"Wittgenstein’s Formalism" by Tamara Dobler (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

 In this paper, we examine the influence of mathematical formalism on the development of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language. We argue that the formalist conception of mathematics as a game served as a central catalyst in the development of Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning and his broader anti-Platonist approach to semantics. We trace the roots of this position to the Tractatus, where the Grundgedanke that logical constants are not representatives already expresses a distinctly formalist conception of meaning. Wittgenstein’s subsequent engagement with mathematical formalism extends this insight beyond logic, culminating in the conception of language itself as a rule-governed practice or “language game,” in which the meaning of linguistic signs is determined by their role within a system of use rather than by any representational relation to abstract entities. Finally, we argue that although this formalist orientation remains remarkably stable throughout Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, his conception of rules undergoes an important transformation. His early discussions of language games often present grammatical rules as largely conventional and freely alterable, whereas his mature philosophy increasingly emphasises that rule-following is constrained by established practices and by what he calls the “very general facts of nature.” This shift, we argue, constitutes a significant refinement rather than a rejection of Wittgenstein’s formalism.

"Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle on Science and Relativism" by Martin Kusch (Universität Wien)
Abstract: I argue that there is a common theme in the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Philip Frank and Otto Neurath: that the philosophy of science needs to take seriously social-scientific perspectives on the sciences, and that such perspectives come with commitments to relativism.

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