Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira
Assistant Professor of Computer Science
University of Virginia
Matheus is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of Virginia. His research interests include AI, Algorithmic Economics, and Security. He applies artificial intelligence, optimization, and theoretical computer science tools to create secure, transparent, and auditable platforms. For instance, he designs auctions that prevent auctioneers from profiting from manipulations.
Previously he was a Postdoctoral Fellow of Computer Science at Harvard University supervised by David C. Parkes. He earned his Ph.D. (2022) and M.A. (2018) in Computer Science from Princeton University, supervised by S. Matthew Weinberg, his B.S. in Computer Engineering (2016) from the Federal University of Itajubá. Matheus hails from Itabira, the Brazilian capital of poetry.
Upcoming and Recent Talks
2024
Rutgers Theory Seminar. Rutgers University. New Brunswick, New Jersey. TBD
I am co-organizing the Oxford-Harvard Conference on Decentralised Finance and Market Microstructure. Oxford University. Oxford, UK. January 20-21, 2025 [Webpage]
Ivy Collective for Inclusion in Engineering. Panelist. Harvard University. Boston, MA. November 8, 2024
Double auctions for cross-blockchain resource allocation. EC24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance. Yale School of Management. New Haven, CT. July 8, 2024. [Website]
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. UCSB-ECON DeFi Seminar. Santa Barbara, CA. June 28, 2024
EC' 24 Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Tutorial. ACM EC 2024. June 25, 2024 [Webpage]
I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior. Marketplace Innovation Workshop (MIW). May 20, 2024
I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior. TLDR Conference. Columbia Business School. New York City, NY. May 17, 2024
I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior. NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference. Vanderbilt University. Nashville, TN. April 19, 2024
I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior. Seminar. Stern School of Business, New York University. New York City, NY. April 12, 2024
2023
I Wasn’t There: Applications of Blockchain to Privacy Preserving Reality Protection. Facilitator. Princeton University. Princeton, NJ. December 04, 2023
Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Guest Lecture. BU Center for Computing and Data Sciences. Boston, MA. November 30, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Seminar. International Association for Quantitative Finance, Thalesians Seminar. New York City, NY. October 03, 2023
Future of Decentralization and Computing Summit. Panelist. UC Berkeley. Berkeley, CA. August 27, 2023
Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Blockchains + Economics Workshop. August 15, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. CryptoEconDay. Paris. July 19, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Highlights Beyond EC. ACM EC 2023. London, UK. June 23, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. STOC 2023. Orlando, FL. June 22, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Seminar. MIT, Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative. Cambridge, MA. June 14, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering. Philadelphia, PA. June 09, 2023
Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains. Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop. May 22, 2023
Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis. Panelist. De Gruyter. May 18, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Research Day at the Metrograph. New York City, NY. May 16, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Symposium. Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum’s symposium. April 20, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Algorithms and Complexity Seminar. MIT. Cambridge, MA. April 19, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics. Decenter Seminar. Princeton University. Princeton, NJ. April 10, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics. Seminar. University of Virginia. Charlottesville, VA. March 20, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics. Seminar. Tufts University. Medford, MA. February 28, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics. Seminar. The University of Sydney. Sydney, Australia. February 20, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics. Seminar. Carnegie Mellon University. Pittsburgh, PA. February 16, 2023
2022
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Tokenomics. Paris, France. December 12, 2022
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Seminar. Harvard University. Boston, MA. November 04, 2022
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. Seminar. Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series. November 04, 2022
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Crypto Economics Security Conference. UC Berkeley. Berkeley, CA. November 01, 2022
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. INFORMS. Indianapolis, IN. October 18, 2022
Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems. Seminar. RIT, Department of Computer Science. Rochester, NY. September 22, 2022
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. ACM EC 2022. Boulder, CO. July 12, 2022
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. Seminar. Ripple Labs. June 21, 2022
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. Seminar. Harvard University. Boston, MA. February 11, 2022
2021
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. Spotlights Beyond WINE. WINE 2021. December 15, 2021
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market. AFT 2021. September 26, 2021
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. ACM EC 2021. July 22, 2021
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation. July 23, 2021
Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group. Redmond, WA. March 10, 2021
2020
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments. Winning presentation. Princeton University Research Day. Princeton, NJ. May 05, 2020