MAJOR SOCIETAL, CULTURAL, POLITICAL CHANGES

MAJOR SOCIETAL CHANGES IN INDONESIA

Indonesia's Economic Crisis

The Asian currency crisis arose from a loss of confidence in several countries’ ability to maintain fixed exchange rates while allowing free movement of foreign finance capital at a time of rising current account deficits.

The pressure on other regional currencies initially did not affect the Indonesian rupiah. However, as it began to fall, the underlying weakness of the Indonesian financial sector was revealed, and private foreign debt was far more outstanding than previously thought. The crisis in Indonesia worsened due to a lack of effective government policy responses.

The currency crisis, combined with the effects of the drought, has resulted in rapid inflation, particularly in the cost of food and other necessities and a significant increase in unemployment and underemployment (8.7 million and 18.4 million, respectively 30 percent of the workforce). The return of poverty for many Indonesians and the end of short-lived affluence for others has shattered expectations created by the New Order regime's economic achievements that Indonesia was on the path to continued growth and prosperity.

The Indonesian government agreed to conditions in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial stabilization package that required Indonesia to reform its financial sector, reduce fiscal expenditure, and drastically change government involvement in the economy. Disagreements between the Indonesian government and the IMF over reform implementation have become the focal point of debate over the IMF's role. Much of the controversy stems from the IMF's offer of a financial rescue package and an economic reform program. The IMF has been chastised for employing an inappropriate formula for Indonesia, was too difficult to implement in the time allotted, and did not address the immediate issues. While the package details can be renegotiated, the IMF believes that such crises will reoccur unless Indonesia's economic institutions are reformed.

The legitimacy of the New Order regime was based on its ability to bring about sustained improvements in the standard of living of the majority of Indonesians and to meet the aspirations of an expanding middle and working class. The apparent end of this success will have severe consequences for the Indonesian state's political stability. The crisis has dealt a psychological blow to Indonesians' belief that the country had finally overcome its long history of economic and political instability and was on the road to long-term prosperity.

The crisis has increased the likelihood that many ordinary Indonesians will participate in spontaneous or organized mass protest movements, possibly even a "people's power" movement similar to the one that deposed Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. NGOs, labor unions, and Islamic organizations have grown in recent years, but civil society has been stifled by thirty years of tight New Order political control. There have been isolated riots and the emergence of a pro-democracy student movement, but the Army has crushed the riots and restricted student protest to universities. The outbreak of significant riots would put enormous strain on the factionalized Army, raising the question of whether it would intervene against Suharto.

Because Indonesia is now a major strategic and economic partner for Australia, the Indonesian crisis has significant implications for Australia. Indonesia plays a vital role in the Asia-Pacific region, which is critical to Australia's interests. The Australian government has provided emergency assistance to Indonesia, financially supported the IMF program, and attempted to help Indonesia and the IMF resolve their differences.

The Politics of Crisis-President Suharto and the New Order

Indonesia has evolved from a country with a small social elite and many impoverished peasants to a rapidly urbanized society with new social groups less willing to trade political rights for personal prosperity. There is growing resentment of President Suharto and his family's dominance of economic and political life, as well as the Army and Government's suppression of free political expression.

There appears to be widespread agreement within the Army that Soeharto should relinquish power, but senior officers are still reluctant to express their views openly. The Army does not like the new Vice President, B. J. Habibie, and it is unclear whether the Army would support Habibie becoming President if Soeharto died or retired. These doubts highlight the uncertainty created by the transition from Soeharto's rule.

MAJOR CULTURAL CHANGES IN INDONESIA

Culture is deeply rooted in beliefs, socialization, and the environment in which a person grows up and lives. A person's culture is formed primarily by their family, friends, and surroundings, which defines their culture. Cultural values are frequently experienced without cognition, which is why we do not question many of our cultural values and simply accept them as we have been taught.

Another thing to consider is the significant difference between urban culture (Jakarta) and rural culture in Indonesia. Those days, all of these cultures came together in Jakarta. You will sometimes deal with people behaving, thinking, and acting very Western while also firmly and proudly representing Indonesian cultural values regarding critical issues. However, peering behind the "Western facade" reveals their cultural roots, beliefs, and behaviors. Simply meet them later, with local friends, in a small Warung (local food stall). You will quickly notice the original culture. Put another way, it has to be this way and cannot be any other way. Of course, it is easy for young people to adopt certain things they like and adopt them as a culture, but being with their family in the village will quickly make them forget about all this western stuff and return them to their original culture.

Indonesia has a rich, diverse, and fascinating culture. We are currently in a fascinating transition period in which different cultural values coexist, clash, mix, and sort themselves out.

People are looking for a cultural identity that is relevant in the twenty-first century. Many topics are influencing this identity search. There is traditional Indonesian culture, a new democratic movement, the pursuit of economic wealth, the purpose of knowledge, cultural influences from China, Korea, Japan, Europe, or the United States, religious influences, western lifestyle versus Asian lifestyle, and a variety of others.

Since the late 1980s, Indonesia has sent many young high-potential students to study in the United States or elsewhere globally, earning a reputable university and gaining international experience. There, they learned international management techniques, negotiation styles, leadership, and communication skills.

Is there a change in Indonesian culture?

Cultures do change, but significant changes take time or require massive steps (the Indonesian government tried this step last year with the "Revolusi Mental" program). Indonesia began changing its political system in 1999, and its social system is still "under construction." Assume that a genuinely transformative culture change takes two generations, with one age lasting 25 years.

Some cultural basics in Indonesia are far older than the Republic of Indonesia itself, and they have been passed down from generation to generation because they were either useful to maintain social order or valuable from a personal standpoint. Take, for example, the principles of harmony (Rukun), discussion and consensus (Musyawarah & Mufakat), respect for age and status, Indonesian unity, cooperation (Gotong Royong), and power in Indonesia. These principles are ingrained in beliefs, social values, and even national ideology.

MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGES IN INDONESIA

The New Order

Politically, the New Order remained a stable regime, thanks in part to economic development across the archipelago, but primarily to its military underpinnings. However, it would be incorrect to describe the New Order as a military regime, and Suharto was concerned with constitutional forms in the early years of his presidency. His first government included solid civilian components in Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and statesman Adam Malik (both later served as vice president). Nonetheless, military strength was visible, closely aligned with bureaucracy, and the government developed evident authoritarian characteristics.

Suharto used his power to control and discipline political parties, eventually rationalizing them. The four Muslim parties merged to form the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; PPP) in 1973, while the five non-Muslim parties merged to form the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia; PDI). The Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, a government-sponsored organization, was more formidable than either (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya; Sekber Golkar, or Golkar). In theory, Golkar was a nonpartisan organization representing the elements of the nation, similar to Sukarno's functional groups; in practice, it was a government party, and its sweeping electoral victories were primarily due to voter pressure exerted government agencies. It won more than three-fifths of the seats in the lower house of parliament, the Council of People's Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat; DPR), in 1971, and its dominance was confirmed in subsequent elections in 1977, 1982, and 1987. The government's imposition of the Pancasila, or the Five Principles (belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice), initially formulated by Sukarno as the national ideology, was also significant as a measure of political control.

Between 1971 and 1998, parliamentary elections were followed by Suharto's unopposed reelection to a second presidential term. These results were not obtained without a great deal of effort. Suharto's economic policies, particularly the attempt to spread development more evenly across the archipelago, helped reduce the solid regional feelings of the 1950s. However, perceptions of the regime being dominated by Java persisted. Irian Jaya posed a unique challenge to the New Order. Even after the 1969 Act of Free Choice had confirmed western New Guinea's desire to remain a part of Indonesia, the Suharto regime had to deal with frequent outbreaks of violence instigated by the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka; OPM). The promotion of immigration to Irian Jaya from Java and elsewhere and the expansion of educational opportunities for region residents were intended to integrate the province into the country better. However, these initiatives were interpreted locally as examples of cultural imperialism. The exploitation of the province's resources—oil, natural gas, copper, and timber—was another source of resentment.

Unlike Irian Jaya, which Indonesia has always claimed as part of the republic, the Portuguese colony on the island of Timor (established by the Portuguese beginning in the 16th century) had not been the subject of any such claim until political changes in Portugal cast doubt on the colony's future. In 1975–76, Indonesia intervened forcibly and established Timor Timur (East Timor) as an Indonesian province, drawing domestic and international condemnation. This invasion of the former Portuguese colony effectively engaged the government in an ongoing (and particularly harsh) struggle to crush the Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente), the movement for an independent East Timor. Tens of thousands of pro-independence East Timorese died as a result of the Indonesian occupation.

In addition to these specific areas of opposition, there was some Islamic opposition to the regime. Muslim thought was increasingly blurring the old stereotyped divide between modernist and traditionalist, or fundamentalist thought. Although these shifts were primarily concerned with theological issues, their impact was like a movement of Islamic renewal within and outside the Muslim PPP. Initially motivated by a dislike for Pancasila's essentially secular ideology, the PPP grew to represent a broader ambivalence toward the government. There were criticisms of the corruption, which was seen not only as built into the economy’s structure but also as extending to the highest levels of the regime, particularly among some Muslim intellectuals and students. There were instances of open discontents, such as when students used Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1974 to launch protests against Suharto and the role of foreign capital in Indonesia; the demonstrations escalated into open rioting in Jakarta. Before Suharto was re-elected for a third term in 1978, the government shut down sections of the press and arrested student leaders.

Interethnic conflicts, which had previously been successfully suppressed, began to resurface in the late 1990s. These conflicts, too, manifested themselves to some extent along political lines. Large-scale, lethal uprisings erupted in West Kalimantan's Sanggau Ledo, and the unrest spread to other parts of the province just before the May 1997 general election. Local Dayak groups, who generally supported the non-Muslim PDI, clashed with Madurese, primarily supporting the Muslim PPP. This unrest in West Kalimantan quickly sparked uprisings in other parts, mainly, most notably in West Java. Such ethnopolitical animosities aided the ruling Golkar party in the end.