Journal Papers
From Monopoly to Competition: When Do Optimal Contests Prevail?
with Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), 2025.
Unified Fair Allocation for Indivisible Goods and Chores via Copies
with Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 2023.
with Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 2022.
Journal Revisions
Transaction Fee Mechanisms Robust to Welfare-Increasing Collusion.
with Aviv Yaish
Minor Revision in Games and Economic Behavior (GEB).
Information-Sharing in Training and Inference: Collusion vs. Accuracy
with Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz
Major Revision in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC).
Conference Papers
Deterring A Small Collusion is All You Need
To Appear in the ACM Web Conference 2026 (WWW-26)
Prediction-sharing During Training and Inference
with Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz
Appeared in the Seventeenth International Symphosium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT-24)
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
with Aviv Yaish
Appeared in the Twenty-Fifth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-24)
Discrete and Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
with Aviv Yaish
Appeared in the Fifth International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE-24)
with Moshe Tennenholtz
Appeared in the Nineteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-23).
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail
with Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
Appeared in the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-23). (Arxiv)
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks
with Moshe Tennenholtz
Appeared in the Twenty-Third ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-22). (Arxiv)
with Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR). Appeared in the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21). (Arxiv)
VCG under False-name (Sybil) Attacks --- a Bayesian Analysis
with Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Appeared in the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-20). (Arxiv)
Working papers
Centralization and Stability in Formal Constitutions.
Incentive-Compatible Collusion Resistance via Posted Prices.
with Matheus V.X. Ferreira, Max Resnick
Scheduling with Time Discounts.
with Aviv Yaish
Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting.
with Ben Golan
with Omer Ben-Porat, Or Markovetzki