The Causes of the Battle of Gate Pa (c )2014 Dr. Cliff Simons
Premier Whitaker was the mastermind behind sending the troops to Tauranga in January. He definitely had a confiscation agenda and had just passed the Native Settlements Act in December 1863 which allowed the government to confiscate the land of Maori deemed to be ‘in rebellion against the crown’. Colonel Carey was in command of the move to Tauranga and his instructions included burning the crops and gathering in the Maori livestock- because it was going to feed the Kingitanga forces in the Waikato. Many Tauranga Maori were not King supporters and the political situation was tricky. Both Archdeacon Brown and the Civil Commissioner Smith urged Carey not to be aggressive, and so he disobeyed orders and didn’t burn the crops or gather in the animals. Whitaker was furious with Smith, but Grey wrote to him and thanked him for his advice and changed the orders to just a passive blockade. Grey and Whitaker were in a power struggle and Grey finally removed him a year later, but by then a lot of the damage had been done.
The Maori response was, 'What do we do about all of these soldiers who have just arrived here?' They couldn’t get a clear answer from anyone about why the soldiers had arrived, so obviously they needed to plan for a military eventuality. Ngaiterangi chief, Rawiri seems to have been in overall command, if that is the right word, but several groups fortified their old pa sites along the edge of the Kaimai forest. It was thought that the troops might land in bigger numbers at Te Puna or come up the Wairoa River. Of course all of the young bloods were keen on a fight and once they had prepared their pa, they became agitated that there was no action. Rawiri and others embarked on the campaign of letter writing etc to goad Colonel Greer (now in command) to come and attack them. Greer knew that he didn’t have enough men to do that as well as protect his base at Te Papa, besides, his orders were not to undertake any aggressive actions. Rawiri had to keep moving closer to try to get Greer to attack- hence the pa at Poteriwhi and eventually Pukehinahina or Gate Pa.
Greer actually misunderstood Rawiri’s actions- he thought that the move to Pukehinahina was the prelude to an attack on Te Papa, especially as he had just received a letter saying that Rawiri intended to take breakfast at Te Papa (attack). He sent a letter to General Cameron asking for more men and guns, and of course, Cameron himself came and took over the operation. Rawiri would have originally thought that he was going to be attacked by a proportion of Greer’s 600 men (which would have been a manageable task) and there was also a large Tai Rawhiti war party that seems to have been on its way to help him. However, it was defeated at Maketu by a joint British Arawa force on 27 April. He could also have hoped for help from the Waikato- after all, the Tauranga warriors had been helping them. In the end, the odds changed dramatically in the last week. He got very few reinforcements, and the British force trebled in size. He must have been very worried.
I don’t know what would have happened if the Maori had decided not to militarily oppose the British. There wouldn’t have been a Gate Pa and Te Ranga, but I imagine that a lot of the land would have passed out of Maori hands anyway over the years. A lot of battles are not really planned- they just happen because the political situation gets out of control, and I think that is what happened here. In the end the Maori probably made a strategic mistake by going to war against the British because there was really only going to be one winner. But what could they do- they were in a war and it had escalated to their lands?