Table of Contents
Introduction
Summary of background research and project validation.
Our background research in Element A indicated a staggering prevalence of intimate partner violence, with 1 in 3 women and 1 in 10 men experiencing physical or sexual violence in their lifetime. Furthermore, the digital age has introduced new emerging problems; 1 in 10 teens report the use of technology for stalking or surveillance. Traditional tools like LifeAlert—which are limited by a 1,000-foot console tether—or smartphone apps are insufficient. These tools are either too visible or reliant on devices frequently monitored by abusers. The validation for this project was further reinforced through a market research survey of over 50 respondents. The data revealed a significant demand for this technology, with 66.7% of participants stating they could see themselves or others using a discreet safety device in domestic abuse situations, and a staggering 91.1% identifying its utility for general safety, such as walking alone at night. From a health and legal perspective, the project seeks to mitigate the long-term psychological effects of abuse—where survivors are three times more likely to meet PTSD criteria—by bridging the gap between crisis onset and medical intervention. By providing a secure method for verifiable evidence collection and immediate signaling, Project Aegis empowers victims to exercise their right to communicate with authorities safely.
Following an extensive prototyping phase, we have identified four critical design requirements that serve as the benchmarks for system success. These requirements were subjected to a formal peer review by a professional engineer, ensuring that the testing protocols provide objective, unbiased, and statistically significant data. The four facets of this texting phase are:
1. Achieving a high-reliability GPS fix within critical time constraints to ensure an emergency response
2. Validating cloud security rules and API key rotation to prevent unauthorized data access to our website's database
3. Ensuring near-instantaneous haptic, vibrational confirmation for the user while maintaining a discreet profile.
4. Confirming the end-to-end propagation of emergency alerts across the LTE-M cellular network.
To rigorously validate these requirements, we implemented a series of standardized tests. Each procedure was refined based on expert feedback to eliminate observer bias
1. We are testing the Time to First Fix (TTFF) and Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP) when the GPS "cold-starts." This ensures the device transitions from a "Cold" state to a "Search and Lock" state within 90 seconds, providing coordinates accurate to within 5 meters.
2. Penetration & Database Security Testing: To ensure victim data remains impenetrable, we are safeguarding from abusers attempting to tamper with the database. This involves using revoked API keys and malformed data packets to confirm that the Firebase security rules successfully return 403 Forbidden errors, preventing abusers from tampering with or accessing shared contact information.
3. We are measuring the millisecond latency between a hardware interrupt and the Linear Resonant Actuator (LRA) reaching its resonant frequency. Additionally, we are measuring the noise of the vibration in decibels to confirm the device remains audible only to the wearer, fulfilling the design requirement for total discretion.
4. We are quantifying the propagation delay across the SIM7080G LTE-M link. We are monitoring the RSSI (Signal Strength) and timing the delta from the hardware trigger to the physical reception of an SMS on a target device, ensuring a clickable, accurate Google Maps URL is delivered in under 30 seconds.
Problem Statement
Domestic abuse victims often face significant barriers when seeking help. Even if they have some mobility, 71% of victims' report that abusers monitor their communication, restrict their movements, and/or manipulate them in a manner that prevents them from reaching out in an indiscreet manner. Current safety tools are either too visible, inflexible, or too dependent on established infrastructure or law enforcement, leaving victims without discreet, reliable, and comfortable ways to signal for help.
Test #1: GPS
Purpose:
The primary objective of this testing phase is to quantify the operational readiness of the Adafruit GPS architecture by measuring the Time to First Fix (TTFF) and the resulting geospatial precision. In a life-safety context, 'near-accurate' data is insufficient; therefore, this test validates the system’s ability to achieve a 3D fix within a cold-start window of less than 90 seconds. By benchmarking the device against high-precision control coordinates, we establish a verifiable Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP). Ensuring a consistent sub-5-meter margin of error is critical for emergency responders, as it transforms raw satellite telemetry into an actionable, high-fidelity rescue coordinate.
Pass/Fail Criteria:
Valid GPS fix achieved in <90 seconds
Accuracy margin of error of <5 meters compared to a control coordinate.
Materials:
WeMos D1 Mini ESP32
Adafruit Ultimate GPS Breakout
LiPo Battery
Computer
Arduino Serial Monitor
Initial Conditions:
Outdoor environment with clear line-of-sight.
No previous satellite data is cached in the GPS
GPS and serial monitor set on a table
Safety Hazards:
Lithium batteries can become volatile if left in direct sunlight
Proximity to high-voltage lines can cause electromagnetic signals to interfere
The computer itself that is registering serial data can interfere with the GPS's signal
Control:
Test occurs in 15-minute intervals and in the early morning
Test site is at least 50 feet away from power transformers
The computer is set at least 2 feet away from the GPS
Procedure:
Power on the device
Start timer
Monitor serial output once satellites are in view
Record time to catch a signal
Record GPS Precision
Mock Data Chart:
Test #2: Data Breach Testing
Purpose:
Project Aegis employs a hardened cloud integration strategy utilizing RESTful API protocols to bridge the gap between physical hardware and the Google Firebase environment. This testing cycle serves as a formal Penetration and Validation Audit; it confirms that the database successfully ingests valid location packets while simultaneously enforcing Server-Side Security Rules. By challenging the system with unauthenticated 'Mock' injections and malformed data—such as invalid phone number strings—we verify that the database is encrypted and secure. Furthermore, this phase validates the efficacy of our Credential Rotation Protocol, ensuring that even if an API key were compromised, the underlying contact architecture remains impenetrable to potential abusers.
Pass/Fail Criteria:
Valid packet (contact information) appears in the database within 5 seconds of trigger; "Mock" packet from an unauthorized source receives a 403 Forbidden error.
Materials:
ESP32 Serial Number
Firebase Database Console
Contact information
projectaegisportal.com website configuration interface
Initial Conditions:
Database is in "Listen" mode while it is also set to require authorization.
Safety Hazards:
Hard-coding API keys in public repositories or unencrypted code poses a risk to user privacy
Control:
Encode a secret API key that hackers do not have access to
Procedure:
Open the Firebase Console, Postman API tester, GitHub repository, and projectaegisportal.com website
Test if information is registered in the database in less than 5 seconds
Test if the database will only accept approved devices
Test if the database will only accept valid phone numbers
Test if the API key in the GitHub repository can be used to access the database; if it can, then the database can be breached
Mock Data Chart:
Test #3: Haptic Feedback & Button Confirmation
Purpose:
To minimize user uncertainty during high-stress encounters, the interface must provide instantaneous, non-visual confirmation of system status. This procedure evaluates the mechanical efficacy and interrupt latency of the DRV2605L Haptic Driver and the Linear Resonant Actuator (LRA). By physical button engagement, we measure the system's ability to provide tactile feedback within a 500ms window. This testing ensures that the haptic 'handshake' is both discreet—maintaining a low acoustic signature for user safety—and unmistakable in its tactile resonance, confirming that the SOS sequence has been successfully initiated without requiring the user to look at the device.
Pass/Fail Criteria:
The linear resonant actuator must achieve its resonant frequency within 500 milliseconds of pushing a button. The tactile output must be discernible via the human touch while maintaining a noise floor below 40dB to ensure discretion.
Materials:
WeMos D1 Mini ESP32
DRV2605L Haptic Motor Driver
10mm Linear Resonant Actuator
Tactile Push Button
Decibel Meter Sound Level
Initial Conditions:
Device is turned on
Timer is on standby
Device is on a table in a quiet room
Safety Hazards:
Mechanical wire fatigue
Sound levels in the room are interfering with the decibel monitor app
Control:
Inspect haptic lead wires for strain relief at the solder point
Run test in an isolated environment
Procedure:
Push the SOS button
Measure the time until the LRA vibrates
Measure how loud (in decibels) the LRA is.
Rate the vibration strength on a scale of 1-10
Trigger three different patterns and see if the serial monitor registers them
Triple-tap: Emergency SOS triggered
Double-Tap: Haptic Status Check:
5 Second Hold: ESP32 in sleep mode
Mock Data Chart:
Test #4: Cellular Link & Propogation
Purpose:
The final validation stage examines the telecommunications integrity of the SIM7080G LTE-M uplink, which serves as the critical 'Physical-to-Digital' bridge. This test quantifies the end-to-end Latency of the emergency broadcast, measuring the time elapsed from a local hardware trigger to the successful propagation of a high-priority SMS across the cellular network. By evaluating the Uplink Budget under varied signal strengths (RSSI), we ensure the system can maintain connectivity in signal-marginal environments. The goal is to verify that a sanitized, clickable Google Maps URL is delivered to emergency contacts within 30 seconds, providing an immediate and reliable lifeline that transcends the limitations of localized hardware.
Pass/Fail Criteria:
SMS must be received by the target mobile device within 30 seconds. The link must be "clickable" and resolve to the correct coordinates captured from Test #1.
Materials:
SIM7080G Module
LTE-M High-Gain Antenna
Active SIM Hologram Card
Target Mobile Phone
Stopwatch
Initial Conditions:
Verify the module is registered on the network (e.g., Status LED is blinking at 1 Hz)
Record the RSSI (signal strength) before beginning tests
Safety Hazards:
Peak current surge, which is >500mAh could lead to brownouts.
Control:
Utilize a high-discharge LiPo battery (800mAh); monitor for "brown-out" resets on the ESP32 during the transmission window
Procedure:
Trigger SOS by pressing the tactile button
Log the AT command response on the serial monitor
Start the timer when button is pressed and end it when an SMS message with a Google Maps URL appears on the target phone
Mock Data Chart:
Expert Review
Conclusion
The formulation of this testing plan represents a massive effort to lessen the gap between theoretical engineering and life-safety application. By focusing on the four critical vectors of GPS precision, database security, haptic feedback, and cellular propagation, we intend to create a device that prioritizes the user's physical safety and digital privacy above all else. These specific tests were selected because they represent the "primary failure points" of any emergency wearable; if the GPS fails to lock or the security is breached, the device ceases to be a tool for protection and becomes a liability. I expect these tests to yield results that confirm a high-speed system response, specifically demonstrating that an SOS signal can travel from a physical button press to a secure cloud server and then to a target handset in under 30 seconds. This expectation is rooted in the high-performance capabilities of the SIM7080G module and the optimized interrupt-driven logic of the ESP32, both of which were chosen for their industrial-grade reliability.
While this plan is comprehensive regarding technical performance, certain criteria, such as long-term battery degradation and structural durability (e.g., waterproof ratings or impact resistance), are not included in this current cycle. These were omitted primarily because the current project phase focuses on electronic and logical validation rather than mechanical environmental hardening, which would require specialized industrial equipment beyond the scope of a high school senior project. By narrowing the scope to the core communication and security pipeline, we can ensure that the fundamental technology is flawless before moving toward physical "armor" testing. The next logical phase is Element I, where we will transition from this theoretical plan into the actual execution of these procedures. During that stage, we will gather the empirical data needed to prove that Project Aegis is not just a concept, but a functional, secure, and life-saving reality for those in the Inland Empire and beyond.