The following minor and substantive corrections pertain only to the hardcover edition. The paperback edition incorporates these corrections.
Book jacket (inside front flap, second sentence of second paragraph): It should read: “Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that
which each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can…” [Delete 'which'. This error was introduced after I had approved an error-free draft of the jacket text.]
P. 106 (first full paragraph): 'Nicolas' should be 'Nicholas'.
P. 152 (note 3): 'Slote' should be in small caps. [This error was also introduced by the production people.]
- P. 166 (clause 1 of proposition 6.1): Change the sub-scripted 'j' at the end of the clause to a sub-scripted 'i' so that it reads as follow: "S would perform αj if S were to have at tj both B and
the intention to perform αi."
p. 254 (the bibliographic information for Norcross 2006b): The page numbers should read "38-53," not "5-20."
If you discover other errors, please email me at firstname.lastname@example.org to tell me about them.
P. 102 (first sentence of the first full paragraph): This
should read: “consequentialists can claim that, other things being equal, agents
should be more concerned to minimize the number of people that they treat
as a mere means than to minimize the number of people that they actually
P. 167 (note 21): This should read: “Here, I am assuming
counterfactual determinism. That is, I am assuming that for any event, e (including actions, sets of actions,
and the formations of intentions), there is some determinate fact as to what
the world would be like if e were to
occur. Of course, this is controversial. So, depending on what sorts of events
may be indeterminate and whether so-called “counterfactuals of freedom” can be
true even if we have libertarian free will, I would
may need to
substitute “there is some chance S would would likely” for “S would”
in the relevant subjunctive conditionals.”
PP. 233 (note 32) and 243 (definition of ‘more reason to
desire’): These should both be replaced with the following: “For any set of
actions α1 that
is scrupulously securable by S at ti via a
set of attitudes A1 and for any alternative set of actions α2 that
is scrupulously securable by S at ti via
a set of attitudes A2, S
has at ti more (requiring) reason to desire the prospect of
her performing α1 (viz., p1) than to desire the prospect
of her performing α2 (viz., p2) if and only if ∑i[Pr(oi/A1)
× Ds-t(oi)] is greater than ∑i[Pr(oi/A2)
× Ds-t(oi)], where Pr(oi/Ai)
is the objective probability of oi’s obtaining given S’s possessing
Ai and where Ds-t(oi) is
the S-relative ti-relative desirability value of oi,
which is just a measure of how much (requiring) reason S has at ti
to desire that oi obtains.”