Solo-Authored.
Presentations: University of Connecticut (2025); Tenth Annual VINS Conference at NYU Shanghai (2025, scheduled)
Abstract: This paper examines how trade protection affects firm behavior through the lens of agency costs and competition. Using the U.S.-China trade war as a setting, I find that firms exposed to import tariffs increase R&D spending but experience a decline in innovation quality, suggesting inefficient investment. These firms also increase leverage by reducing equity issuance, limiting shareholder oversight. The results support agency theory, which posits that weaker competition increases managerial discretion, leading to inefficient resource allocation. My results highlight the unintended governance consequences of trade protection.
with Samuel Piotrowski (Colorado State University).
Revise & Resubmit at Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Semi-finalist for the FMA Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance (2025)
Presentations: NHH Norwegian School of Economics (2024); EasternFA (2025); Nordic Initiative for Corporate Economics Conference (2025); FMA-Europe (2025); University of Connecticut (2025); FMA (2025); SFA (2025, scheduled)
Abstract: This paper studies how product market competition shapes firms’ political investment strategies. Using import penetration from China in other developed countries as an instrument, we find that increased import competition leads to a significant and persistent decline in corporate lobbying. The reduction is concentrated in more competitive industries and in tariff-related lobbying, consistent with firms reassessing the strategic value of political investments. We also find that reduced lobbying coincides with higher regulatory exposure in future periods, suggesting that cutting political investment may carry longer-term costs for firms. The results highlight how competition alters the marginal value of political investment.
with Francois Derrien (HEC Paris) and Samuel Piotrowski (Colorado State University).
Abstract: This paper studies how the transition from private to public markets shapes firms’ ESG-related hiring. Using withdrawn IPOs as a counterfactual and an IV/2SLS strategy, we find that firms significantly increase ESG hiring—particularly in environmental roles—after going public. The increase is muted for firms with greater pre-IPO visibility and for those already engaged in ESG hiring, consistent with the idea that early signaling reduces the need for post-IPO adjustments. We also show that stronger pre-IPO ESG hiring is associated with fewer regulatory violations after listing, suggesting that ESG-oriented workforce investments carry governance benefits. The results highlight how public market pressures influence firms’ human capital strategies and the governance role of ESG hiring.
with Samuel Piotrowski (Colorado State University).