Resources
Here we collect small introductory entries about different themes of Wittgensteinian work. Help us expand the list. These are only very preliminary and non exhaustive bibliographies.
Moral Philosophy (general)
Wittgenstein has influenced some of the great (moral) philosophers of our time, such as Simon Blackburn, Stanley Cavell, Alice Crary, Cora Diamond, Raimond Gaita, Paul Horwich, Sabina Lovibond, John McDowell, Irish Murdoch, Peter Strawson, Barry Stroud, Peter Winch, and Crispin Wright. During the last decade, philosophers have shown a growing interest in one of the most understudied and neglected aspects of Wittgenstein’s work: his moral philosophy. Recent monographs that discuss Wittgenstein’s moral philosophy and Wittgensteinian moral philosophy include, but are not limited to, Christensen (2021), Crary (2016), De Mesel (2018), Hermann (2015), Iczkovits (2012) and O’Hara (2018). In addition, there are numerous collections of essays, such as those edited by Agam-Segal & Dain (2018), Amesbury and von Sass (2021), Beale and Rowland (Forthcoming), Crary (2007), De Mesel and Kuusela (2021) and Eriksen et. al. (2022), and a journal special issue in Ethical Perspectives edited by De Mesel and Thompson (2015) which focus on this topic. A brief survey of this literature shows that philosophers have generally explored the significance of Wittgenstein’s work for moral philosophy, with a focus on the later Wittgenstein. More specifically, they illustrate how Wittgenstein’s insights and methods can contribute and be advantageous to existing debates in moral philosophy. Here are some examples: Entry on Moral Certainties, Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics.
References
Agam-Segal, R.; Dain, E. (Eds.) (2018). Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought. New York: Routledge.
Amesbury R.; von Sass H. (Eds.) (2021). Ethics after Wittgenstein. Bloomsbury.
Beale, J.; Rowland, R. (Forthcoming). Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Christensen, A-M. S. (2021) Moral Philosophy and Moral Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crary, A. (Ed.) (2007). Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Crary, A. (2016). Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
De Mesel, B. (2018). The Later Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. Cham: Springer.
De Mesel, B.; Kuusela, O. (Eds.) (2021). Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge.
De Mesel, B.; Thompson, J. (Eds.) (2015). Wittgensteinian Approaches to Moral Philosophy. Special issue of Ethical Perspectives, 22 (1). Leuven: Peeters.
Erisken, C.; Herman, J.; O’Hara, N, & Pleasants, N. (Eds.) (2022). Philosophical Perspectives on Moral Certainty. Oxford: Routledge.
Hermann, J. (2015). On Moral Certainty, Justification and Practice: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Iczkovits, Y. (2012). Wittgenstein’s Ethical Thought. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
O’Hara, N. (2018). Moral Certainty and the Foundations of Morality. Cham: Springer.
Moral Certainties
Philosophers have become increasingly interested in studying the applications of Wittgenstein’s epistemological observations in On Certainty (hereinafter, OC) to moral philosophy (see e.g., Goodman 1982; Kober 1997; Crary 2005; Pleasants 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2015; Harré 2010; Christensen 2011; Hermann 2015; O’Hara 2018; Eriksen et al. 2023). A clear-cut example is to be found in the work of Nigel Pleasants (2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2015), who has developed the idea of moral certainties (see Hermann 2018 for a detailed exposition).
Wittgenstein, in On Certainty, introduces the idea of certainties. They can be broadly understood as the fundamental presuppositions of our worldview which are exempt from doubt and make it possible for us to perform other epistemic operations, such as discovering, justifying, verifying, evaluating beliefs as rational, giving reasons for belief and doubt, and so on (OC, §341, §415). Examples include, but are not limited to, empirical certainties such as ‘There is an external world’ and epistemic principles about which we are certain, such as ‘Sense perception is reliable’ (for more examples of certainties see OC, §93, §118, §120, §146). Pleasants has sought to extend Wittgenstein’s insights to moral philosophy by arguing that there are basic moral certainties that are akin to empirical certainties, playing a similar “[…] kind of foundational role in our moral practices and judgements as basic epistemic certainty does in our epistemic practices and judgements” (Pleasants 2009, 669).
Moral certainties, such as ‘It is wrong to kill’, are beyond doubt and justification and are displayed unreflectively and automatically in what we say and do. They are the fundamental condition of morality as such, making it possible for us to perform other moral operations (e.g., judging, justifying, giving reasons for belief and doubt, and so on). Existing research has focused on examples of moral certainty (Pleasants 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2015; Brice 2013; Rummens 2013; Fairhurst 2019; Forthcoming; Ariso Forthcoming; Galli Forthcoming), the scope of moral certainties, i.e., whether they are universally held (Pleasants 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2015), locally embedded in specific cultures (Kober 1997; Harré 2010; Brice 2013) or both (O’Hara 2018; Laves 2020a; 2020b), their role in explaining moral progress and moral revolutions (Hermann 2015; 2016; 2019), the adequacy the idea of moral certainties (Glock 2022), and its meta-ethical implications (O’Hara 2018; Laves 2020b), among other topics (see Eriksen et. al. 2022).
References
Ariso, J. M. (Forthcoming). “Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocents is Not a Universal Moral Certainty.” Philosophical Investigations.
Brice, R. G.. (2013). “Mistakes and Mental Disturbances: Pleasants, Wittgenstein, and Basic Moral Certainty.” Philosophia 41 (2): 477-487.
Christensen, A-M. S. (2011). “Wittgenstein and Ethics.” In M. McGinn and O. Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein (pp. 796-818). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crary, A. (2005). Wittgenstein and ethics: a discussion with reference to On Certainty. In D. Moyal-Sharrock and W. Brenner (Eds.), Readings of Wittgenstein’s (pp. 275-301). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Erisken, C.; Herman, J.; O’Hara, N, & Pleasants, N. (2022). Philosophical Perspectives on Moral Certainty. Oxford: Routledge.
Fairhurst, J. (2019). “Problems in Pleasants’ Wittgensteinian Idea of Basic Moral Certainties.” Ethical Perspectives 26 (2): 271-298.
Fairhurst, J. (Forthcoming). Some Concerns About the Idea of Basic Moral Certainty: A Critical Response to Samuel Laves. Philosophical Investigations.
Galli, E. (Forthcoming). On the existence of moral certainties: The case of the pisa-suaves. Philosophical Investigations
Glock, H-J. (2022). Moral Certainties – Subjective, Objective, or Objectionable? In C. Eriksen, J. Hermann, N. O’Hara & N. Pleasants (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Moral Certainty. Routledge.
Goodman, R. B. (1982). “Wittgenstein and Ethics.” Metaphilosophy 13 (2): 138-148.
Harré, R. 2010. “Are There Moral Hinges?” Praxis: Revista de Psicologia 18: 11-27.
Hermann, J. (2015). On Moral Certainty, Justification and Practice: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hermann, J. (2016). Possibilities of Moral Progress in the Face of Evolution. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20: 39-54.
Hermann, J. (2018). Moral Certainty. In International Encyclopedia of Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee855
Hermann, J. (2019). The dynamics of moral progress. Ratio, 32(4): 300-311.
Kober, M. (1997). “On Epistemic and Moral Certainty: A Wittgensteinian Approach.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3): 365-381.
O’Hara, N. (2018). Moral Certainty and the Foundations of Morality. Cham: Springer.
Pleasants, N. (2008a). “Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception.” Journal of Social Philosophy, 39 (1): 96-115.
Pleasants, N. (2008b). “Wittgenstein, ethics and basic moral certainty.” Inquiry, 51 (3): 241-267.
Pleasants, N. (2009). “Wittgenstein and basic moral certainty.” Philosophia 37: 669-679.
Pleasants, N. (2015). “If killing isn’t wrong, then nothing is: A naturalistic defense of basic moral certainty.” Ethical Perspectives 22 (1): 197-215.
Rummens, S. (2013). “On the Possibility of a Wittgensteinian Account of Moral Certainty.” The Philosophical Forum 44 (2): 125-147.
Meta-Ethics
Many have used Wittgenstein’s philosophical insights as a kind of toolbox to explore various meta-ethical issues. Instead of limiting their investigation to how Wittgenstein deals with certain philosophical problems, these philosophers take the liberty of using Wittgenstein’s insights as tools in order to tackle meta-ethical problems that Wittgenstein himself did not (substantially) deal with. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples.
First, Wittgenstein’s work has played an important role in the metaethical debate between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism (see Loobuyck 2005; Glock 2015, Arrington 2017 for a detailed exposition). On the one hand, non-cognitivists such as Stevenson (1937; 1944) and Hare (1952; 1963) were influenced by Wittgenstein’s later observations on the non-descriptive uses of language. On the other hand, Wittgenstein remains an influential figure among moral cognitivists and moral realists. Cognitivists resorted to Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ to emphasize how there are different paradigms for rationality (see e.g., Harman 2000; Putnam 1981). Meanwhile, moral realists like Foot (2002), Lovibond (1983) and McDowell (1998) have resorted to Wittgenstein’s work to point out that noncognitivism is built upon the imaginary wide gap between fact and value. For example, Lovibond (1983) and McDowell (1981; 2002) have explored how Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ can contribute to a novel conception of moral realism and moral cognitivism which avoids the problems that have traditionally plagued these philosophical programs.
Relatedly, McDowell (1981; 1998; 2002) and Miller (2019) have explored the meta-ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks. More specifically, they discuss the consequences of Wittgenstein’s rejection of a view-from-nowhere for the existing debate between moral cognitvism and moral-non-cognitvism. Meanwhile, Horwich (2012, vii, pp. 60–62) argues that Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophical pronouncements suggest that he defends a deflationary meta-philosophical point of view as the foundation of his treatment of specific issues, such as goodness. Horwich explored how this deflationary meta-philosophical point of view offers a novel conception of truth, and truth-aptness in ethics (see also Akhlaghi Forthcoming). Last, Brandhorst (2015; 2017) and De Mesel (2017) have explored whether Wittgenstein’s work can support the case for moral objectivity or not.
Second, Brandhorst (2015), Fairhurst (2022), Horwich (2012), Kuusela (Forthcoming), Lovibond (1983) and McDowell (1981; 1998; 2002), among others, have explored different strands of Wittgenstein’s later work to argue for or against the existence of moral entities, such as moral properties or facts. For example, Kuusela has explored Wittgenstein’s attributive conception of ascriptions of goodness, whereby the sense in which an action is good depends on the action, to explore a novel form of moral realism which does not require the postulation of special non-natural or natural moral properties or a naturalistic reduction.
Third, philosophers have explored Wittgenstein’s observations on language to spell out their implications for the meaning of moral locutions. Glock (2015; Forthcoming) and Fairhurst (2019; Forthcoming) have shown that Wittgenstein’s later explorations of the meaning of moral judgments can contribute to our understanding of moral expressivism. Meanwhile, Lovibond (1983), Kelly (1995), Loobuyck (2005) have shown some affinities between Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy and the central tenets of moral descriptivism. Last, De Mesel (2019; cf. Hermann 2021) has offered a Wittggenstenian approach to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism. On this account, ‘Cognitivist or non-cognitivist?’ poses a false dilemma which rests on the assumption that moral language must be semantically uniform. Exploring Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance, De Mesel investigates the possibility that moral locutions may have different uses, and thereby meanings, in different contexts.
Last, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on use over form comprises an important lesson about the subject-matter of ethics. Specifically, it encourages us to think more broadly about what makes different uses of language moral or aesthetical, as we may not be able to read the moral or aesthetical character directly from the sentence (Cook 1998; Diamond 1996; Hertzberg 2002. See De Mesel 2018: Chap. 4; Christensen 2021 for a discussion regarding whether there are ways of identifying moral sentences and the subject matter of ethics). It is often assumed that there are a group of paradigmatic and distinctive moral and aesthetical concepts (e.g., evil, kind, courageous, selfish, or cruel) which allow us to identify the subject matter of ethics. By contrast, Wittgenstein’s work has been used to explore the idea that moral thought has no specific subject matter identifiable in terms of distinctively moral and aesthetical concepts (Diamond 1996; Mulhall 2002; Kuusela 2021; Forthcoming). Relatedly, Glock (2015, 105; see also Harcourt 2019; cf. Hertzberg 2002; Mulhall 2002) notes that “Wittgenstein played a part not just in the exaltation of meta-ethics, but also in this demotion. In recent years, he has been invoked in support of the radical view that meta-ethics as standardly conceived is impossible, since ethics lacks a subject matter to begin with”. See Glock (2015), De Mesel (2018), Kuusela (2018; 2021), and Ricther (2018) for a discussion of this topic.
References
Akhlaghi, F. (Forthcoming). Metaethical Quietisim? Wittgenstein, Relaxed Realism, and Countercultures in Metaethics. In J. Beale and R. Rowland (Eds.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Arrington, R. L. (2017) Wittgenstein and Ethics. In H-J. Glock and J. Hyman (Eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 605–611). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Brandhorst, M. (2015). Correspondence to Reality in Ethics. Philosophical Investigations, 38: 227-250.
Brandhorst, M. (2017). Varieties of Objectivity: A Reply to De Mesel. Philosophical Investigations, 40: 64-81.
Christensen, A-M. S. (2021) Moral Philosophy and Moral Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cook, J. W. (1998) Morality and Cultural Differences. Oxford: Oxford University Press
De Mesel, B. (2015). Wittgenstein, Meta-Ethics and the Subject Matter of Moral Philosophy. Ethical Perspectives, 22 (1): 69-98.
De Mesel, B. (2017). Wittgenstein and Objectivity in Ethics. A Reply to Brandhorst. Philosophical Investigations, 40 (1): 40-63.
De Mesel, B. (2018) The Later Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. Cham: Springer.
De Mesel, B. (2019). Are Moral Judgments Semantically Uniform? A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Cognitivistm - Non-Cognitivism Debate. In O. Kuusela and B. De Mesel (Eds.), Ethics in Wake of Wittgenstein (pp. 126-148). New York: Routledge.
Diamond, C. (1996). Wittgenstein, mathematics, and ethics: Resisting the attractions of realism. In H. Sluga, and D. G. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 226-260). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fairhurst, J. (2019). Morality, Truth and Meaning in Wittgenstein and Brandom. Disputatio: Philosophical Research Bulletin, 8 (9): 347-374.
Fairhurst, J. (2021) ‘Wittgenstein, deflationism and moral entities’, Synthese 199: 11023-50.
Fairhurst, J. (Forthcoming). The Later Wittgenstein on Expressive Moral Judgments. The Philosophical Quarterly.
Foot, P. (2002). Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glock, H.-J. (2015). Wittgensteinian Anti-Anti Realism: One ‘Anti’ Too Many?. Ethical Perspectives, 22 (1): 99-129.
Glock, H-J. (Forthcoming). Communitarian Expressivsm and the Normative Animal. In J. Beale and R. Rowland (eds.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Harcourt, E. (2019). Moral Concepts, ‘Natural Facts’ and Naturalism: Outline of a Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy. In B. De Mesel and O. Kuusela (Eds.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein (pp. 47-62). New York: Routledge.
Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hare, R. M. (1963). Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, G. (2000). Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hermann, J. (2021). Three Wittgensteinian Interventions in Current Metaethical Debates. In R. Amesbury & H. von Sass (Eds.) Ethics after Wittgenstein. Bloomsbury.
Hertzberg, L. (2002) ‘Moral Escapism and Applied Ethics’, Philosophical Papers, 31: 251-70.
Horwich, P. (2012). Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, J. C. (1995). Wittgenstein, the Self, and Ethics. The Review of Metaphysics, 48 (3): 567-590.
Kuusela, O. (2018). Wittgenstein, Ethics and Philosophical Clarification. In R. Agam-Segal and E. Dain (Eds.), Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought (pp. 37-66). New York: Routledge.
Kuusela, O. (2021) ‘Defending Diamond Against Harcourt: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy and the Subject Matter of Ethics’, in M. Balaska (ed.) Cora Diamond On Ethics, 81-102. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kuusela, O. (Forthcoming). Later Wittgenstein on moral good: realism without the postulation of moral properties or naturalistic reduction. In S. Greve (Ed.), Culture and Value after Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loobuyck, P. (2005). Wittgenstein and the shift from noncognitivism to cognitivism in Ethics. Metaphilosophy, 36: 381-399.
Lovibond, S. (1983). Realism and Imagination in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
McDowell, J. (1981). Non-cognitivism and rule-following. In S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich (Eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule (pp. 141-162). London: Routledge.
McDowell, J. (1998). Mind, Value and Reality. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (2002). Wittgenstein on following a rule. In A. Miller and C. Wright (Eds.), Rule-following and meaning (pp. 45-80). Acumen: Acumen Publishing.
Miller, A. (2019). Rule-Following, Moral Realism and Non-Cognitivism Revisited. In O. Kuusela and B. De Mesel (Eds.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein (pp. 103-125). Routledge: New York.
Mulhall, S. (2002). Ethics in the Light of Wittgenstein. Philosophical Papers, 31 (3): 293-321.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Richter, D. (2018). Sketches of Blurred Landscapes: Wittgenstein and Ethics. In. R. Agam-Segal and E. Dain (Eds.), Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought (pp. 153-173). New York: Routledge
Stevenson, C. L. (1944). Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stevenson, C. L. (1937). The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms. Mind, 46 (181): 14-31.
Hinge Epistemology
Hinge epistemology is an umbrella-term for a diverse group of epistemological theories about justification and knowledge that expand on Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘hinges’ in On Certainty (hereinafter, OC). This concept can be roughly defined as the fundamental presuppositions of one’s worldview which are exempt from exempt from doubt, and make it possible for us to perform other epistemic operations (such as discovering, justifying, verifying, evaluating beliefs as rational, and giving reasons for belief and doubt) (OC, §341, §415). Justification, knowledge, and doubt, then, do not take place in vacuum, but rather depend on hinge commitments. Just as the hinges must stay put for a door to move, so too must hinge commitments be exempt from doubt for our epistemic practices to work. Examples of hinge commitments include but are not limited to: ‘There is an external world’, ‘Sense of perception is reliable’ or ‘There is a brain inside my skull’ (for more examples see OC, §93, §120, §146, §209; Moyal-Sharrock 2004; 2016; Brueckner 2007; Pritchard 2011b; Ranalli 2020; Siegel 2021).
What hinge commitments are meant to be remains highly controversial. Competing hinge theories have different views on how best to understand the notion of a hinge commitment, each with different implications for the analysis of our epistemic practices. Johnson (2020, sect. 3.1) has highlighted four dimensions along which hinge theories differ:
First, there is a distinction, between theories which hold that hinge commitments are fact-stating propositions (Pritchard 2016; Wright 1986; 2004; Williams 1991; 2004; Hazzlet 2014), those that hold that they are propositions albeit not fact-stating (Coliva 2010; 2015; 2016; see also McGinn 1989; Stroll 1994; Conant 1998;), and, finally, those that take hinge commitments to be non-factual rules (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 2016).
Second, there is a division between theories in virtue of how they conceive the epistemic status of hinge commitments. On the one hand, there is a family of non-epistemic theories (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 2016; Stroll 1994; Pritchard 2011a; 2011b; 2016) which shares the core claim that hinges are outside the scope of rational evaluation and lack epistemic properties, i.e., they are neither justified nor unjustified. For instance, Pritchard holds that while hinge commitments are truth-apt statements (i.e., they are capable of being true or false), they are not believable. Pritchard’s argument is thus. (P1) Beliefs are responsive to reasons. (P2) Our attitude to hinge commitments is not responsive to reasons. Again, hinges are the basic presuppositions of our belief systems which are exempt from rational evaluation. (C) This leads to a non-belief theory of hinge commitments: our attitude to hinges is one of certainty, not belief. On the other hand, there is a family of epistemic theories (Williams 1991; 2004a; 2004b; Wright 2004a; 2004b; 2014; Hazlett 2014) which shares the core claim that hinge commitments are within the scope of rational evaluation and do have epistemic properties (i.e., they can be potentially justified or unjustified), albeit in a non-paradigmatic way. For instance, Wright argues that our justification for hinge commitments consists in having a default attitude of entitlement to trust or accept them (which is a positive epistemic property), in the absence of evidence or anything which indicates that they’re true.
Third, there is a division between theories that defend that hinge commitments are context-sensitive, i.e., they are held by someone in a particular domain of inquiry (Wright 2004a; 2004b; Williams 1991), and those that defend that they are not context-sensitive: if someone holds a hinge commitment they will do so regardless of the context of inquiry (Pritchard 2016).
Fourth, there is a division between theories that hold that there are limits on what kinds of propositions can be hinge commitments (Wright 2004a; 2004b; Coliva 2016) and those that hold that (almost) any proposition can be a hinge commitment (Pritchard 2016).
Hinge epistemology has found applications in the study of deep disagreements (see Ranalli 2020; 2021 for an overview), mathematics (McGinn 1989; Moyal-Sharrock 2004; Kusch 2016; Coliva 2020; Martin 2022), prejudices (Boncompagni 2019; Forthcoming), testimony (Coliva 2019) morality (see entry on Moral Certainties), among many other topics.
References
Boncompagni, A. (2019). Hinge, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters. Wittgenstein-Studien 10(1): 165-181.
Boncompagni, A. (Forthcoming). Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account. Episteme: 1-18.
Brueckner, A. (2007). Hinge propositions and epistemic justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88(3): 285–287.
Coliva, A. (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, A. (2015). Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, A. (2016). Which Hinge Epistemology? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 6(2-3): 79-96.
Coliva, A. (2019). Testimonial Hinges. Philosophical Issues 29: 53-68.
Coliva, A. (2020). Are there mathematical hinges? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10: 346-366.
Conant, J. (1998). “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” Philosophical Investigations 21: 222–250.
Hazlett, A. (2014). Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement. Episteme, 1:1–25
Johnson, D. (2020). Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility. Episteme, 1-20.
Kusch, M. (2016). Wittgenstein on Mathematics and Certainties. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 6 (2-3): 120-142.
Lavorerio, V. (Forthcoming). The fundamental model of deep disagreements. Metaphilosophy, 1-16.
Martin, J. V. (2022). On Certainty, Change, and “Mathematical Hinges.” Topoi, 41: 987-1002.
McGinn, M. (1989). Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell
Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein’s on certainty. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2016). The animal in epistemology. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 6: 97–119.
Pritchard, D. (2011a). Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian epistemology. In S. D. Hales (Ed.), The Blackwell companion to relativism (pp. 266-285). Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Pritchard, D. (2011b). Wittgenstein on scepticism. In O. Kuusela and M. McGinn (Eds.), Oxford handbook of Wittgenstein (pp. 523-549). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic Angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ranalli, C. (2020). Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology. Synthese, 197: 4975-5007.
Ranalli, C. (2021). What is Deep Disagreement?. Topoi, 40: 983-998.
Siegel, H. (2021). Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements. Topoi, 40: 1107–1116.
Stroll, A. (1994). Moore and Wittgenstein on certainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, M. (1991) Unnatural doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Williams, M. (2004a). Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism. In D. McManus (ed.), Wittenstein and Scepticism (pp. 76-96). London-New York: Routledge.
Williams, M. (2004b). Wittgenstein, Truth and Certainty. In M. Koelbel and B. Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance (pp. 249-284). London-New York: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell. [OC]
Wright, C. (1986). ‘Facts and Certainty.’ Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429-472.
Wright, C. (2004a). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 78 (1): 167–212.
Wright, C. (2004b). Wittgensteinian certainties. In D. McManus (Ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism (pp. 22–55). London: Routledge.
Wright, C. (2014). On epistemic entitlement II: Welfare state epistemology. In D. Dodd and E. Zardini (Eds.), Scepticism and perceptual justification (pp. 213-247). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deep Disagreements
Deep disagreements
Deep disagreements are persistent conflicts of opinions about matters that can be said to be worldview defining. Examples include but are not limited do disagreements over creationism, abortion, euthanasia, vaccination, or the existence of God. Since its inception in Fogelin (1985) seminal paper, research on deep disagreements has relied heavily on the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Inspired by Wittgenstein’s last work, On Certainty, many authors took deep disagreements to involve clashes between hinge propositions or commitments the parties hold (Pritchard 2018; 2021; Ranalli 2020; Coliva & Palmira 2021; Siegel 2021; Kusch 2021; Johnson 2021; Kant 2022). Other philosophers have taken inspiration from other works of Wittgenstein to think of deep disagreements as involving different forms of life (Fogelin 1985; Dare 2014), language-games (Godden & Brenner 2010), pictures (Lavorerio 2021) or ethical systems (Fairhurst 2022).
References
Coliva, A., & Palmira, M. (2021). Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style. Metaphilosophy. 52: 402– 415.
Dare, T. (2014). Disagreement over Vaccination Programmes: Deep or Merely Complex and Why Does It Matter? HEC Forum, 26: 43–57.
Fairhurst, J. (2022). Wittgenstein y los desacuerdos morales: Sobre la justificación moral y sus implicaciones para el relativismo moral. Cuadernos de Filosofía, (40), 21-46.
Fogelin, R. (1985). The Logic of Deep Disagreements. Informal Logic, 7(1):1-8. Reprinted in Informal Logic 25: 3–11 (2005).
Godden, D., Brenner, W. (2010). Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement. Cogency: Journal of reasoning and argumentation, 2(2), 41.
Johnson, D. (2020). Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility. Episteme, 1-20.
Kant, D. (2022). Independence and Naturalness in Set-theoretic Practice. Doctoral Dissertation, Universität Konstanz.
Kusch, M. (2021). Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism. Topoi, 40: 1097-1105.
Lavorerio, V. (2021). Lectures on Religious Belief and the epistemology of disagreements. Wittgenstein-Studien, 12(1), 217-235.
Pritchard, D. (2018). Disagreements, of Beliefs and Otherwise. In Voicing Dissent, edited by C. Johnson. London: Routledge, 22– 39.
Pritchard, D. (2021). Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and deep disagreement. Topoi, 40(5): 1117-1125.
Ranalli, C. (2020). Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology. Synthese, 197(11): 4975-5007.
Siegel, H. (2021). Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements. Topoi, 40: 1107–1116.