Program & Abstracts

Sara Ayhan

Are contradictions (un)desirable? Considerations from proof theory, queer feminism and psychology

Abstract: Contradictory logics are systems that go beyond paraconsistency in the sense that they actually contain contradictions in their set of theorems without this leading to triviality. Thus, these are not non-classical logics (understood as subsystems or extensions of classical logic) but contra-classical logics, i.e., containing theorems that are non-theorems of classical logic. A notoriously difficult question or objection to answer in this context is the one about a justified motivation. Therefore, in this talk I want to briefly present an overview of motivations that have been considered so far and add my own motivations, some of which might be considered rather unusual for the field of logic. These will stem from 1.) philosophical assumptions in proof-theory 2.) empirical findings in the area of psychology, specifically about human reasoning about negated conditionals and about perceptions of an inconsistent self, and 3.) a political argument, tying acceptance of contradictions to endorsing democratic values.

Roy T. Cook

Queering Consequence: A Framework for Liberatory Logic

Abstract: We will begin with a brief summary of Robin Dembroff's analysis of the concept "genderqueer" as a gender critical kind, and then use Dembroff's account to formulate a framework for logically revisionary gender critical kinds (i.e., gender critical kinds whose resistance to the gender binary requires rejection of the dominant, presumably classical, logic). After developing this framework, we will use the framework to taxonomize a number of extant attempts to argue for logical revision based on feminist concerns (including Val Plumwood, Gillian Russell, Maureen Eckert, Ashley Tauchert, Rory Collins and Becca Kosten), using the framework to tease out important commonalities and differences between the various approaches. Finally, we will look at some novel, purely technical questions that are raised if one wants to develop a thoroughgoing account of gender critical logical kinds.

Maureen Eckert

Plumwood, Classical Negation, and Modeling its Public and Hidden Transcript

Abstract: In Val Plumwood's "Politics of Reason," classical negation is held to center truth against the background of falsity. Whatever is not true (classically false) takes up a lot of real estate in logical space, in contrast with whatever happens to be true, so constructed.  Plumwood takes issue with this model of negation as radically exclusionary (among several specific problems). As logicians explore options for feminist logics, Plumwood's critique of classical negation guides many of our evaluations. However, puzzles about her view of classical negation, which I call the Recentering Problem, have arisen. Centering does not always seem wrong, especially in social justice contexts. Sometimes it seems necessary to exclude, if only for protection. These puzzles can be productively addressed through James C. Scott's model of hidden and public/official transcripts. Plumwood's model of classical negation is a context or universe of domination, representing a Public Transcript that describes and serves the dominant group. The radically excluded side (~A) of the classical model represents a hidden transcript, the perspective of the oppressed.  The hidden transcript goes unacknowledged in the public transcript. The hidden transcript, the perspectives of the oppressed, is quite real yet asymmetrically related to the public transcript (in this case the classical model). Once we understand this fundamental asymmetry, the Recentering Problem evaporates, and Plumwood's call for Decentering becomes clearer and even more useful.

Viviane Fairbank

Feminist Logics, Alien Logics

Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have argued that feminists ought to be logical pluralists, in the sense that different (groups of) people (ought to) reason differently. Contingent facts about certain social groups may lead to their developing logically different, though equally correct, reasoning practices. Certainly, there are good feminist reasons for considering this picture of logic. But a question naturally arises: How, if at all, might a feminist logical pluralist avoid the threat of logical relativism—and, worse, irrationalism? One popular "anti-exceptionalist" answer to this problem assimilates feminist philosophy of logic to feminist philosophy of science (cf. Russell 2024). On this picture, logic, like science, is simultaneously pluralistic and objective—and so the problem of relativism is avoided. Saint-Croix & Cook (2024) accordingly propose that "even if there are genuinely worthwhile, and equally worthwhile, scientific projects with distinct best logics, this kind of indeterminacy is compatible with the sort of scientific objectivity achieved through intersubjective agreement" (38). Despite its initial appeal, however, I argue that this solution is unsatisfactory: the analogy between science and logic fails precisely at the level where questions of objectivity and pluralism arise. A more promising solution to logical relativism will pay due attention, instead, to recent debates concerning "logical aliens," where the objectivity of logic is associated with its transcendental attributes (Travis & Miguens 2020). I conclude that feminist philosophers should accept that logical practice is constrained, in some way, by the bounds of rationality—but this does not prevent an interesting kind of pragmatic logical pluralism.

Becca Kosten

Re-Evaluating The Master’s Tools for An Authentically Intersectional Approach to Feminist Logic

Abstract: In early work on feminist logic, there has been significant reference to the now classic Audre Lorde quote: "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." Typically, this quote is referenced because it offers a powerful way to articulate one of the major concerns regarding the viability of feminist logic: is logic one of the master's tools? And, if so, does that mean it cannot be used for liberatory projects? However, as I demonstrate here through a series of applications in Heyting-Brouwer logic, it is clear that when we take the broader context of her comments into account, Lorde offers far more than a helpful metaphor. In fact, her critique of the limitations of white American feminism provides powerful criteria for a mutual, non-dominant understanding of difference built directly upon foundational practices of intersectional activism. This, in turn, provides a meaningful contrast to Plumwood's focus on dualisms involving negation, since Lorde's critique directs attention toward broader systemic methods for representing differences among social groups in a manner that is compatible with the demands of contemporary intersectional feminism.

Franci Mangraviti

Feminist logic as critical practice: from gender identity to gender grounds

Abstract: In the first part of this talk, I will present a conception of feminist logic as a collection of practices addressing feminist concerns by tweaking logical aspects of dominant practices. A rich taxonomy presents itself when we ask which feminist concerns, which logical aspects, which dominant practices, and how radical a tweaking we are talking about. In the second part I will present - and locate - my own contribution to the field, namely the notion of gender grounds: sets of accepted and rejected "gender proofs" modeling the narrative identities of individuals from a gender perspective. I will argue that gender grounds - when appropriately deployed - can overcome some shortcomings of (naive, medicalized, or essentialized notions of) gender identity while also preserving first-person authority over gender.

Gillian Russell

Social Spheres

Abstract: This paper uses logic—a formal language with models and a consequence relation—to think about the social and political topics of subordination and subordinative speech.

Sara L. Uckelman

Teaching Feminist Logic vs. Feminist Teaching of Logic 

Abstract: Drawing on work in progress, I have three aims in this talk.  The first is to talk about feminist logic: What it is, and why it matters.  But since it matters, it's important that we teach it, which will bring me to the second aim, namely, discussing key issues of logic teaching, including separating them into content issues and pedagogy issues, and to hopefully collaboratively reflect on our current practices.  With these two aims achieved, my final aim is to revisit the "why it matters" question to argue that in fact, more important than teaching feminist logic is the feminist teaching of logic (explaining along the way what I mean by this).