Research

Why do individuals support redistribution in some settings but not others, even under persistently high inequality? This paper distinguishes between two foundations of redistributive preferences—beliefs about inequality and aversion to it—and shows that each operates differently at the municipal and the national level in the context of Brazil. I combine a survey informational experiment with a structural choice model to first identify individuals’ beliefs about inequality and to quantify their aversion to inequality. I use a Difference-in-Differences approach to identify belief effects and a GMM estimator derived from the choice model to recover inequality aversion parameters as a function of individual-level and municipal-level covariates. Downward belief updating reduces support for national but not local redistribution. Respondents exhibit stronger aversion to local inequality than to national inequality. Together, the results show that beliefs drive national preferences, whereas aversion anchors redistribution locally. These results challenge a unitary view of redistributive preferences and show how assessments of the problem’s magnitude and preferences over where to address it interact across levels of government.

Why do preferences for reducing inequality often fail to translate into support for redistributive politicians? In Brazil, one of the world’s most unequal democracies, voters express strong concern about inequality, yet electoral outcomes remain misaligned with progressive redistributive platforms. This paper argues that this disconnect stems from both the demand side and supply side of redistribution, if we treat redistribution as multidimensional. Using original survey data from the 2018 and 2022 Brazilian elections, I measure individual preferences over three dimensions of redistribution: taxation, local spending, and national spending. I combine these with large language model-based analysis of candidate proposals to estimate political supply across the same dimensions. The results reveal substantial heterogeneity within and across candidates, and show that local redistribution preferences, not taxation or national spending, most strongly predict left-wing voting. I propose a structural model of voter–politician interaction to interpret these patterns as equilibrium outcomes. This approach offers new insight into the microfoundations of redistributive politics in unequal democracies.

This paper shows that hate crimes targeting religious minorities reshape local housing markets. We relied on the exogenous timing of the onset of the October 7, 2023 Gaza–Israel conflict as a natural experiment, to examine how anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hate crimes affected housing decisions in New York City. Using Difference-in-Differences and instrumental variable designs, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in anti-Jewish hate crimes reduced property values by 4–5 percent and was associated with a nearly 10 percent decline in housing transactions in affected neighborhoods. Effects of anti-Muslim hate crimes are directionally similar but less precise, consistent with underreporting and lower transaction density. These results demonstrate that religion-based hate crimes not only threaten physical security but also alter residential decision-making and local investment, with enduring implications for spatial inequality and the economic consequences of intergroup conflict.

This paper develops a theoretical and empirical framework to explain how inequality can persist even in highly redistributive societies. We propose a general equilibrium model in which individuals internalize inequality in their preferences, becoming less willing to exert labor effort when they anticipate redistribution or feel morally responsible for disparities. As these behavioral responses aggregate, total output falls and inequality regenerates itself. The model distinguishes between local and national inequality aversion and examines how these preferences, when expressed through democratic voting, shift policies away from efficiency-maximizing allocations, producing measurable welfare losses. We test these predictions using matched employer–employee data from Brazil’s Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), exploiting variation between rural and urban regions. Consistent with the theory, regions exhibiting stronger redistributive preferences and greater concern for inequality display lower average labor supply, flatter wage gradients, and slower income growth. The results reveal a paradox of redistribution: societies that care more deeply about equality may, through moral and political responses, sustain the very inequality they seek to reduce.

This study investigates the causal effects of hate crimes on voter turnout, using individual-level administrative data from New York City between 2016 and 2023. We link geocoded hate crime incidents to detailed records on electoral participation, demographics, and migration patterns to examine how exposure to group-targeted violence conditions political behavior across racial and ethnic groups. Contrary to prior evidence suggesting mobilization, we find that hate crimes reduce turnout among targeted minority groups while increasing turnout among white voters. For minorities, this demobilization effect operates through two mechanisms: a decrease in the salience of policy preferences and an increase in the perceived costs of voting. In contrast, hate crimes appear to heighten political salience among white voters. These heterogeneous effects underscore the uneven political consequences of identity-based violence and point to the need for a more nuanced understanding of how threat and solidarity shape electoral engagement.

This study explores the role of entertainment media in shaping public perceptions of inequality and social mobility, focusing on Brazil, one of the most unequal countries in the world. Despite extensive research on traditional determinants of redistributive preferences such as income, education, and political ideology, the influence of media and cultural representations has been largely understudied. We argue that popular media, particularly telenovelas, subtly influences viewers’ attitudes toward inequality by normalizing wealth disparity and promoting "rags-to-riches" narratives, which frame upward mobility as attainable while downplaying structural barriers. By examining how entertainment media affects perceptions of economic disparities, this study seeks to uncover the mechanisms by which media consumption shapes attitudes toward redistribution, potentially reinforcing or challenging public support for redistributive policies. Using Avenida Brasil, a widely popular Brazilian telenovela, as a case study, we conduct a survey experiment in which participants are exposed to contrasting media portrayals of social mobility—one highlighting manipulative paths to wealth and the other focusing on merit-based success. Through this approach, we aim to isolate the causal effects of media exposure on viewers' perceptions of economic realities and their preferences for redistribution. In doing so, we extend current research by examining the impact of entertainment media on political outcomes, with a particular focus on Latin America, a region characterized by high levels of income inequality. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of how media representations can shape societal attitudes toward inequality and social mobility in contexts marked by significant wealth disparities.

We have collected data spanning 13 years from the Court of Justice of São Paulo, where we observe promotion outcomes, whether promotions were based on seniority or merit, the number of cases closed by judges, the number of hearings held, and the hierarchy of judges each quarter. Our findings indicate that the higher the ranking of judges in cumulative closed cases, the higher their probability of promotion tends to be. Moreover, the additional number of cases a judge closes decreases as their seniority ranking increases. These findings point out that the rate at which judges close cases depends on their anticipated probability of promotion. We will structurally estimate the case-closing decisions made by judges at various stages of their tenure to empirically test whether these patterns arise from judges inflating their perceived merit by prematurely closing cases (without acquiring the socially optimal level of information) or whether merit-based promotions effectively increase the productivity of public servants.