RESEARCH

Publication:

Lasfer, M., & Ye, X. (2023). Corporate insiders’ exploitation of investors’ anchoring bias at the 52-week high and low. Financial Review, 59(2), 391-432. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12371

Education:

PhD in Finance

Employment:

Lecturer in Finance (Research and Teaching)


Class Teacher/Associated Staff


Bayes Fellow in Finance (Teaching): Fixed-Term


Data Analyst: Fixed-Term


Working Papers:


Executive equity-based compensation and tournament incentives  Here

Abstract: We find that CEO promotion tournament losers sell equity profitably to mitigate the reductions in the promotion-based component of their contracts. They avoid doing so before losing the contest to maximize their promotion probabilities. Those who are more likely to compete in the tournament and to face a greater forgone tournament prize trade more aggressively. Our results suggest tournament losers consider their insider trading opportunities as outside options to compensate themselves ex-post. This strategy weakens the relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance, and highlights new implications of the tournament incentives models, compensation committees, and insider trading regulations. 



Do Customers Play a Corporate Governance Role? Here

Abstract: This paper presents new evidence that corporate customers play a governance role in disciplining managerial behavior. Using a comprehensive dataset of customer-supplier relationships, we show that major downstream firms respond to upstream firms’ EPS manipulation - instrumented by variations in the incentive to manipulate - by severing business relationships. Ex ante, the threat of withdrawal by major customers appears to deter upstream firms from engaging in EPS manipulation. Suppliers with short-term incentives strategically reallocate trade credit among customers to retain their largest customers, which mitigates the ex-post impact of customer governance.


Insider trading through supply-chain M&A event. Here

Abstract: We document that corporate insiders significantly alter their trading activities and make more informed transactions when their competitor firms or customer firms become an M&A target. We argue that these insiders have a better understanding of the impact of the deal on their firms than the aggregate market. Consistent with the prediction of the operating and purchasing efficiency hypotheses, the main sources of gain behind these more informed transactions are the changes in future operating and in innovation efficiencies, and a higher probability of being acquired in the future. We show that these more informed transactions are based on public information channels rather than the conventional private information channels.


Firm centrality and corporate ESG profiles 


Academic Conference

2024: AEA Poster^, EFMA, CICF^

2023: University of Birmingham Research Seminar; EFMA;  12th Portuguese Financial Network Conference (PFN)^; 23th Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference (FMCG)*; Royal Economic Society Annual Conference^; Behavioural Finance Working Group (BFWG, selected fee-waiver paper)^; AFS^; Corporate Finance Day (CFD); 4th Annual Boca Conference*; Pint of Science (non-academic presentation).

2022: AfriMed Finance Society Conference (AFS)^; The China International Conference in Finance (CICF); FMA Europe*; Bayes Business School Finance Research Day; University of Sussex Research Seminar^; University of Bath Research Seminar^  

2021: Vlerick Business School Research Seminar;  University of Technology Sydney Research Seminar^; Bayes Business School Finance Research Day; International Young Finance Scholar (IYFS) Conference; Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Conference*; European Financial Management Association Annual Conference (EFMA)*; European Financial Association (EFA) Doctoral Workshop  

2020: University of Swansea Research Seminar^; Bayes Business School Finance Research Day


* served as discussant

^ presented by co-authors

Academic Achievements, Grants, Rewards:

Professional Body Membership:

AFA, EFA, FMA, EFMA,SAS

Professional Service:

Referee:  Corporate Governance: An International Review,  Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

Research Interest:

Empirical Corporate Finance: Corporate Governance, Insider Trading, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), Supply Chain