Research

My research focuses on understanding how informal incentives work and which economic consequences they have.  I am particularly interested in the provision of incentives in the presence of illegal activities. To shed light on these issues, I use both theoretical and empirical methods.

Publications

Managing Relational Contracts, joint with Liam Wren-Lewis, (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 12645), Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (2023), pp. 941-986  Slides

Policy coverage: FREE policy brief , Faculti video

Vague Lies and Lax Standards of Proof: on the Law and Economics of Advice, joint with Mikhail Drugov, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 28 (2019), pp. 298-315   

Self-Enforcing Trade Credit, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 52 (2017), pp. 333-357   

Vagueness and Information-Sharing, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 100 (2016), pp. 301-320

Older version with more focus on antitrust policy available here. 

Working papers

I'll pay you later: Backloading to sustain opportunistic relationships, joint with Elena Paltseva and Gerhard Toews, (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 17121) Online Appendix NEW!

Policy coverage:  VoxEU, FREE policy brief

Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment, joint with Mikhail Drugov, Roberto Hernán González, and Praveen Kujal. 

Work in progress

Once Upon a Time in America: the Mafia and the Unions,  joint with Giovanni Mastrobuoni and Andrea Matranga

Public Procurement Relationships in the Shadow of Trial: Evidence from Russia,  joint with Dzhamilya Nigmatulina and Gerhard Toews

Relational Tax Evasion