I am a senior research fellow in philosophy at Oxford's Global Priorities Institute.
My past research has focused on phenomenal consciousness and mental causation, their place in the world, and empirical constraints on theorizing about them. More recently, I've been thinking about digital minds, catastrophic risks, and the long-term future.
My publications - View work by theme
"A Dualist Theory of Experience" (forthcoming) in Philosophical Studies.
I introduce and motivate a dualist theory of experience.
“Does Cognitive Phenomenology Support Dualism?" (forthcoming) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
I argue that cognitive phenomenology supports dualism about experience.
"Planetary Fine-Tuning, Cosmological Fine-Tuning, and the Multiverse" (forthcoming) in Synthese.
I argue that planetary fine-tuning evidence supports the existence of other universes via four paths.
"Rational Slack and Doxastic Grain" (forthcoming) in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
I argue for granular permissivism, roughly the view that evidence is sometimes permissive between doxastic attitudes at different levels of grain.
"Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough" (forthcoming) in Acta Analytica.
I answer Tiehen's (2015a) challenge to the causal argument for physicalism.
“Should Dualists Locate the Physical Basis of Experience in the Head?” (2024) in Synthese.
I argue that a puzzle about spatial experience gives dualists reason to opt for tracking dualism, a theory on which the physical basis of sensory experience reaches outside the head.
“Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach” (2024) in Analytic Philosophy [Runner-Up for the 2022 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind]
I propose a view of consciousness, show how it shields physical theories from Boltzmann brain problems, and explore interactions between it, fine-tuning, and time's arrow.
"Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist" (2024) in American Philosophical Quarterly.
I argue that cosmological fine-tuning should make us more confident that other universes exist.
"The Sooner the Better: An Argument for Bias Toward the Earlier" (2023) in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward the earlier: other things equal, we should (dis)prefer for (dis)valuable events to occur earlier.
"Harmony in a Panpsychist World" (2022) in Synthese.
I argue that a form of psychophysical fine-tuning supports panpsychism.
"Spatial Experience, Spatial Reality, and Two Paths to Primitivism" (2021) in Synthese.
I argue that two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality each in their own way lead to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism, either about phenomenal representation or about instantiated spatial properties.
"An Exclusion Problem for Epiphenomenalist Dualism" (2020) in Thought.
I argue that some physical theories generate an exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism and that this problem is hard to solve without making trouble for epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the more familiar causal exclusion problem.
"Two Solutions to the Neural Discernment Problem" (2020) in Philosophical Studies.
The neural discernment problem for interactionism is (roughly) that of explaining how non-physical minds produce behavior and cognition by exercising different causal powers over physiologically similar neurons. I propose two models of mind-brain interaction that solve it. One model avoids overdetermination while the other respects the causal closure of the physical domain.
“A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness” (2019) [pre-print] in an issue on David Chalmers's “Meta-Problem of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies. Chalmers replies on pp. 11-4, 20 of his “Debunking Arguments for Illusionism about Consciousness”.
The meta-problem of consciousness is (roughly) that of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain in physical terms. I propose a teleological strategy for solving this problem. The strategy posits a fundamental law that operates on normative features of experiences in ways that bias experiences towards causing effects that they rationalize, including judgments about the difficulty of explaining consciousness in physical terms. The strategy sheds light on the luck-avoidance problem of explaining why it is not a lucky accident that consciousness plays a role in explaining those judgments.
"A Causal Argument for Dualism" (2018) in Philosophical Studies.
Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a causal argument for dualism, defend its prima facie plausibility, and spell out some of its implications.
"Indeterministic Causation and Two Patches for the Pairing Argument" (2018) in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Interactionism holds that non-spatial objects (e.g. immaterial minds) stand in causal relations. The pairing argument aims to refute interactionism. The pairing argument relies on the premise that non-causal differences underwrite causal differences. That premise is susceptible to counterexamples involving indeterministic causation. I develop two new versions of the pairing argument that are immune to such counterexamples.
"Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?" (2017) in dialectica.
Reductive physicalists typically accept the causal argument for their view. Tiehen (2015b) parts ways with his fellow reductive physicalists. Heretically, he argues that reductive physicalists should reject the causal argument. Although not myself a reductive physicalist, I show how reductive physicalists can answer this challenge.
"Interactionism, Haecceities, and the Pairing Argument" (2017) in Inquiry.
I defend interactionism against the pairing argument. Roughly, my defense contends that the pairing argument fails for one reason if haecceities exist and another if they don't.
"How to Befriend Zombies: a Guide for Physicalists" (2016) in Philosophical Studies.
Physicalists and zombies are not usually thought of as friends. After all, zombies figure prominently in the conceivability argument against physicalism and physicalists must deny the possibility of zombies. Nonetheless, I argue that there is room for a physicalist-zombie alliance.
[ Brad Saad philosophy of mind , philosophy of consciousness , analytic philosophy , artificial sentience , artificial consciousness , property dualism , catastrophic ]
Working Papers/Reports/Misc.
"Digital Minds Takeoff Scenarios" (2024) with Lucius Caviola.
We distinguish some different types of digital minds takeoff scenarios and offer some reflections on their implications for catastrophic risks.
Status quo treatment risk calculator
How likely do you think it is it that we will cause a catastrophe by creating AI moral patients and treating them as mere tools?
"Input to UN Interim Report on Governing AI for Humanity" (2024)
Responding to an open call for feedback on a UN draft report on AI governance, other signatories and I offer recommendations concerning existential risk, openness in AI development, and non-human minds with moral standing.
"Digital Minds: Importance and Key Research Questions" (2024) (with Andreas Mogensen & Patrick Butlin)
We summarize some of our reasons for thinking that digital minds may be very important for making the future go well and highlight some key research topics in the area.
"Evolutionary debunking and value alignment" (2024) Coauthored with Michael Dale.
We examine how evolutionary debunking arguments bear on the value alignment problem in AI safety.
"In Search of a Biological Crux for AI Consciousness" (2024)
I identify a thesis concerning the relationship between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness.
"Simulations and Catastrophic Risks" (2023) Sentience Institute Report.
This report provides an overview and exploration of various connections between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks.
"Chains of Care and the Expanding Circle of Prudential Concern" (2025) Coauthored with Han Li:
Argues for an expanding circle of prudential concern that substantially exceeds what common sense posits.
Coauthored publications
"AI Alignment vs. AI Ethical Treatment: Ten Challenges" (forthcoming) in Analytic Philosophy with Adam Bradley
We argue that aligning AI systems that merit moral consideration without mistreating them would be challenging.
"Varieties of Moral Agency and Risks of Digital Dystopia" (forthcoming) in American Philosophical Quarterly, coauthored with Adam Bradley.
Argues that AI systems will likely have a form of moral agency and that this poses several distinctive and neglected catastrophic risks.
"The Problem of Nomological Harmony” (2024) in Nous with Brian Cutter:
We raise a puzzle about why laws apply to initial conditions and explore the solution space.
For discussion, see Bentham's Bulldog/Adelstein post.
"The Multiverse Theodicy Meets Population Ethics" (2024) in Ergo with Han Li.
The multiverse theodicy tries to reconcile the existence of God and evil by supposing that God created all and only the creation-worthy universes. We argue that the multiverse theodicy faces an overlooked problem that is analogous to the mere addition paradox in population ethics.
"Digital suffering: why it’s a problem and how to prevent it" (2022) in Inquiry, coauthored with Adam Bradley.
We argue that the potential for suffering in future digital minds poses a catastrophic risk and propose a strategy for preventing such suffering.
For a response, see Dung (forthcoming).
We've also written an accompanying FAQ on the Problem of Digital Suffering.
"Panpsychism and Ensemble Explanations" (2022) in Philosophical Studies, coauthored with Han Li.
We develop a problem for panpsychism. The problem is that panpsychism imperils two appealing ensemble explanations, namely the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.
"Internal Constraints for Phenomenal Externalists: A Structure Matching Theory" (2022) in Synthese, coauthored with Bryce Dalbey.
We propose a novel form of tracking intentionalism about experience. The theory is designed to satisfy a range of constraints and to overcome problems for existing tracking intentionalist theories.
"Permissivism in Morality and Epistemology" (2020) in Inquiry, coauthored with Han Li.
We offer an account of why sources of moral permissiveness do not generate epistemic permissiveness.