interval, T: A function from times in T to sets of intentions (J. Ross Forthcoming).
Schefflerian utilitarianism (SU): The view according to which all the following hold: (1) dual-ranking act-consequentialism is true; (2) S has more moral reason to want oi to obtain than to want oj (j ≠ i) to obtain if and only if oi contains more utility for others (i.e., for those other than S) than oj does; and (3) S has more reason, all things considered, to want oi to obtain than to want oj to obtain if and only if oi contains more egoistically adjusted utility than oj does. (See also egoistically adjusted utility.)
Scrupulously securable: A set of actions, αj, is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if there is a time, tj, that either immediately follows ti or is identical to ti, a set of actions, αi (where αi may, or may not, be identical to αj), and a set of background attitudes, B, such that the following are all true: (1) S would perform αj if S were to have at tj both B and the intention to perform αi; (2) S has at ti the capacity to continue, or to come, to have at tj both B and the intention to perform αi; and (3) S would continue, or come, to have at tj B (and, where αi is not identical to αj, the intention to perform αi as well) if S both were at ti aware of all the relevant reason-constituting facts and were at tj to respond to these facts/reasons in all and only the ways that they prescribe, thereby coming to have at tj all those attitudes that she has, given these facts, decisive reason to have and only those attitudes that she has, given these facts, sufficient reason to have. (Contrast securable and personally possible.)
Securable: A set of actions, αj, is, as of ti, securable by S if and only if there is a time, tj, that either immediately follows ti or is identical to ti, a set of actions, αi (where αi may, or may not, be identical to αj), and a set of background attitudes, B, such that the following are all true: (1) S would perform αj if S were to have at tj both B and the intention to perform αi; and (2) S has at ti the capacity to continue, or to come, to have at tj both B and the intention to perform αi. (Contrast personally possible and scrupulously securable.)
Securitism (Sec): The view that it is, as of ti, objectively rationally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, at least one of the objectively rationally permissible maximal sets of actions that are, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S involves S’s performing αj. (Contrast actualism, possibilism, and moral securitism.)
Securitist consequentialism (SC): The view that the deontic status of a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) is determined by the reasons there are for and against the agent’s preferring certain outcomes to others, such that, if S is, as of ti, morally required to perform αj, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about by performing some MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S, S has most reason to desire some subset of those that would result from S’s performing an MSA that involves S’s performing αj. (Contrast act-consequentialism.)
Self-other asymmetry: Whereas the fact that S’s performing x would further S’s self-interest does not constitute a moral reason for S to perform x, the fact that S’s performing x would further someone else’s self-interest does constitute a moral reason for S to perform x.
Self-other utilitarianism: The view that S’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if there is no available act alternative that would produce both more utility for others and more overall utility than x would.
Set of actions: See act-set.
Simple act: See minimal act.
Special obligations: Obligations that are specific to individuals given their particular relationships and history. Examples include obligations arising out of past acts (e.g., the obligation to keep one’s promises) as well as the obligations that come with occupying certain roles (e.g., professional and familial obligations). A special obligation is a type of agent-centered constraint. Thus, there is a special obligation to perform a certain act-type (e.g., a special obligation to save one’s own child) if and only if agents are required to perform that act-type even in some circumstances in which their failing to perform that act-type is the only way to minimize comparable failures to perform that act-type.
Subjective ought: S subjectively ought to perform x if and only if performing x is what a normatively conscientious person would do if she were in the exact same situation that S is in, facing S’s choice of alternatives and all the normative and non-normative uncertainty that goes along with being in S’s epistemic position. (Contrast objective ought.)
Subjective rationality: On Parfit’s view, an act is subjectively irrational if and only if the agent has beliefs whose truth would give her decisive reasons not to perform the act. And when the agent has inconsistent beliefs, the act will be subjectively rational relative to some beliefs but subjectively irrational relative to others (Parfit 2011, pp. 112–113). On Gert’s view, an act is subjectively irrational if and only if it indicates some failure in the practical mental functioning of the agent (Gert 2004, p. 160). (Contrast objective rationality.)
Successfully counter: To say that the reasons to φ successfully counter the reasons to ψ (ψ ≠ φ) is to say that the reasons to φ prevent the reasons to ψ from being decisive by, say, equaling, outweighing, undermining, or silencing them. Another possibility is that the reasons to φ are incommensurable with the reasons to ψ such that there is sufficient reason both to φ and to ψ. (Contrast defeat.)
Sufficient moral reason: S has sufficient moral reason to φ if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make S objectively morally permitted to φ. (Contrast decisive moral reason.)
Sufficient reason: S has sufficient reason to φ if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make S objectively rationally permitted to φ. In other words, S has sufficient reason to φ if and only if S does not have decisive reason to refrain from φ-ing. (Contrast decisive reason and merely sufficient reason.)
Sufficient requiring reason: A reason that has sufficient moral requiring strength to generate, absent countervailing reasons, a moral requirement to perform the act of which it counts in favor.
Supererogatory: S’s φ-ing is supererogatory if and only if, in φ-ing, S goes above and beyond the call of both perfect and imperfect duty—that is, if and only if, in φ-ing, S does more than duty requires. (Contrast superperfecterogatory.)
Superperfecterogatory: S’s φ-ing is superperfecterogatory if and only if, in φ-ing, S goes above and beyond the call of perfect duty—that is, if and only if, in φ-ing, S does more than perfect duty requires. (Contrast supererogatory.)
Teleological conception of (practical) reasons (TCR*): An agent’s reasons for and against performing αj are determined by her reasons for and against preferring certain outcomes to others, such that S has at ti more reason to perform ai than to perform aj just when, and because, S has at ti more reason to desire pi than to desire pj, where pi and pj are the prospects of ai and aj, respectively.
Teleological maximizing securitism (TMS): The view according to which all the following are true: (a) it is, as of ti, objectively rationally permissible for S to perform a non-maximal set of actions, αj, beginning at tj (ti < tj) if and only if, and because, it is, as of ti, objectively rationally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, that involves S’s performing αj; (b) it is, as of ti, objectively rationally permissible for S to perform a maximal set of actions, MSAi, if and only if, and because, MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; (c) MSAi is one of the optimal MSAs that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, MSAi’s prospect is not, on S’s ti-relative evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S; and (d) MSAi’s prospect is not, on S’s ti-relative evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S if and only if, and because, there is no alternative MSA that is, as of ti, scrupulously securable by S whose prospect S has at ti more reason, all things considered, to desire. (See also prospect and more reason to desire.)
Time-identical: Persisting over the exact same interval (or intervals) of time.
Top-down approach: The approach to assessing permissibility whereby normative principles are applied only to maximal sets of actions and the distribution principle is used to determine the permissibility of non-maximal sets of actions. (Contrast bottom-up approach and across-the-board approach; see also distribution principle.)
Traditional act-consequentialism (TAC): The view both (1) that act-consequentialism is true and (2) that an act produces an outcome that the agent has optimal reason to want to obtain if and only if it maximizes the good (impersonally construed).
Transitive: A relation, R, is transitive just in case: if xRy and yRz, then xRz.
Ultimate end: “An intrinsic end that is a fundamental and indispensible part of the agent’s life” (Noggle 2009, p. 8).
Undefeated reason: S has an undefeated reason to φ if and only if S has sufficient reason to φ.
Utile: The smallest possible measure of utility, equivalent to someone’s experiencing the mildest of pleasures for the briefest of moments.
Utilitarianism: See maximizing act-utilitarianism.
Utility: A measure of whatever it is that enhances a subject’s welfare. (Contrast disutility.)
Value abstractism: The view that the sole or primary bearers of intrinsic value are certain abstracta—facts, outcomes, states of affairs, or possible worlds. (Contrast value concretism.)
Value concretism: The view that the fundamental bearers of intrinsic value are concrete entities (e.g., persons, animals, and things). (Contrast value abstractism.)
Violation: Any infringement of a constraint that is morally wrong. (Contrast infringement.)
Volitional control: S has volitional control over whether or not she φs only if both (1) she has the capacity to intend to φ and (2) whether or not she φs depends on whether or not she intends to φ. (Contrast rational control.)