Errata

The following minor and substantive corrections pertain only to the hardcover edition. The paperback edition incorporates these corrections.

Minor Corrections:

1. Book jacket (inside front flap, second sentence of second paragraph): It should read: “Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that which each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can…” [Delete 'which'. This error was introduced after I had approved an error-free draft of the jacket text.]
2. P. 106 (first full paragraph): 'Nicolas' should be 'Nicholas'.
3. P. 152 (note 3): 'Slote' should be in small caps. [This error was also introduced by the production people.]
1. P. 166 (clause 1 of proposition 6.1): Change the sub-scripted 'j' at the end of the clause to a sub-scripted 'i' so that it reads as follow: "S would perform α_j if S were to have at t_j both B and the intention to perform α_i."
   1. p. 254 (the bibliographic information for Norcross 2006b): The page numbers should read "38-53," not "5-20."

Substantive Corrections:

1. P. 102 (first sentence of the first full paragraph): This should read: “consequentialists can claim that, other things being equal, agents should be more concerned to minimize the number of people that they treat as a mere means than to minimize the number of people that they actually murder.”
2. P. 167 (note 21): This should read: “Here, I am assuming counterfactual determinism. That is, I am assuming that for any event, e (including actions, sets of actions, and the formations of intentions), there is some determinate fact as to what the world would be like if e were to occur. Of course, this is controversial. So, depending on what sorts of events may be indeterminate and whether so-called “counterfactuals of freedom” can be true even if we have libertarian free will, I would may need to substitute “there is some chance S would would likely” for “S would” in the relevant subjunctive conditionals.”
3. PP. 233 (note 32) and 243 (definition of ‘more reason to desire’): These should both be replaced with the following: “For any set of actions α₁ that is scrupulously securable by S at t_i via a set of attitudes A₁ and for any alternative set of actions α₂ that is scrupulously securable by S at t_i via a set of attitudes A₂, S has at t_i more (requiring) reason to desire the prospect of her performing α₁ (viz., p₁) than to desire the prospect of her performing α₂ (viz., p₂) if and only if ∑_i[Pr(o_i/A₁) × D_s-t(o_i)] is greater than ∑_i[Pr(o_i/A₂) × D_s-t(o_i)], where Pr(o_i/A_i) is the objective probability of o_i’s obtaining given S’s possessing A_i and where D_s-t(o_i) is the S-relative t_i-relative desirability value of o_i, which is just a measure of how much (requiring) reason S has at t_i to desire that o_i obtains.”

If you discover other errors, please email me at douglas.portmore@asu.edu to tell me about them.