Amendment IV: Search and Seizures

Facts of the Case

When police officers went to Mapp's house and asked permission to enter, upon consulting her attorney, Mapp refused their entry without a search warrant. Later that that, officers arrived again and knocked on the door. Mapp did not answer. Police forced entry and showed what many believe was a forged or fake warrant. Upon searching the house, they found illegal gambling slips and pornographic books. She received a misdemeanor charge for betting paraphernalia. She was also charged for possession of "lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs" in violated of Ohio state law.

Mapp argued that her conviction of possessing pornographic material violated her freedom of expression, and that police had no probable cause to search her property. 

Question

Were the confiscated materials protected from seizure by the Fourth Amendment?

Opinions

Majority (6): The majority brushed aside First Amendment issues (freedom of expression) and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

Minority (3):  The minority opinion, written by Justice Harlan, argued against the Court's decision to apply the exclusionary rule to state courts. Justice Harlan believed that the rule, which prevents illegally obtained evidence from being used in court, should not be imposed on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He felt that this rule was a judicial creation rather than a constitutional mandate and that it should not be used to enforce uniform procedural standards across all states. Justice Harlan expressed concern that the exclusionary rule might undermine the reliability of evidence and the effectiveness of state law enforcement. He suggested that the focus should be on the fairness of trials and the integrity of the justice system, rather than on a blanket rule that could potentially hinder the pursuit of justice.

Case Commentary 

The Ohio statue was ruled unconstitutional as it violated Mapp's First Amendment right. More importantly, it selectively incorporated the exclusionary rule to the states. The rule determines that evidence collected in violation of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizures can not be used against the defendant in criminal proceedings. In plain terms, if police violated a suspect's rights to gather evidence, that evidence can not be used against them in court. 

Facts of the Case

Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. 

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone?

Opinions

Majority (7): "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Minority (1):  The minority opinion, delivered by Justice Harlan, expressed concern about the broad implications of the majority's decision, which extended Fourth Amendment protections to include certain types of electronic eavesdropping. Justice Harlan argued that the majority's ruling, which established that the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, could lead to overly expansive interpretations of privacy. He contended that the decision might inadvertently restrict law enforcement's ability to use surveillance tools essential for investigating serious crimes. Harlan was concerned that the Court's new standard, which focuses on the expectation of privacy, might complicate legal standards and create uncertainty about what constitutes a legitimate expectation of privacy. Despite his reservations, Harlan's opinion ultimately acknowledged the need to protect privacy but stressed the importance of carefully balancing individual rights with effective law enforcement.

Case Commentary

Katz reaffirmed that evidence gathered by violating a suspect's rights can not be used to prosecute them. 

The case is known for two developments. First, the decision established that, through the Fourth Amendment, citizens have a "reasonable expectation to privacy." Second, as telephone communications are immaterial, it applied a new interpretation to what may be searched or seized (as sound is not something that can be physically taken from an individual). This interpretation would become critical with the advent of the internet and other electronic communications.

Facts of the Case

California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

Question

Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?

Opinions

Majority (6): The Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained."

Minority (3): Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, which argued against the majority's ruling that allowed police to search containers within a vehicle without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe the containers held evidence of a crime. Justice Stevens expressed concern that this decision undermined Fourth Amendment protections by permitting more intrusive searches of personal belongings. He believed that the majority's approach blurred the line between automobile searches and searches of private homes or personal effects, which traditionally require more stringent safeguards. Stevens' dissent emphasized the importance of maintaining clear and strong privacy protections, arguing that allowing such searches without a warrant could lead to broader and potentially unreasonable invasions of privacy

Case Commentary

The case reaffirmed the 1925 Carroll Rule (based on Carroll v. United States and known more commonly as the motor vehicle exemption): that automobiles are exceptions to the requirement for a warrant in order to search an individual's property. This is based on the idea that there is less of an expectation of privacy in a car than say a home or property and that contraband can be quickly moved in a car. 

Acevedo extended the right to a warrantless search of an automobile to include any containers within the automobile. 

Facts of the Case

Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to "specific reasonable inferences" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to "go on one's way."

Question

Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person?

Opinions

Majority (5): The Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion."

Minority (4): Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the majority opinion. The minority opinion argued that the police lacked sufficient justification to stop and search Wardlow based solely on his sudden flight in a high-crime area. They contended that the majority's ruling lowered the standard for what constitutes reasonable suspicion, potentially leading to arbitrary stops based on ambiguous or minimal behavior. The dissenters expressed concern that such an interpretation of reasonable suspicion could infringe on individual privacy rights and encourage unwarranted police intrusion. They believed that a more substantial, specific indication of criminal activity should be required to justify a stop, rather than relying on vague factors like a person's flight from police in a high-crime area.

Case Commentary

This case highlights the balance between individual privacy rights and the need for law enforcement to act on reasonable, observable behavior to prevent crime. It underscores how courts interpret what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" and how this standard helps law enforcement address potentially criminal activity while protecting citizens' constitutional rights.