History of the General Assembly Plenary

At the end of World War II, representatives from around the world came together for a two-month conference during which they drafted and signed the Charter for the United Nations (UN). The UN was created to maintain international peace and security, develop diplomatic relations, foster social progress, and promote human rights. The General Assembly (GA) is a central organ of the UN and is comprised of all 193 Member States. In the GA,  Member States deliberate the vast array of issues pertinent to the body and make recommendations to set the standard for codification of international law.

Intrinsically, the mandate of the GA is outlined in Chapter IV (Articles 10-22) of the Charter of the United  Nations. Article 10 stipulates the GA is tasked with discussing "any questions or any matters within the scope or  relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the [Charter]." Article 15 asserts the GA “shall  receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of  the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security." In addition, the GA shall consider reports from other organs of the UN and make recommendations to the Security  Council and all Member States. The GA also serves to elect the UN Secretary-General based on recommendations  from the Security Council. 

The GA has six main committees which roughly summarize the topics of discussion mandated by the UN Charter:  the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee), the Economic and Financial Committee  (Second Committee), the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee), the Special Political and  Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee),  and the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). The GA and the six main committees can mandate a subsidiary body to consider a particular issue and to submit reports to the GA. The GA has the power to set the budget, establish financial assessments of Member States, and elect members of councils and organs, including the non-permanent members of the Security Council (SC) and the Secretary-General of the UN. The President and 21 Vice-Presidents of the GA oversee the direction of the GA Plenary, which drives the six main committees. The GA and its main committees can establish subsidiary bodies of varying scope and duration for specific problems to report back to the GA. During sessions of the GA Plenary, agenda items are considered through debate, and any number of resolutions may be adopted by the body. The six main committees run independent sessions and report back to the GA Plenary. 

The GA has universal membership, with each of the 193 Member States attaining one equal vote. Non-Member  States, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can participate in GA sessions with the status of Observer; however, these groups do not have voting rights. Most resolutions in the GA Plenary are decided by a simple majority. However, a two-thirds majority is required in the Plenary on essential issues, such as maintenance of international peace and security, the admission of new members, the suspension and expulsion of members, and all budgetary questions. 

All assessments on the regular UN budget are considered and approved by the GA. The Committee on  Contributions advises the GA on how much each Member State pays to the UN. Draft resolutions with budget  implications must be examined by the GA Fifth Committee before they can be adopted in the GA. The GA budget  covers UN activities across a range of areas, including political affairs, international justice and law, regional  cooperation for development, human rights and humanitarian affairs, and public information. During the 72nd session, the GA endorsed the proposal to move from a biennial planning and budgeting period to an annual program  budget on a trial basis. In December 2023, the GA Fifth Committee approved a USD 3.59 billion budget for the 2024 fiscal year, a USD 300 million increase from the 2022-2023 budget.

The GA meets in regular, annual sessions and in special sessions, which consist of formal and informal meetings. All GA sessions are numbered consecutively, and debate begins on the third Tuesday of September. Since the  GA’s 44th session (1989-1990), the GA has been formally regarded as being active through the whole year, even if  they are not officially in session. Additionally, the GA may also hold special sessions, which can be convened  either at the request of the Security Council or a majority of Member States. There have been 32 GA Special  Sessions as of February 2024. The last two special sessions addressed the coronavirus pandemic (31st session) and  the challenges and measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation (32nd  session). The GA can also hold emergency special sessions, in which the GA can make decisions on issues that are  under the exclusive mandate of the SC if the SC fails to decide on an issue due to a lack of consensus among its  permanent members. There have been 11 emergency special sessions as of February 2024. The 11th special  session was called due to the lack of unanimity among the Security Council when deciding a course of action  regarding the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine. The GA adopted A/RES/ES-11/1 on March 2, 2022, in  which the GA condemned the actions of the Russian Federation and urged Member States to help with the humanitarian crisis that resulted from this invasion. Additionally, as of February 2024, the 10th special session was  reconvened for the first time since 2018 to address the call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.

The 78th Session of the GA commenced in September 2023. The GA has emphasized “peace, prosperity, progress,  and sustainability” as top priorities for the session. In December 2023, the GA adopted 99 resolutions and three decisions, tackling the international rise of Nazism, promoting safety for journalists, eradicating global poverty, and  affirming rights to self-determination for both Ukrainian and Palestinian people. The 78th session has also heard  several resolutions relating to nuclear proliferation and pushing towards total nuclear disarmament. Additionally, while the United Nations has not yet taken action in Gaza, the GA has taken particular interest, passing several resolutions impacting aspects of the conflict. The most current action as of April 2024 is A/RES/78/251, condemning the continued deaths of the United Nations Work and Relief Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. The resolution was presented as a larger report from the Fifth Committee in December 2023.

Preventing and Mitigating the Weaponization of Outer Space 

Introduction:

James Smith McDonnell, the founder of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, a producer of rockets and spacecraft, once  said “The creative conquest of space will serve as a wonderful substitute for war,” that is until space itself becomes a  war zone. Humans have been exploring space since October 4, 1957, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  (USSR) launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, into Earth’s orbit. Fearing the USSR’s growing power, The United States of America (US) raced to launch its own satellite, the Explorer, into Earth’s orbit on January 31,  1958. From 1961-2021, there have been a total of 580 space missions, with 339 successful missions reaching an  Earth orbit. As the initial novelty of space exploration wore off, the international community established outer  space as an “international common” in the 1976 Outer Space Treaty, but it quickly became “a contested, congested, and competitive domain.” Accordingly, world leaders placed pressure on the international community to define  where outer space begins and to codify norms, rules, and principles governing this new domain. The United  Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) has debated and passed a number of treaties and resolutions in relation to  outer space since the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, in recent years, the GA First Committee (Disarmament  and International Security) has raised concern over Member States once again vying for space supremacy. As science continues to advance rapidly, Member States increasingly rely on space-based technology for commercial, civil, and defense purposes. As such, the weaponization of space has emerged as an urgent topic of concern among  the international community.

History: 

Following World War II (WWII), the US and USSR fought to prove their global superiority across various cultural,  military, and political fronts, including advancements in technology. Despite being allies during WWII, the  superpowers’ relationship soured as the US demonstrated its newly-acquired power to instantly level cities with the  use of the atomic bomb to force Japan’s surrender. The following roughly 50-year period became known as the  Cold War, because, while there was no direct military engagement between the two superpowers, “the period was  characterized by an aggressive and costly arms race; bloody proxy wars;” and a high-tension competition “for world  dominance between the US-led capitalist governments and Soviet-led communist bloc.” Immediately after the end  of WWII, both the US and USSR began building rockets to use as long-range weapons, creating a defensive arms  race that quickly gave way to a space race as the two superpowers sought to build rockets for space exploration. 

Thus, space quickly became a crucial arena and “final frontier” for the US and USSR to demonstrate their technological advancements and superiority as the world’s “sole superpower.”

Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite launched by the USSR in 1957, demonstrated the sheer power of the  USSR’s missiles and the increasingly deadly potential for the USSR to send a nuclear weapon to space or flying  towards another Member State. In response, the US launched its own satellite on January 31, 1958, and President  Eisenhower established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in July 1958. Working  tangentially with NASA, Eisenhower also created two space programs with the US Air Force and Central  Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct satellite military reconnaissance, recovering photos of the numbers and  locations of the USSR’s nuclear missiles and bombers. Despite this progress, the US remained “behind” in the  space race as the USSR sent the first human into orbit in 1961. However, the US quickly gained ground, achieving  ten crewed flights to space in the next five years and the first space docking. Ultimately, the US “won” the space  race on July 16, 1969 when Apollo 11 successfully landed on the moon, and Neil Armstrong became the first person  to set foot on the moon's surface. Beyond the US and USSR, the rapid development of military technology spurred  space exploration amongst other Member States, including Canada, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the  United Kingdom (UK), and France.

Canada became the third Member State to successfully design and build its own satellite, Alouette I, which was  launched into orbit by NASA in 1962. Two years after the launch of Sputnik, the PRC sent its first artificial  satellite, Project 581, into space, with this project “economically and materially” supported by the USSR. However, the USSR pulled its funding after political unrest between the two Member States. Despite this, the PRC  became the third Member State to send humans into space in 2003. The UK also attempted to keep up with the US  and USSR during the Cold War by developing its first military rocket, Blue Streak – and its test rocket Black Knight  – to launch nuclear weapons. While the project was ultimately cancelled in 1960 due to cost, the British  government began using its rockets for civilian purposes, such as launching satellites into orbit. In 1971, the  satellite Prospero was launched into space by the UK using solely British technology. Similarly, despite many of  France’s ambitious space exploration programs being grounded due to a lack of funding, France established the  Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) and began launching beta satellites in 1965. France quickly realized the expensive cost of space exploration made international collaboration a necessity and thus played an instrumental role in setting up the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1973. 

A little over a decade later, the idea of collaboration to decrease the cost of space exploration developed into the International Space Station (ISS), a program bringing together international flight crews, launch vehicles,  engineering, communications networks, and more. Elements of the ISS were designed and constructed between  1984 and 1993 by a number of Member States, including the US, Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, and  members of the ESA. The ISS remains an example of international collaboration as five partner agencies – the  Canadian Space Agency, the European Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, NASA, and the  State Space Corporation “Roscosmos” – work together to operate it. The ISS is expected to “continue to be a  working laboratory and outpost in orbit until at least 2030.”

Beyond military capabilities, the new arena of space and space technology revolutionized many scientific fields. In the 1950s, the same satellite technology used for military reconnaissance also revolutionized weather forecasting as the US launched the first meteorological satellite in 1960, capturing pictures of the Earth’s cloud patterns. Furthermore, Telstar 1, the first communications satellite – owned by the American Telephone and Telegraph  Company (AT&T) and launched by NASA – entered Earth’s orbit in 1962. While it was deactivated in 1963, the success of Telstar 1 led to the launch of Early Bird, a global communications satellite backed by the US  government. In 1964, 18 Member States convened to create the International Telecommunications Satellite  Organization, originally abbreviated as INTELSAT but later changed to ITSO, “to [internationally] own and manage  a constellation of communications satellites providing international broadcast services.” Although founded as a public-private consortium, INTELSAT was privatized in 2001 with public services under the oversight of the  ITSO. In 1966, the US launched its first satellite with the Global Positioning System (GPS) to monitor submarines carrying nuclear missiles. Although originally reserved for military use only, President Reagan authorized the use of GPS by civilian commercial airlines in 1983 to improve air travel safety and navigation. In 2000, President Clinton made the system public for all civil and commercial uses.

Current Situation:

In 2023, global government expenditure for space programs hit a record high of approximately USD 117 billion,  with the US having the highest space expenditure in the world at USD 73.2 billion. The People’s Republic of  China (PRC) followed the US, spending over USD 14 billion on space programs in 2023. As Member States  continue to increase spending on space exploration and satellites, the international community increasingly relies on  the use of space for peaceful purposes, such as communications (television, cell phones, radio, and more), transportation (GPS and air traffic control), environmental management, observations, weather analysis and  predictions, climate change, surveillance of natural disasters, and “minimally invasive verification of international treaties.” In 2018, communications activities alone comprised 26 percent of the total space economy, and this  number is expected to grow to over 50 percent by 2040. In 2021, the global revenue from the space economy came  from a wide array of activities, such as space research, exploration, and utilization and was valued at around USD  469.3 billion. In the same year, USD 224.4 billion came from commercial space products – such as communications and remote sense satellites – and services alone. In addition to Member States, there is an  increasing engagement of private actors – such as Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin and Elon Musk’s SpaceX – in space  exploration and commercial space, posing both unique challenges and opportunities for collaboration. While  private companies offer new avenues for scientific discovery and technological development, their presence in space creates issues, such as gaps in space law, and exacerbates others, such as the proliferation of space debris. With  satellite launch costs declining, the commercialization of space is rapidly increasing, and without “general space  norms” or “governing regimes,” there is no guarantee all parties will use space for peaceful purposes.

There are thousands of satellites orbiting Earth, and a conflict in space affecting these satellites would have wide ranging implications for civilians and militaries alike. Most space weapons systems can be placed into one of three  categories: space-to-space, space-to-earth, and earth-to-space. A space-to-earth weapon is any weapon in orbit able  to attack or disrupt a terrestrial target. Space-to-space weapons are “satellites or other assets that are placed into orbit and attack or disrupt other satellites.” However, technical challenges make space-to-earth and space-to-space  weapons “unlikely to be pursued in the short term.” Earth-to-space weapons – such as direct-ascent anti-satellite  weapons and directed energy lasers and jammers, all which have been tested by the US, PRC, the Russian  Federation, and India – currently pose the greatest threat. Of particular concern are the development of nuclear armed anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). ASATs are weapons “designed to destroy or limit satellites for military  purposes.” Kinetic energy ASATs physically collide with other satellites at high velocities or deploy other  methods, such as drones, ballistic missiles, and explosives, to destroy satellites. On the other hand, non-kinetic  energy ASATs use non-physical mechanisms to interfere with satellite functions, such as “blinding satellites with  lasers, launching cyberattacks, or jamming frequencies.” While ASATs have existed since the Cold War, nuclear  weapons are strictly prohibited in space under the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. In addition, the detonation of such  a weapon in space would take out satellites indiscriminately, likely destroying many of the attacker’s own satellites  and making it unlikely for any Member State to launch such a weapon.

The potential for cyberattacks on satellites continues to be a pressing threat, as “hackers can upload malware to  satellite terminals that gives them control of the devices, shuts them down, cuts off communication with the ground,” or forces a satellite to overheat and explode. Unlike nuclear weapons in space, there are no treaties preventing cyberattacks on satellites. Such an attack on satellites would impact military and civilian activity alike,  as satellites are crucial for daily conveniences like the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Internet, but also in  defense systems and environmental monitoring. Furthermore, space systems often have a “dual use” for Member  States, performing both civilian and military functions. Infrastructure critical to civilian needs, such as healthcare,  transportation, communications, energy, and trade, are increasingly dependent on satellites and other space  systems. The destruction or disabling of these systems could have wide-reaching impacts for civilians across the  globe. This threat persists as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity and the CyberPeace Institute found  the number of cyberattacks has increased by 300 percent in the past five years, emphasizing the need for increased  international cybersecurity measures in space “to protect sensitive data and prevent unauthorized access to critical satellite systems.”

On August 23, 2023, India became only the fourth Member State to successfully land a spacecraft on the moon and  the first Member State to land near the little-explored south pole region, where “permanently shadowed craters may  hold frozen water that could help future astronaut missions.” In February 2024, India unveiled its shortlist of  astronauts for its first human spaceflight mission to take place in 2025. Currently, only the US, the Russian  Federation, and the PRC have the capability of carrying out manned spaceflights. As India marks the fourth  nuclear-armed Member State to land on the moon and prepares to carry out its first human spaceflight – and other Member States, such as Japan, South Korea and members of the ESA, race to follow pursuit – the international  community has once again become enveloped in conversations around the preservation of peaceful space  exploration and use, and the prevention of a space arms race with space weapons systems.

Actions Taken by the United Nations:

Prior to the launch of the first satellite into Earth’s orbit, the UN began efforts to maintain outer space for peaceful  purposes. To assist in the prevention and mitigation of the weaponization of space, the GA established the ad hoc  Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1958, later becoming the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 1992. In the spirit of the Cold War and heightened fear around nuclear weapons, early UN  proposals in the late 1950s and early 1960s considered the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These efforts only heightened after the US conducted  five space nuclear tests in 1962, knocking out roughly a third of the 22 satellites in orbit at the time, including  Telstar 1. In 1967, after being considered by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the GA, the  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”) entered into force. 

Today, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) has 114 states-parties – Member States that have ratified or acceded to the  international treaty – with another 22 Member States having signed but not completed ratification. The OST  opens with the statement, “The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,  shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or  scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.” Simply put, the OST establishes outer space for  peaceful purposes that benefit the international community and codifies space as a domain not subject to national  appropriation or claims of sovereignty by any Member State. Accordingly, the OST lays the foundation for  international space law, and notably prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other WMD in outer space and  on celestial bodies. The term “weapons of mass destruction” is not defined in the OST but is commonly  understood to mean “nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.” Although the treaty’s repeated call for the use  of outer space for peaceful purposes is often broadly interpreted to prohibit all types of weapons in outer space, the OST does not explicitly do so. Four other treaties have been adopted to reinforce the OST: the Rescue Agreement  of 1968 (“requires States to assist an astronaut in case of accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing”); the Liability Convention of 1972 (“establishes the standards of liability for damage caused by space objects”); the Registration Convention of 1975 (“requires States to register all objects launched into outer space with the United  Nations”); and the Moon Agreement of 1979 (“elaborates on the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as they apply  to the Moon and other celestial bodies”).

Following the adoption of the OST, the UN has continuously addressed the peaceful use of outer space through  conventions, resolutions, and working groups. In 2005, the GA adopted A/RES/60/66 to explore and develop  transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space activities. Five years later, in 2010, the  GA adopted A/RES/65/68 to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to conduct a study on outer space  and set TCBMs for Member States and international organizations to implement on a voluntary basis. Some of the  recommended measures included: information exchange on space policies and notifications related to space  activities; contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities; and consultative mechanisms. The Secretary General’s 2017 report on TCBMs in outer space activities (A/72/65) included replies from 9 Member States – including the PRC, France, the US, and the UK – and the European Union providing support and updates on the  implementation of the recommended TCBMs. For instance, France highlighted its implementation of the  recommendations, including its public national registry of objects in orbit provided through its participation in the  Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.137 In 2017, the GA adopted A/RES/72/250 to  establish a GGE “to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding  instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space,” but the group was unable to reach a consensus. 

In 2020, the GA adopted A/RES/75/36, noting the increasing threat of long-lived space debris, cyber interference  and attacks, and the difficulty in verifying the military and/or civilian use of satellites. This resolution sought to  study existing and potential threats, characterize outer space activities as responsible, irresponsible, or threatening, and for Member States to share ideas on the development and implementation of establishing norms, rules and  principles of responsible behavior to prevent an arms race in space. The resolution also gave guidelines and  suggestions including encouraging Member States to “consider establishing channels of direct communication for  the management of perceptions of threat.” Furthermore, A/RES/75/36 “invites” Member States to inform the  Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission of their national space security policies, strategies  or doctrines as well as potential threats and security risks to space systems. Despite this resolution, division  between Member States remains as some support “promoting responsible behaviors through voluntary  commitments” while others call “for an early start of negotiations on a legally binding instrument.” The latter believe a new, legally binding international space treaty is needed as the OST only prevents the placement of nuclear  weapons and WMD, leaving room for another arms race and the weaponization of space by other means. 

Conclusion: 

Over the years, the GA has increasingly taken steps needed to mitigate the weaponization of outer space. However, the threat of outer space weaponization remains as space security becomes increasingly linked to economic and social stability on Earth. The GA Plenary and GA First committees have placed a priority on creating an international, legally-binding instrument to prevent an arms race that has yet to be established. As such, current international agreements do not offer an enforceable means of addressing the weaponization of space;  thus, enforcement heavily relies on diplomacy. Creating and adopting an international framework for the  enforcement and adjudication of outer space practices is imperative as international organizations have emphasized  the immeasurable human cost of using weapons in space. The increasing presence of non-state actors in space and  use of satellites for multiple purposes, including military and civilian, highlights the need for heightened cybersecurity in space and the demand for a treaty to prevent the weaponization of outer space. Whether in the  form of a binding, legal treaty or a new set of transparency and confidence-building measures, it is evident the international community needs further guidance to prevent and mitigate the weaponization of outer space.

Committee Directive

Delegates should look at how the Member State is currently involved in the topic, whether directly within domestic and international foreign policies or indirectly through socioeconomic implications of other Member States’ actions.  Delegates should seek information on what their Member State is doing nationally to address the issue and how those actions may affect other Member States both regionally and internationally. In doing so, delegates should ask themselves the following questions: what are some current national, regional, and international space weaponization prevention and aid policies that have seen positive improvements? What can the GA Plenary do to incentivize Member States to proactively become involved in preventing the weaponization of space? What are the consequences of ignoring the  need to prevent the weaponization of space, such as economic, security, and humanitarian effects? Overall, delegates should address these questions with realistic solutions for implementing their goals. Delegates should focus on building upon established UN, GA, and other multilateral programs and initiatives rather than creating new bodies within the UN or the GA Plenary. Delegates should also focus on the issue as a whole and not specific situations.

Annotated Bibliography

Preventing and Mitigating the Weaponization of Outer Space

1. Chow, Brian G. “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2, 2018, pp. 107–32, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26430818.

2. Strategic Studies Quarterly (SSQ) is a peer-reviewed strategic journal of the United States Air Force for national and international security professionals. This article, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” discusses the need for space arms control and proposes a hybrid approach to achieve effective and verifiable control measures for space weapons. The approach includes measures such as prohibiting certain weapons from tailgating satellites, monitoring potential treaty violations, and using pre-launch inspections to prevent long-range weapons from being launched into orbit. The journal goes in-depth to address what Member States can do to achieve peace in space, such as implementing a comprehensive space arms control treaty with measures like prelaunch inspections of spacecrafts, banning certain categories of space-based weapons, and controlling the use of potential weapons in space. By establishing clear guidelines for the registration and technical specifications of space systems, Member States can ensure they are not used for offensive purposes.

3. Moltz, James Clay. “The Changing Dynamics of Twenty-First-Century Space Power.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 12, no. 1, 2019, pp. 15–43, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26623076.

4. The Journal of Strategic Security (JSS) is a multi-disciplinary forum of strategic security issues drawing from the fields of global security, international relations, intelligence, terrorism, counterterrorism studies, and more. The article, “The Changing Dynamics of Twenty-First Century Space Power,” provides an in- depth analysis of the changing dynamics of 21st-century space power, with a focus on the United States (US), Russia, and China. The emergence of factors such as the growth of commercial space start-ups and the presence of increasingly space-capable allies and private companies has had a significant impact on space activities. The article also examines the challenges and opportunities facing the US, Russia, and China’s space power, including military, commercial, and technological aspects, such as investing in both civil and military space capabilities; developing effective policies to engage the commercial sector and allies; and the decline in state orders and marketable products for the increasingly competitive and innovation-driven commercial market. The article explains how space power and the promotion of commercial space capabilities are important for UN Member States to ensure national security.

5. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. The Outer Space Treaty: Overcoming Space Security Governance Challenges. Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29986. 

6. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization providing a better understanding of the foreign policy choices facing the international community. This article, The Outer Space Treaty: Overcoming Space Security Governance Challenges, discusses the challenges and limitations of the current global governance mechanisms for outer space activities, particularly considering the increasing diversification of actors and growing competition in space. It highlights the outdated nature of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its subsidiary legal instruments, which are not well-suited to address contemporary challenges, such as the weaponization of outer space and the need to regulate counter-space technologies. This article addresses how UN Member States can create a more effective and inclusive framework for governing outer space activities. The article also recommends formulating new, more inclusive space regulations, stressing the importance of including the voices of emerging powers and developing Member States, ensuring better compliance.

7. Zahoor, Saadia. “Maintaining International Peace and Security by Regulating Military Use of Outer Space.” Policy Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 2, 2017, pp. 113–35, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/polipers.14.2.0113.

8. Policy Perspectives is the flagship journal of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), distinctive in combining original research papers with reflective studies and analyses. The article, “Maintaining International Peace and Security by Regulating Military Use of Outer Space,” discusses the ambiguity in Article 51 of the UN Charter regarding the right of anticipatory self-defense and the interpretation of “peaceful use” of space. In its analysis, the article addresses the concerns about the weaponization of space and the potential threats it poses to world peace. The article also advocates the need for a consolidated legal regime to prevent the weaponization of space. Additionally, the article discusses the role of Member States in promoting the peaceful use of space technology for the benefit of humanity to uphold international laws and treaties, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the placement of nuclear or weapons of mass destruction in space.

9. Frank Church Model United Nations extends its deepest gratitude to the Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) for allowing us to use their resources for our conference.