"Futures with digital minds: Expert forecasts in 2025" with Lucius Caviola

We asked experts to forecast what the future holds for digital minds (defined as computer-bases systems with a capacity for subjective experience). Their answers suggest short timelines and a fast takeoff.

"AI Alignment vs. AI Ethical Treatment: Ten Challenges"  with Adam Bradley (forthcoming) in Analytic Philosophy.

We argue that aligning AI systems that merit moral consideration without mistreating them would be challenging.

"Varieties of Moral Agency and Risks of Digital Dystopia" (forthcoming) in American Philosophical Quarterly, coauthored with Adam Bradley.

We argue that AI systems will likely have a form of moral agency and that this poses several distinctive and neglected catastrophic risks.

Status quo treatment risk calculator (associated talk)

How likely do you think it is it that we will cause a catastrophe by creating AI moral patients and treating them as mere tools?

"Digital Minds Takeoff Scenarios"  (2024) with Lucius Caviola.

We distinguish some different types of digital minds takeoff scenarios and offer some reflections on their implications for catastrophic risks.

"Digital Minds: Importance and Key Research Questions" (2024) (with Andreas Mogensen & Patrick Butlin)

We summarize some of our reasons for thinking that digital minds may be very important for making the future go well and highlight some key research topics in the area.

"Evolutionary debunking and value alignment"  (2024) Coauthored with Michael Dale in GPI Working Paper Series.

We examine how evolutionary debunking arguments bear on the value alignment problem in AI safety.

"In Search of a Biological Crux for AI Consciousness" in GPI Working Paper Series.

I identify a thesis concerning the relationship between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness.

"Input to UN Interim Report on Governing AI for Humanity" (2024)

Responding to an open call for feedback on a UN draft report on AI governance, other signatories and I offer recommendations concerning existential risk, openness in AI development, and non-human minds with moral standing.

"Simulations       and Catastrophic Risks" (2023) Sentience Institute Report.

This report provides an overview and exploration of various connections between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks.

"Digital suffering: why it’s a problem and how to prevent it" (2022) in Inquiry, coauthored with Adam Bradley.

We argue that the potential for suffering in future digital minds poses a catastrophic risk and propose a strategy for preventing such suffering.

For a response, see Dung (2023).

We've also written an accompanying FAQ on the Problem of Digital Suffering.

"A Dualist Theory of Experience" forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

I introduce and motivate delegatory dualism, a dualist theory on experiences are assigned to physical states with matching causal profiles and those physical states delegate their causal responsibilities to those experiences.

“Should Dualists Locate the Physical Basis of Experience in the Head?” in Synthese.

I argue that a puzzle about spatial experience gives dualists reason to opt for tracking dualism, a theory on which the physical basis of sensory experience reaches outside the head.

"Internal Constraints for Phenomenal Externalists: A Structure Matching Theory" in Synthese, coauthored with Bryce Dalbey.

We propose a novel, structure matching tracking theory of experience. The theory is designed to satisfy a range of constraints and to overcome problems for existing tracking intentionalist theories.

“Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach” in Analytic Philosophy.

I propose an interpretationist view of consciousness, show how it shields physical theories from Boltzmann brain problems, and explore interactions between it, fine-tuning, and time's arrow.

"A Dualist Theory of Experience" forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

I introduce and motivate delegatory dualism, a dualist theory on experiences are assigned to physical states with matching causal profiles and those physical states delegate their causal responsibilities to those experiences. Along the way the paper explores various forms of interactionist dualism.

"Two Solutions to the Neural Discernment Problem" in Philosophical Studies.

The neural discernment problem for interactionism is (roughly) that of explaining how non-physical minds produce behavior and cognition by exercising different causal powers over physiologically similar neurons. I propose two models of mind-brain interaction that solve it. One model avoids overdetermination while the other respects the causal  closure of the physical domain.

“A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness”  [pre-print] in an issue on David Chalmers's “Meta-Problem of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies.  Chalmers replies on pp. 11-4, 20 of his “Debunking Arguments for Illusionism about Consciousness”. 

The meta-problem of consciousness is (roughly) that of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain in physical terms. I propose a strategy for solving this problem. The strategy posits a fundamental law that operates on normative features of experiences in ways that bias experiences towards causing effects that they rationalize, including judgments about the difficulty of explaining consciousness in physical terms.

"An Exclusion Problem for Epiphenomenalist Dualism"  in Thought.

I argue that some physical theories generate an exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism and that this problem is hard to solve without making trouble for epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the more familiar causal exclusion problem.

"A Causal Argument for Dualism" in Philosophical Studies.

Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a causal argument for dualism, defend its prima facie plausibility, and spell out some of its implications.

"Indeterministic Causation and Two Patches for the Pairing Argument" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Interactionism holds that non-spatial objects (e.g. immaterial minds) stand in causal relations.  The pairing argument aims to refute interactionism.  The pairing argument relies on the premise that non-causal differences underwrite causal differences.  That premise is susceptible to counterexamples involving indeterministic causation.  I develop two new versions of the pairing argument that are immune to such counterexamples.

"Interactionism, Haecceities, and the Pairing Argument" in Inquiry.

I defend interactionism against the pairing argument. Roughly, my defense contends that the pairing argument fails for one reason if haecceities exist and another if they don't.

"Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?" in dialectica.

Reductive physicalists typically accept the causal argument for their view. Tiehen (2015a) parts ways with his fellow reductive physicalists. Heretically, he argues that the causal argument has an illicit warrant structure and that causal argument proponents should reject it. Although not myself a reductive physicalist, I show how reductive physicalists can answer this epistemological challenge.

 "Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough" forthcoming in Acta Analytica.

I answer Tiehen's (2015b) metaphysical challenge to proponents of the causal argument for physicalism: roughly, show that the causal closure of the physical has a ground that does not undermine the causal argument. My proposal gives physicalists reason to run the causal argument using a weaker closer premise than is typically assumed.

"How to Befriend Zombies: a Guide for Physicalists" in Philosophical Studies. 

Physicalists and zombies are not usually thought of as friends.  After all, zombies figure prominently in the conceivability argument against physicalism and physicalists must deny the possibility of zombies.  Nonetheless, I argue that there is room for a physicalist-zombie alliance.

"A Causal Argument for Dualism" in Philosophical Studies.

Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a causal argument for dualism, defend its prima facie plausibility, and spell out some of its implications.

"An Exclusion Problem for Epiphenomenalist Dualism"  in Thought.

I argue that some physical theories generate an exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism and that this problem is hard to solve without making trouble for epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the more familiar causal exclusion problem.

"In Search of a Biological Crux for AI Consciousness" in GPI Working Paper Series.

I identify a thesis concerning the relationship between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness and explain why the thesis does not correspond to any of the traditional views in the metaphysics of mind.

"Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?" in dialectica.

Reductive physicalists typically accept the causal argument for their view.  Tiehen (2015) parts ways with his fellow reductive physicalists. Heretically, he argues that reductive physicalists should reject the causal argument. Although not myself a reductive physicalist, I show how reductive physicalists can answer this challenge.

“Does Cognitive Phenomenology Support Dualism?" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

I argue that cognitive phenomenology supports dualism about experience

"Spatial  Experience,  Spatial  Reality,  and  Two  Paths to  Primitivism" in Synthese.

I argue that two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality each in their own way lead to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism, either about phenomenal representation or about instantiated spatial properties.

"A Causal Argument for Dualism" in Philosophical Studies.

I develop a causal argument for dualism, defend its prima facie plausibility, and spell out some of its implications.

“A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness”  [pre-print] in Journal of Consciousness Studies.

I introduce a teleological form of interactionism about consciousness and argue that it meets a range of challenges while also elegantly solving Chalmers's meta-problem of consciousness.

“Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach” in Analytic Philosophy.

I propose a view of consciousness, show how it shields physical theories from Boltzmann brain problems, and explore interactions between it, fine-tuning, and time's arrow.

"An Exclusion Problem for Epiphenomenalist Dualism" in Thought.

I argue that some physical theories generate an exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism and that this problem is hard to solve without making trouble for epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the more familiar causal exclusion problem.

"Spatial  Experience,  Spatial  Reality,  and  Two  Paths to  Primitivism" in Synthese.

I argue that two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality each in their own way lead to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism, either about phenomenal representation or about instantiated spatial properties.

“Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach” in Analytic Philosophy.

I propose a view of consciousness, show how it shields physical theories from Boltzmann brain problems raised by anthropic reasoning, and explore interactions between that view, fine-tuning, and time's arrow.

"Simulations and Catastrophic Risks" Sentience Institute Report.

This report provides an overview and exploration of various connections between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. Sections 12 and 13 of the report address connections between anthropic reasoning and simulations.

"Panpsychism and Ensemble Explanations" in Philosophical Studies, coauthored with Han Li.

We develop a problem for panpsychism. The problem is that  panpsychism imperils the anthropic reasoning operative in two appealing ensemble explanations, namely the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.

"Harmony in a Panpsychist World" in Synthese.

I argue that a form of psychophysical fine-tuning supports panpsychism.

"Panpsychism and Ensemble Explanations" in Philosophical Studies, coauthored with Han Li.

We develop a problem for panpsychism. The problem is that  panpsychism imperils two appealing ensemble explanations, namely the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.

"The Problem of Nomological Harmony” in Nous with Brian Cutter: 

We raise a puzzle about why laws apply to initial conditions and explore the solution space.

For discussion, see Bentham's Bulldog/Adelstein post.

"Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist" in American Philosophical Quarterly.

I argue that cosmological fine-tuning should make us more confident that other universes exist. I also provide model of our epistemic situation with respect to fine-tuning and multiverse hypotheses that improves on some existing models.

"Planetary Fine-Tuning, Cosmological Fine-Tuning, and the Multiverse" (forthcoming) in Synthese.

I argue that planetary fine-tuning evidence supports the existence of other universes via four paths.

“Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach” in Analytic Philosophy.

I propose a view of consciousness, show how it shields physical theories from Boltzmann brain problems, and explore interactions between it, fine-tuning, and time's arrow.

"Harmony in a Panpsychist World" in Synthese.

I argue that a form of psychophysical fine-tuning supports panpsychism.

"Panpsychism and Ensemble Explanations" in Philosophical Studies, coauthored with Han Li.

We develop a problem for panpsychism. The problem is that  panpsychism imperils two appealing ensemble explanations, namely the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.

“A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness”  in Journal of Consciousness Studies.

I propose a model of mental causation that explains the striking match between experiences' causal and rationalizing powers.

"The Problem of Nomological Harmony” in Nous with Brian Cutter: 

We raise a puzzle about why laws apply to initial conditions and explore the solution space. We tentatively favor a 'third-factor' solution that explains the match between laws and initial conditions in terms of either a meta-law or a designer.

"Planetary Fine-Tuning, Cosmological Fine-Tuning, and the Multiverse" (forthcoming) in Synthese.

I argue that planetary fine-tuning evidence supports the existence of other universes via four paths.

"The Multiverse Theodicy Meets Population Ethics" in Ergo with Han Li.

The multiverse theodicy tries to reconcile the existence of God and evil by supposing that God created all and only the creation-worthy universes. We argue that the multiverse theodicy faces an overlooked problem that is analogous to the mere addition paradox in population ethics.

"Simulations  and Catastrophic Risks" Sentience Institute Report.

This report provides an overview and exploration of various connections between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. Section 11 examines some connections between the simulation argument and religious catastrophic risks.

"The Sooner the Better: An Argument for Bias Toward the Earlier" in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward the earlier: other things equal, we should (dis)prefer for (dis)valuable events to occur earlier. 

"Rational Slack and Doxastic Grain" forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

I argue for granular permissivism, roughly the view that evidence is sometimes permissive between doxastic attitudes at different levels of grain.

"Permissiveness in morality and epistemology" in Inquiry with Han Li.

We offer an account of why sources of moral permissiveness do not generate epistemic permissiveness.