Establishment Clause

Facts of the Case

A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds.

Question

Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?5

Opinions

A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.

Majority (5): Justice Hugo Black delivered the majority opinion, in which he emphasized the importance of maintaining a "wall of separation between church and State." However, he concluded that the New Jersey law did not breach this wall. Black argued that the reimbursement program was designed to assist parents in getting their children to and from school, which is a general public service. The law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it directly support them; it merely provided a benefit to all parents. Therefore, the program had a secular purpose and did not violate the Establishment Clause.

Minority (4): Justice Wiley Rutledge authored the dissent, joined by Justices Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson, and Harold Burton. The dissenters argued that the reimbursement scheme effectively supported religious institutions by providing financial assistance that enabled students to attend parochial schools. They contended that any form of aid to religious institutions, even indirect, breached the Establishment Clause. Rutledge and the dissenters maintained that the majority’s decision eroded the strict separation between church and state and set a precedent for future government support of religious activities.

Case Commentary 

Establishment Clause Interpretation: This case marked the first time the Supreme Court thoroughly interpreted the Establishment Clause. The decision set a precedent for how the Court would handle cases involving the separation of church and state.

Neutrality Principle: The ruling reinforced the principle that government policies must remain neutral toward religion. While the Court upheld the reimbursement program, it did so on the grounds that the policy was neutral and served a secular purpose.

Precedent for Future Cases: The majority opinion provided a framework for evaluating future Establishment Clause cases, emphasizing the importance of neutrality and the secular nature of government actions involving religion.

Controversial Balance: The case highlighted the ongoing tension in American jurisprudence between accommodating religion and maintaining a strict separation of church and state. The close decision and strong dissent underscored the contentious nature of this balance.

Facts of the Case

The case tested the principle of "released time", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Question

Did the use of the public school system for religious classes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Opinions

Majority (8): Justice Hugo Black delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, and Frankfurter. The Court found that the Champaign, Illinois, school district's practice of allowing religious instruction in public schools constituted an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. The Court emphasized that using tax-supported public school buildings for religious classes and involving public school teachers and administrators in coordinating these classes amounted to state support of religious education. This, they argued, was a clear violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits government actions that unduly favor one religion over another.

Minority (1):  Justice Stanley Reed authored the dissent, with Justices Jackson, Burton, and Vinson concurring. The dissenting justices argued that the program was voluntary and that parents had the right to choose whether their children would participate. They believed that the program did not amount to an establishment of religion because it did not compel any student to attend religious classes, and participation was entirely optional. The dissenters were concerned that the majority opinion imposed unnecessary restrictions on religious freedom and expression in public schools.

Case Commentary

This decision underscored the importance of keeping religious activities out of public schools to prevent government endorsement or support of religion. It set a precedent for subsequent cases dealing with religious activities in public institutions, significantly shaping the interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The ruling highlights the delicate balance the Court seeks to maintain between protecting religious freedom and preventing government entanglement with religion.

The entirety of this case name is Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County. 

Facts of the Case

The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments.

Question

Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment?

Opinions

Majority (6): The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Hugo Black, emphasized that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment must be interpreted to prevent any government endorsement or promotion of religion. The Court ruled that by providing the prayer, even if it was non-denominational and voluntary, the state of New York had officially approved religion, which constituted an unconstitutional government interference with religion. The decision was rooted in the historical context of the Establishment Clause, which was intended to prevent any government involvement in religious activities.

Minority (1):  Justice Potter Stewart was the sole dissenter in this case. He argued that the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent the establishment of a state-sponsored church, not to prohibit all types of government interaction with religion. Stewart believed that prohibiting the prayer in this context denied children who wished to say the prayer the opportunity to participate in a voluntary religious exercise. He contended that the decision misapplied the First Amendment by promoting a type of governmental hostility toward religion.

Case Commentary

It reinforced the principle that government should not be involved in composing official prayers and furthered the interpretation of the Establishment Clause as a means to ensure government neutrality in religious matters. This case has had a lasting impact on the discourse surrounding religious activities in public schools and has influenced subsequent rulings concerning the presence of religion in government settings. By drawing a strict line against state-sponsored prayer, the ruling affirmed the importance of protecting individual religious freedoms in a diverse society.

Facts of the Case

Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself.

The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state. 

Question

Did the Pennsylvania law requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Opinions

Majority (8): The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Tom C. Clark, stated that the practice of Bible reading in public schools was unconstitutional because it amounted to government sponsorship of a religious exercise. The Court emphasized that the government must remain neutral in religious matters and that public schools should not endorse or favor any particular religion. The decision reinforced the principle of separation of church and state, asserting that religious exercises conducted as part of public education were a violation of the Establishment Clause.

Minority (1):  Justice Potter Stewart was the sole dissenter in this case. He argued that the practices in question did not constitute the establishment of religion. Stewart contended that permitting students to opt-out of the religious activities provided sufficient protection for individual religious freedom. He believed that the majority's decision misinterpreted the First Amendment and unnecessarily restricted religious expression.

Case Commentary

The ruling underscored that public schools should not engage in activities that could be seen as endorsing or promoting a specific religion, thus protecting students' religious freedom. This case set a crucial precedent for subsequent cases involving religious activities in public institutions and has had a lasting impact on the interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause in the United States.

Facts of the Case

Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries.

The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.

Question

Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Opinions

Majority (8): Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the majority opinion, emphasizing the need to avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. He outlined the "Lemon Test," which requires that a statute must meet three criteria to comply with the Establishment Clause:

• The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.

• Its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion.

• It must not result in excessive government entanglement with religion.

The Court found that the Pennsylvania law failed the third prong of the Lemon Test. By providing financial aid to religious schools, the state would have to closely monitor these institutions to ensure the funds were used solely for secular purposes, leading to excessive entanglement between church and state.

Minority (1): Justice Byron White dissented, arguing that the Court's decision was too rigid and impractical. He believed that the state's efforts to ensure that public funds were used only for secular purposes in religious schools did not constitute excessive entanglement. He emphasized the importance of the secular benefits provided by the aid, such as improved education, which could be sufficiently monitored without infringing on religious freedom.

Case Commentary

The ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman is significant because it established a clear and enduring framework for evaluating the constitutionality of laws under the Establishment Clause: the Lemon Test. This decision reinforced the separation of church and state by setting stringent criteria for government involvement with religious institutions. The Lemon Test has been influential in subsequent church-state cases, though it has also been subject to criticism and calls for revision. The case highlights the delicate balance the Court must strike in ensuring that government actions neither promote nor inhibit religious practice while allowing for secular benefits that may incidentally affect religious institutions.

Facts of the Case

A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.

Question

Did the Louisiana law, which mandated the teaching of "creation science" along with the theory of evolution, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Opinions

Majority (7): Majority Opinion (Justice Brennan): The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, ruled that the Louisiana law failed the Lemon test for determining violations of the Establishment Clause. The law was found to have a religious purpose, as it sought to promote a particular religious belief under the guise of scientific instruction. The majority concluded that the primary effect of the law was to advance a specific religious doctrine, which was impermissible under the Constitution.

Minority (2): Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the law did not violate the Establishment Clause. Scalia contended that the law's purpose was to promote academic freedom rather than to endorse a religious view. He believed that the law's requirement to teach creation science alongside evolution was permissible and that the majority's decision unjustly limited educational approaches.

Case Commentary

The decision reinforced the principle that religious teachings cannot be presented as science in public schools. By striking down the Louisiana law, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Establishment Clause prohibits government actions that advance religious doctrines, even if they are framed within the context of educational reform. This case remains significant for its role in delineating the boundaries between religion and public education, ensuring that scientific instruction in public schools is not compromised by religious ideologies.

Facts of the Case

In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

Question

Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Opinions

Majority (5): Justice Kennedy emphasized that even though the graduation ceremony is a non-denominational and voluntary event, the inclusion of prayer still represents a government endorsement of religion. He argued that the prayer could coerce students into participating in a religious practice, thereby violating the principle of separation between church and state.

Minority (4): Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, contended that the prayer at issue did not coerce participation and argued that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prevent all public religious expressions, especially when they are non-sectarian and not mandatory.

Case Commentary

By ruling against the practice of clergy-led prayers at graduation ceremonies, the decision reinforces the principle that even indirect coercion, where students might feel pressured to conform to religious practices, breaches the constitutional separation of church and state. This case is pivotal in understanding the extent to which public institutions can incorporate religious elements in their activities and has set a precedent for evaluating the constitutionality of religious expressions in public schools.

*This case was argued before the U.S. District Court fo the Middle District of Pennsylvania and was not heard by the Supreme Court.

Facts of the Case

A group of parents challenged the Dover Area School District's policy of requiring students to hear a statement about "intelligent design" as an alternative to the theory of evolution in biology classes. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits government endorsement of religion. The case is sometimes referred to as the "Dover Panda Trial" (a reference to the Scopes Monkey Trial). 

Question

Did the teaching of intellgient design, rather than creationism, also violate the Establishment Clause?

Opinion

The majority opinion, delivered by Judge John E. Jones III, concluded that intelligent design was not a scientific theory but rather a religious view. The court emphasized that the intelligent design curriculum lacked empirical support and did not meet the standards of scientific inquiry. The decision was based on the principle that public schools must remain neutral on matters of religion and cannot promote religious beliefs under the guise of science.

Case Commentary

The case clarified that teaching intelligent design as science in public schools is unconstitutional because it is inherently religious. This ruling reinforced the principle that scientific education should be based on empirical evidence and established scientific standards, not on religious doctrine. The decision was a pivotal moment in the ongoing debate over science and religion in education, affirming that public school curricula must adhere to secular and scientific principles.

Facts of the Case

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.

Questions

1. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Opinions

Majority (5): Justice Souter, writing for the majority, emphasized that the displays were unconstitutional because they were intended to advance religious principles. The majority opinion focused on the intent behind the displays, noting that they were motivated by a desire to promote religious views rather than a secular historical context. The Court used the Lemon test and the historical context of the displays to determine that the displays did not have a legitimate secular purpose.

Minority (4): Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the displays did not violate the Establishment Clause because they were intended to reflect the historical and cultural significance of the Ten Commandments, not to endorse religion. He contended that the displays were part of a broader historical presentation and that their religious content did not necessarily imply a constitutional violation. 

Case Commentary

McCreary v. ACLU of Kentucky is significant for its strict interpretation of the Establishment Clause, particularly in how the Court assesses the intent behind religious displays on government property. The decision reinforced the principle that government actions must have a secular purpose and cannot be driven primarily by religious motivations. The case is crucial for understanding the limits of religious expression in public spaces and continues to influence how courts evaluate similar Establishment Clause issues.

Facts of the Case

Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.

Question

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

Opinions

Majority (5):  Justice Breyer emphasized the historical and contextual nature of the monument. He argued that the display of the Ten Commandments in this particular context, surrounded by other historical markers and monuments, did not primarily serve a religious purpose but rather a historical and educational one. He cautioned against an overly rigid application of the Establishment Clause that could undermine the acknowledgment of historical traditions.

Minority (4): Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Rehnquist, was more assertive in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. They focused on the historical context of the Ten Commandments as a foundational legal and moral document, arguing that such a display did not constitute an endorsement of religion but rather reflected the nation’s legal heritage.

Justices Stevens and Souter, in their dissent, took a stricter approach, arguing that the monument's display could be seen as endorsing a particular religious view and thus violated the Establishment Clause. They were concerned that the presence of religious symbols on government property could lead to a perception of governmental favoritism towards particular religions.

Case Commentary

The decision highlights the complexity of applying the Establishment Clause to cases involving religious symbols in public spaces, especially when those symbols have historical significance. The ruling suggests that the context in which religious symbols are displayed can influence their constitutionality, and it illustrates a more flexible interpretation of the Establishment Clause compared to earlier cases. This case remains a key reference point in discussions about the boundaries of religious symbols and government endorsement in public spaces.