By Jessica Case
The United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) is one of six main bodies within the UN System. Defined by Article 24 of the June 26, 1945 United Nations Charter, the SC is entrusted with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and regularly submitting reports, recommendations, and requests to the other UN bodies, especially the General Assembly. There are five permanent Member States and 10 non-permanent Member States which serve rotating two-year terms in the SC. The permanent Member States are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The current non-permanent Member States are Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia. The non-permanent Member States on the SC are elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Article 23 of the UN Charter requires the non-permanent Member States to be elected according to “equitable geographical distribution.” To fulfill the requirement of equitable geographical distribution, the General Assembly passed Resolution 1991 A (XVIII) in 1963, requiring five non-permanent Member States to be elected from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and two from Western Europe or elsewhere.
The SC reaches decisions by voting, and every Member State receives one vote. Decisions on “procedural matters” require nine affirmative votes, rather than a simple majority. Decisions on “all other matters” also require nine votes, except that all permanent Member States must either vote affirmatively or abstain from voting. No clear distinction is made between which matters are procedural and which are non-procedural. The indeterminate nature of motions allows permanent Member States in the SC to exercise the “double veto” because the “preliminary question” to determine the procedural nature of a matter is itself eligible for the veto of a permanent Member State. The power of the double veto was first exercised in a June 7, 1945 “statement on voting” from all permanent Member States excluding France, but was not commonly used in the early years of the SC.
The SC is funded directly from the United Nations’ Regular Budget, which has declined in recent years due to Member States not fully paying their assessed contribution in a timely manner, potentially posing obstacles for the SC in the future. The UN Charter legally obligates Member States to make independent contributions to the SC’s peacekeeping efforts.
Recent SC activity affirming its dedication to peaceful resolution includes S/RES/2788 (2025), which “encourages the Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations is able to lead and support mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts.” The UN Charter compels all Member States to comply with decisions made by SC. In the event that Member States fail to comply with the SC, the SC also possesses the power to impose “complete or partial interruption of economic relations.” Currently, 726 individuals and 273 groups or organizations are subject to restrictions on economic relations by the SC. Finally, the SC has the authority to approve of the use of force when economic restrictions are insufficient. The SC may implement peacekeeping, “to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement,” peacebuilding, to “reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict,” peacemaking, to “address conflicts in progress,” and/or peace enforcement, which “involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force.” UN Peacekeeping operations began shortly after the UN’s founding with the deployment of peacekeepers to the Middle East in 1948 to supervise a truce between Israel and its neighboring Member States. To date, there have been more than 70 peacekeeping operations involving hundreds of thousands of personnel from more than 120 Member States. The First UN Emergency Force, deployed to Egypt in 1956, was the first armed peacekeeping operation. There are currently 11 active peacekeeping operations. Current operations include the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the first peacekeeping operation established in 1948.
In the past few years, Member States have increasingly called for structural reform in the UN, including the SC. In January 2026, the General Assembly held open discussions “on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council.” UN Secretary-General António Guterres has spoken on the concerns of equitable representation noted by the General Assembly, saying “The Security Council is not about hegemons and empires. It is about parents who have lost their children, refugees flung far from their homes, soldiers who have sacrificed their limbs.” Others are concerned the SC’s veto power may contribute to SC inefficiency. For example, in 2025 alone a permanent Member State’s veto prevented significant SC resolutions on both the conflict in Gaza and the conflict in Ukraine. Facing financial constraints, growing calls for structural reform, and a rapidly expanding list of global crises, the ability of the Security Council to fulfill its mission, and therefore the future of the SC itself, remains unclear.
The United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC, or the Council) annual agenda can be generated from the following five sources: the previous year's agenda, the President of the SC, any UN Member State, the UN Secretary-General, and/or other UN bodies. Regarding the previous year’s agenda, the SC may decide to keep certain items on its agenda if more discussion is deemed necessary by the body. For example, a universal yet timeless topic that reappears on the agenda nearly every year is Women, Peace, and Security.
Additionally, the Office of the SC President plays a crucial role in determining the agenda, as it has the ability to place items on the agenda. For example, in January 2000, the United States of America, which held the Office of the Presidency at the time, placed AIDS as a threat to international security on the agenda.
Furthermore, Article 35 of the UN Charter grants UN Member States the right to refer disputes to the SC. In 1948, India used this mechanism to refer the situation in Kashmir to the SC. Likewise, under Article 99, the UN Secretary-General may bring items to the attention of the SC, as seen when Former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cueller asked the Council to investigate violations of the Geneva Convention in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.
Finally, other UN bodies may refer items to the SC. The General Assembly, for instance, is afforded this right under Article 11 of the UN Charter. General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948, for example, requested the SC discuss the demilitarization of Jerusalem.
In preparation of the formal agenda for the year, the President of the SC and the Secretary-General prepare a provisional agenda based on all sources of potential items. The provisional agenda is provided to the members of the SC, who then discuss and adopt the agenda. The SC may choose to discuss or not to discuss any agenda item referred to it by another body or Member State.
FrankMUN’s SC will operate differently than other committees held at FRANKMUN conferences. As opposed to providing delegates with pre-selected topics to consider, the SC, in line with how the real committee operates at the UN, will have an open agenda. The Council is charged with setting the agenda based on current issues of importance to the SC by means of a majority vote. Each delegate will be responsible for presenting two potential topics within their position papers that they will later defend before the SC to be considered as agenda items.
These two topics should reflect the most important issues or crisis affecting your Member State. Additionally, these topics do not need to reflect the topics presented to the delegates in the three updates that you will be provided as the conference approaches. The three updates provided prior to conference are simply tools to inspire delegates to think about current events from an international lens.
The SC will operate independently of the other organs at FrankMUN due to the possibility of a crisis scenario. Therefore, other UN organs represented at FrankMUN will not refer items to the SC. The Secretary-General and the President of the SC are staff members and will not impact substantive debate, except when necessary. This leaves the agenda in the hands of the SC delegates and therefore should be prepared for a range of likely topics.
At the first committee session and after roll call, the President of the SC will open discussion of the agenda. Delegates may make formal speeches and utilize caucuses to discuss potential topics and negotiate how to proceed. After some discussion and negotiation, delegates may make motions to set the agenda. An example of such a motion is:
“The Delegate from Jordan moves for a discussion of the Situation in the Middle East.”
Note that the naming of the topic will affect the breadth of the topic. For instance, the issue of “Israeli practices concerning the human rights of the Palestinian people” is much narrower and more focused than “the situation in the Middle East.”
There can be multiple motions for different agenda items, but each motion can only name one potential agenda item. Motions for agenda items will be voted on in the order in which they are received. The first motion to receive nine or more affirmative votes will become the agenda item. At the conclusion of discussion of that agenda item (either through voting or adjournment of the agenda item), the SC will again move back into a discussion of setting the agenda, and the process will proceed until the next agenda item passes by nine or more votes. Delegates may choose to negotiate more than one agenda item at a time, but they can only vote on one item at a time. For example, delegates may decide amongst themselves to discuss “The Situation Regarding Iran’s Atomic Energy Program” and then “Children in Armed Conflict.” However, only one agenda item may be adopted at a time. Thus, delegates would move to set the agenda as the first topic. Once the topic regarding Iran has been discussed and resolutions have been voted on or discussion on the topic has been adjourned, then the SC will move to discuss the agenda again, and delegates would have to move to discuss “Children in Armed Conflict.”
The SC will adhere to the voting rules set forward in the UN Charter. All votes (both procedural and substantive) in the Security Council require a minimum of nine affirmative votes to pass, as outlined in the UN Charter. For instance, a vote of eight in favor, with zero opposed and seven abstentions would fail. Substantive votes (draft resolutions, amendments, and the second vote on division of question) additionally require the “concurring votes” of the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the SC (China, France, Russia, UK, and US). The UN interprets that an abstention by a member of the P5 does not represent a veto. Therefore, for a resolution to pass, all members of the P5 must either vote yes or abstain, and the resolution must receive a minimum of nine affirmative votes. In both 2018 and 2019, the veto was utilized on three occasions, while 2010 and 2013 saw zero veto votes and 2000, no vetoes were cast.
Due to the open agenda of the SC, delegates will be asked to write position papers that are different from all other FRANKMUN committees. In place of a topic in the Background Guide, delegates will be presented with two relevant topic updates in the weeks leading up to the conference. These topic updates are intended to help prepare delegates with awareness of real-world events that may impact debate in committee. Please note that topics chosen by delegates do not need to reflect those topics presented in the Committee updates.
For their position papers, delegates should identify two issues related to international peace and security that best reflect the interests of their Member State. Position papers should present the significance of the two issues in the order in which their Member State wishes to see them addressed. For instance, the delegate for Chad may propose the following two topics in order: 1) UN Efforts to Remove Landmines; and 2) Eliminating the Small Arms trade in Africa, whereas the delegate for the United Kingdom may propose: 1) UN Participation in the Rebuilding of Iraq; and 2) Terrorism.
The South China Sea, located South of China, East of Viet Nam, North oflndonesia, and West of the Philippines, is one of the world's most strategically valuable and contested maritime regions.' As a result, disagreements over sovereignty, resources, and freedom of navigation in this region have remained a source of tension between great powers and regional actors.2 Today, many Member States, including China, Viet Nam, the Philippines, and Japan, have competing territorial claims and economic interests in the region which are a source of international diplomatic tension and conflict.3 This has resulted in smaller Pacific Member States like Fiji, Tuvalu, and Kiribati to express concern about not only their overall relations with Member States making territorial claims within the South China Sea, but also whether smaller Member States have the resources and capabilities to ensure that defenses are capable should the need arise.4 Overall, the politics of the South China Sea region are incredibly pertinent to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as tensions are not only brewing between the larger Pacific Member States, but also smaller Member States, which would be most impacted if an issue were to arise.5 Being as other Member States across the globe hold interests in trade routes based in the South China Sea, it is an issue that the UNSC should seek to address before tensions come to a head in the region.6
The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895, ending the first Sino-Japanese War and giving Japan control of Taiwan.7 However, in the years since the signing, it has been contested whether the Treaty of Shimonoseki encompassed the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are located Northeast ofTaiwan.8 The treaty included "all islands appertaining or belonging to" Taiwan, however China and Japan, both parties to the treaty, disagreed over the scope of this provision.9 ln 1937, Japan strengthened its control of the South China Sea by invading the Pratas Islands, before later taking control of the Island ofHainan in 1939, both located close to China in the North of the South China Sea.10 Prior to the Japanese occupation, China was involved on Hainan as it was used for trade." When Japan surrendered at the end of World War II, it ceded significant control to the Allied Powers, with "all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate [the] surrender" of imperial Japan.12 The control given to the Allies meant the United States gained control of the Ryukyu Islands, which they interpreted to include the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.13 Control of the Pratas Islands was then returned to China after the war.14
In 1947, China published a map with an "eleven-dash line" which asserted sovereignty over significant sections of the South China Sea.15 The eleven-dash line overlaps into the exclusive economic zones and territorial areas of the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Viet Nam.16 In 1948, China sought to regain control of the Ryuktu Islands, which were under United States control; however, the US did not return control of the islands until 1952.17 In 1953, China published a revised map of territorial claims, ceding its claim to control over the Gulf of Tonkin in a new "nine-dash line", which revised the eleven-dash line.18 Control of the Gulf of Tonkin was given to Viet Nam at this time.19 In May 1970, China claimed ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after a UN report found potential for "substantial energy deposits" in the region.20 In a bid to grow their regional hegemony, China invaded the Paracel Islands in 1974, claiming the territory from Viet Nam.21
In 1982, the UN adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).22 Among its provisions, UNCLOS establishes the right of innocent passage for all Member States, meaning such passage does not pose a risk to the security of another Member State.23 UNCLOS also restricted the scope of an exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles from a Member State's territorial sea.24 Within exclusive economic zones, Member States have broad rights of sovereignty, the ability to extract resources, build artificial strnctures, and conduct research.25 When two or more coastal Member States occupy the same exclusive economic zone, UNCLOS states they should arrive at a mutual agreement on "measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation" of the area.26 In 1992, China opposed UNCLOS by passing a similar law, the "Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," which claimed the entirety of the South China Sea as Chinese territory.27 The Law of the Territorial Sea extended the right of innocent passage to non-military ships but also imposed restrictions to "safeguard State security as well as [China's] maritime rights and interests," such as a "designated sea lane" to direct traffic.28 After legal proceedings were initiated by the Philippines, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), established by the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, has since ruled that these territorial claims violate UNCLOS.29 Following the ruling, China strongly denounced both the outcome and the PCA, alleging international bias and issuing a statement which asserted that the ruling will not be enforced domestically.30
Since the adoption of the UNCLOS, questions have arisen regarding the effectiveness of international law in maintaining security within the South China Sea.31 In I988, China attacked three ships belonging to Viet Nam in the Johnson Reef, causing 74 deaths.32 This occurred during a series of economic reforms in China which made coastal areas such as the Johnson Reef more valuable for maritime resources.33 In 1995, a Chinese construction was found in Mischief Reef, which China claimed was a structure for fishermen, but due in part to the withdrawal of the United States' military presence in the area, the structure is now linked to Chinese military presence in the region.34 In 2000, China and Viet Nam signed a treaty agreeing to maritime boundaries for the Gulf ofTonkin.35 A new territorial map affirmed by China in 2009 included "approximately 2,000,000 square kilometers of maritime space, an area equal to about 22 percent of China's land area."36 The 2009 version of the nine-dash line is still in use today when it comes to consideration of the South China Sea.37
Modem tensions over the South China Sea are largely due to its crucial status as a vector for trade for many Member States.38 The South China Sea accounted for an estimated 21 percent of global trade in 20 I6, or $3.4 trillion USD.39 In 2014, a Chinese oil rig was found in contested waters near the Parcel Islands, prompting appeals to the Secretary-General.40 These stakes were raised when in 2025, CNOOC Ltd. found over"100 million tons of oil equivalent" in the South China Sea.41 However, more recent evidence has contributed some nuance to the situation; as of 2016, analysis of satellite imagery revealed a total of 1,082 platforms in the South China Sea, with most belonging to Malaysia or Thailand, and less than one half of pre-20IO platforms reported in other studies as being built by China were found to actually belong to China.42
China has also made recent efforts to increase its presence in the South China Sea by artificially creating new islands, as well as expanding existing ones.43 The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative estimates that over 3,200 acres ofland have been created via the creation of these artificial islands by China.44 Some experts argue that UNCLOS only permits artificial island construction within a Member State's exclusive economic zone, which experts debate whether these islands fall under.45 Additionally, it has been stated that the construction of these artificial islands may cause "widespread damage to coral ecosystems through physical burial as well as indirect turbidity effects."46
China's military presence in the South China Sea has been persistent in recent years, beginning with Viet Nam accusing China of sinking one of their fishing ships in 2020.47 In April 2026, Chinese ships were alleged to have blocked the entrance to the Scarborough Shoal, a significant fishing area in the South China Sea, after the Philippines sent its coast guard to accompany their fishing vessels.48 In the following months, the United States Coast Guard cooperated with the Philippines to conduct a patrol near the Scarborough Shoal along with Chinese ships later using water cannons against Filipino ships when delivering supplies to fishermen.49
Although the UNSC has not yet taken direct action regarding the South China Sea, it has considered the matter in recent discussions with a January 2026 statement to the SC, on behalf of the United States expressing concern over the international effects of the disputed territorial claims in the region.50 However, the conflict in the South China Sea still remains unresolved; as of late June of 2026, China still has a military presence in the area patrolling the Scarborough Shoal.51 China stiII claims ownership of large areas of the South China Sea and frequently takes effort to secure its control, leaving the diplomatic future of the region uncertain.52
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D. L. Michalk. "HAINAN ISLAND: A BRIEF HISTORlCAL SKETCH." Journal of the Hong Kong Branch ofrhe Royal Asiatic Society 26 (1986): 115-43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23887126.
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