Publications

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Ferreira, M. V. X.; and Parkes, D. C. In To appear at Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, of STOC '23, New York, NY, USA, 2023. Association for Computing Machinery

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. Ferreira, M. V. X.; Hahn, Y. L. S.; Weinberg, S. M.; and Yu, C. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '22, pages 89–114, New York, NY, USA, 2022. Association for Computing Machinery

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions. Essaidi, M.; Ferreira, M. V. X.; and Weinberg, S. M. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022), volume 215, pages 66:1–66:19, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2022. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market. Ferreira, M. V. X.; Moroz, D. J.; Parkes, D. C.; and Stern, M. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, of AFT '21, pages 86–99, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for Computing Machinery

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. Ferreira, M. V. X.; and Weinberg, S. M. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '21, pages 433–453, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for Computing Machinery

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments. Ferreira, M. V. X.; and Weinberg, S. M. In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '20, pages 683–712, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Computing Machinery

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. Chattopadhyay, T.; Feamster, N.; Ferreira, M. V. X.; Huang, D. Y.; and Weinberg, S. M. In The World Wide Web Conference, of WWW '19, pages 196–206, New York, NY, USA, 2019. Association for Computing Machinery

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