My publications

“Does Cognitive Phenomenology Support Dualism?" (forthcoming) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

I argue that cognitive phenomenology supports dualism about experience

“Should Dualists Locate the Physical Basis of Experience in the Head?” (forthcoming) in Synthese.

I argue that a puzzle about spatial experience gives dualists reason to opt for tracking dualism, a theory on which the the physical basis of sensory experience reaches outside the head.

“Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach” (forthcoming) in Analytic Philosophy [Runner-Up for the 2022 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind]

I propose a view of consciousness, show how it shields physical theories from Boltzmann brain problems, and explore interactions between it, fine-tuning, and time's arrow.

"Harmony in a Panpsychist World" (2022) in Synthese.

I argue that a form of psychophysical fine-tuning supports panpsychism.

"The Sooner the Better: An Argument for Bias Toward the Earlier" (2023) in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward the earlier: other things equal, we should (dis)prefer for (dis)valuable events to occur earlier.

"Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist" (forthcoming) in American Philosophical Quarterly.

I argue that cosmological fine-tuning should make us more confident that other universes exist.

"Spatial  Experience,  Spatial  Reality,  and  Two  Paths to  Primitivism" (2021) in Synthese.

I argue that two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality each in their own way lead to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism, either about phenomenal representation or about instantiated spatial properties.

"An Exclusion Problem for Epiphenomenalist Dualism"        (2020) in Thought.

I argue that some physical theories generate an exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism and that this problem is hard to solve without making trouble for epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the more familiar causal exclusion problem.

"Two Solutions to the Neural Discernment Problem" (2020) in Philosophical Studies.

The neural discernment problem for interactionism is (roughly) that of explaining how non-physical minds produce behavior and cognition by exercising different causal powers over physiologically similar neurons. I propose two models of mind-brain interaction that solve it. One model avoids overdetermination while the other respects the causal  closure of the physical domain.

“A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness”  (2019) [pre-print] in an issue on David Chalmers's “Meta-Problem of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies.  Chalmers replies on pp. 11-4, 20 of his “Debunking Arguments for Illusionism about Consciousness”. 

The meta-problem of consciousness is (roughly) that of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain in physical terms. I propose a teleological strategy for solving this problem. The strategy posits a fundamental law that operates on normative features of experiences in ways that bias experiences towards causing effects that they rationalize, including judgments about the difficulty of explaining consciousness in physical terms. The strategy sheds light on the luck-avoidance problem of explaining why it is not a lucky accident that consciousness plays a role in explaining those judgments.

"A Causal Argument for Dualism" (2018) in Philosophical Studies.

Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a causal argument for dualism, defend its prima facie plausibility, and spell out some of its implications.

"Indeterministic Causation and Two Patches for the Pairing Argument" (2018) in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Interactionism holds that non-spatial objects (e.g. immaterial minds) stand in causal relations.  The pairing argument aims to refute interactionism.  The pairing argument relies on the premise that non-causal differences underwrite causal differences.  That premise is susceptible to counterexamples involving indeterministic causation.  I develop two new versions of the pairing argument that are immune to such counterexamples.

"Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?" (2017) in dialectica.

Reductive physicalists typically accept the causal argument for their view.  Tiehen (2015) parts ways with his fellow reductive physicalists. Heretically, he argues that reductive physicalists should reject the causal argument. Although not myself a reductive physicalist, I show how reductive physicalists can answer this challenge.

"Interactionism, Haecceities, and the Pairing Argument" (2017) in Inquiry.

I defend interactionism against the pairing argument. Roughly, my defense contends that the pairing argument fails for one reason if haecceities exist and another if they don't.

"How to Befriend Zombies: a Guide for Physicalists" (2016) in Philosophical Studies. 

Physicalists and zombies are not usually thought of as friends.  After all, zombies figure prominently in the conceivability argument against physicalism and physicalists must deny the possibility of zombies.  Nonetheless, I argue that there is room for a physicalist-zombie alliance.