research

working papers

Pay as you share: publishers, platforms, and regulation

with Arthur Campbell and Geoffrey Go

Abstract: Content providers bear the costs of producing original content, while digital platforms share secondary versions to generate advertising revenue, often without compensating providers. This perceived imbalance in bargaining power arguably undermines incentives to invest in high-quality content, prompting several countries to introduce or consider media bargaining codes to improve news media companies’ bargaining position. This paper investigates how the increased bargaining strength for content providers affects investments in primary and secondary content and subscription pricing. We show that while greater bargaining power directly boosts investments in secondary content, its effects on primary content are ambiguous: improved secondary content can enhance viewer awareness of primary content but also lead to subscription price adjustments. Moreover, the cannibalization effects may or may not increase the primary content quality. These interplays apply across subscription-based and advertising-based models. The paper extends the analysis to accommodate various investments made by digital platforms.

Startup acquisition and innovation

with Christopher Teh

Abstract: This survey explores how startup acquisitions influence innovation and competition. We review two key streams of literature: post-acquisition innovation, which examines whether incumbents develop or terminate acquired projects, and pre-acquisition innovation, which investigates how the prospect of acquisition shapes startups' and incumbents' incentives and innovation strategies. We also assess the implications for merger policy design, highlighting recent competition authority responses and dynamic considerations. Our work provides insights into the ongoing debate on how competition policy should regulate startup acquisitions in fast-evolving and uncertain markets.

Acquisition-induced kill zones

with Christopher Teh and Dyuti Banerjee

R&R at Management Science

Abstract: We study the impact of a dominant incumbent's acquisition on entry and R&D incentives in a model with multiple start-ups. The incumbent's acquisition directly suppresses entry and can distort the non-target start-up's R&D incentives by creating a kill zone. The reduced threat of entry can also cause the incumbent to shelve the acquired technology. Despite these negative effects, acquisitions generally affect consumer welfare ambiguously due to synergy benefits. We study the design of merger policies aimed at minimizing acquisition-related harms. We also show that entry-for-buyout may not be a valid defence for start-up acquisitions when accounting for non-target start-ups.