Publications

Refereed Articles

1. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Spying and Imperfect Commitment in First-Price Auctions: A case of Tacit Collusion. Economic Theory Bulletin, 11 (2023), 255-275. 

2. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Price Leadership, Spying, and Secret Price Changes: A Stackelberg Game with Imperfect Commitment. International Journal of Game Theory , 52 (2023): 775–804 .

3. Wolfstetter, E. Outsourcing via Reverse Auction with Built-In Menu of Change Orders. Bulletin of Economic Research,  75 (2023), 202-208.

4. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Spying in Bertrand Markets under Incomplete Information: Who Benefits and is it Stable? Journal of Mathematical Economics, 102  (2022).

5. Wolfstetter, E. Universal High-Speed Broadband Provision: A Simple Auction Approach. Information Economics and Policy, 60 (2022).

6. Beck, H., A. Prinz, and E. Wolfstetter. Vaccination Gap, Vaccination Fraud, and Inefficient Testing – Lessons from the Corona Pandemic, Intereconomics - Review of European Economic Policy, 57-5 (2022): 330-336. 

7. Arozamena, L., F. Weinschelbaum, and E. Wolfstetter. Procuring Substitutes with (Fine-Tuned) First-Price Auctions. Economics Letters,  171 (2018), 115-118.

8. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Optimal Licensing under Incomplete Information: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder. Economic Theory, 66  (2018): 975-1005.

9. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 60  (2018), 32-53.

10. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Per-Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing. Economics Letters, 170  (2018), 71-75.

11. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Optimal Bid Disclosure in Patent License Auctions under Alternative Modes of Competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization,  47 (2016), 1–32.

12. Fan, C. and E. Wolfstetter. The Merger-Paradox: A Tournament-Based Solution. Economics Letters , 127 (2015), 35–38.

13. Flåm, S. and E. Wolfstetter. On Liability Insurance for Automobiles: A Large Games Approach. Journal of Public Economic Theory,  17 (2015), 943–963.

14. Jun, B. H. and E. Wolfstetter. Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve may Signal the Cost to Re-Auction. International Journal of Industrial Organization,  40 (2015), 11–21.

15. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Licensing a Common Value Innovation in Oligopoly when Signaling Strength may Backfire. International Journal of Game Theory,  43 (2014), 215–244.

16. Hu, L. and E. Wolfstetter. Spectrum License Auctions with Exit (and Call) Options: Alternative Remedies for the Exposure Problem. Information Economics and Policy,  27 (2014), 13–23.

17. Jun, B. H. and E. Wolfstetter. Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts. Review of Economic Design,  18 (2014), 289–319.

18. Ding, W., C. Fan, and E. Wolfstetter. Horizontal Mergers with Synergies: Cash- vs. Profit-Share Auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization,  31 (2013), 382–391.

19. Fan, C., B. Jun, and E. Wolfstetter. Licensing Process Innovations when Losers’ Messages Determine Royalty Rates. Games and Economic Behavior,  82 (2013), 388–402.

20. Ding, W. and E. Wolfstetter. Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment. RAND Journal of Economics,  42 (4) (2011), 664–680.

21. Ding, W., T. Jeitschko, and E. Wolfstetter. Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction. Economics Letters 108 (2010), 58–61.

22. Lengwiler, Y. and E. Wolfstetter. Auctions and Corruption: An Analysis of Bid Rigging by a Corrupt Auctioneer. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 34 (2010), 1872–1892.

23. Li, J. and E. Wolfstetter. Partnership Dissolution, Complementarity, and Investment Incentives. Oxford Economic Papers,  62 (2010), 529–552.

24. Fan, C. and E. Wolfstetter. Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates. Economics Letters,  98 (2008), 327–334.

25. Fan, C. and E. Wolfstetter. Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and R&D Subsidy Policy. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics) 8 (1) (2008), Article 20.

26. Giebe, T. and E. Wolfstetter. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. Games and Economic Behavior,  63 (2008), 91–106.

27. Giebe, T., T. Grebe, and E. Wolfstetter. How to Allocate R&D (and other) Subsidies: An Experimentally Tested Policy Recommendation. Research Policy , 35 (2006), 1261–1272.

28. Riedel, F. and E. Wolfstetter. Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous, Ascending Bid Auctions. Economic Theory,  29 (2006), 721–726.

29. Güth, W., S. Ivanova-Stenzel, and E. Wolfstetter. Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study. European Economic Review , 49 (2005), 1891–1913.

30. Pettersen-Strandenes, S. and E. Wolfstetter. Efficient (Re-)Scheduling: An Auction Approach. Economics Letters 89 (2005), 187–192.

31. Adolph, B. and E. Wolfstetter. Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited. De Economist, 151 (2003), 1–12.

32. Grimm, V., F. Riedel, and E. Wolfstetter. Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly when Tax Revenue Matters. Review of Economic Design, 7 (2003), 443–463.

33. Grimm, V., F. Riedel, and E. Wolfstetter. Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (2003), 1557–1569.

34. Grimm, V., F. Riedel, and E. Wolfstetter. The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany. ifo Studien, 48 (2002), 123–143.

35. Jeitschko, T. and E. Wolfstetter. Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions. Economic Inquiry, 40 (2002), 403–414.

36. Wolfstetter, E. How to Dissolve a Partnership: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,  158 (2002), 86–90.

37. Landsberger, M., J. Rubinstein, E. Wolfstetter, and S. Zamir. First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge. Review of Economic Design 6 (2001), 461–480.

38. Wolfstetter, E. The Pragmatist Approach to the Proper Scope of Government: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (2001), 53–56.

39. Jeitschko, T. and E. Wolfstetter. Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas. Economics Letters, 68 (2000), 61–66.

40. Perry, M., E. Wolfstetter, and S. Zamir. A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 33 (2000), 265–273.

41. Elberfeld, W. and E. Wolfstetter. A Dynamic Model of Bertrand Competition with Entry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17 (1999), 513-525.

42. Nautz, D. and E. Wolfstetter. Bid Shading and Risk Aversion in Multi-Unit Auctions with Many Bidders. Economics Letters, 56 (1997), 195–200.

43. Wolfstetter, E. Auctions: An Introduction. Journal of Economic Surveys, 9 (1996), 367–421.

44. Rometsch, S. and E. Wolfstetter. The Taxicab Market: An Elementary Model. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 149 (1993), 531–546.

45. Adolph, B., E. Svindland, and E. Wolfstetter. Chiseling, Monitoring, and the Price Mechanism: A Social Choice Dilemma. European Journal of Political Economy, 7 (1991), 367–379.

46. Adolph, B. and E. Wolfstetter. Wage Indexation, Informational Externalities, and Monetary Policy. Oxford Economic Papers 43 (1991), 368–390.

47. Prinz, A. and E. Wolfstetter. Unsichere Rente: Wie reagieren Arbeitsangebot und Ersparnis? Jahrbücher. f. Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 208 (1991), 140-152. 

48. Wolfstetter, E. Zu viele Professoren? WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, (1991), 128-132.

49. Wolfstetter, E. The Labor Managed Firm: A Duality Approach. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1990), 439–444.

50. Wolfstetter, E. Produktionsgenossenschaften und Teilhabergesellschaften: Mikroökonomische Grundlagen. WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, (1990), 9-32.

51. Brown, M. and E. Wolfstetter. Tripartite Income-Employment Contracts and Coalition Incentive Compatibility. RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (1989), 291–307.

52. Adolph, B. and E. Wolfstetter. Lohnindexierung und Geldpolitik bei informativen Preisen. Zeitschrift f. Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 108 (1988), 335–353.

53. Brown, M. and E. Wolfstetter. Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90 (1988), 529–547.

54. Adolph, B. and E. Wolfstetter. Pareto-Verbessernde Beschäftigungspolitik bei Risiko-Externalitäten und Unvollständigen Märkten. Jahrbuch Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, 5 (1987), 185–205.

55. Meran, G. and E. Wolfstetter. Optimal Risk Shifting vs. Efficient Employment in Illyria: The Labor Managed Firm under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Comparative Economics, 11 (1987), 163–179.

56. Brown, M., S. Chiang, S. Ghosh, and E. Wolfstetter. A New Class of Sufficient Conditions for the First-Order Approach to the Principal-Agent Problem. Economics Letters, 21 (1986), 1–6.

57. Adolph, B. and E. Wolfstetter. Pareto-Verbessernde Fiskalpolitik im Allgemeinen Gleichgewicht bei Rationalen Erwartungen. Zeitschrift f. Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 105 (1985), 51–63.

58. Brown, M. and E. Wolfstetter. A Micro Theory of Layoffs and Involuntary Unemployment. Metroeconomica, 37 (1985), 1–19.

59. Brown, M. and E. Wolfstetter. Under- and Overemployment in Optimal Layoff Contracts. Journal of Economics, 45 (1985), 101–114.

60. Wolfstetter, E. Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei Asymmetrischer Information: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit. Zeitschrift f. Wirtschafts- u. Sozialwissenschaften, 105 (1985), 433–458.

61. Brown, M. and E. Wolfstetter. Underemployment and Normal Leisure. Economics Letters, 15 (1984), 157–163.

62. Brown, M., G. Meran, and E. Wolfstetter. Optimal Employment and Risk Sharing in Illyria: The Labor Managed Firm Reconsidered. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140 (1984), 665–668.

63. Wolfstetter, E. Fiscal Policy and the Classical Growth Cycle. Journal of Economics , 42 (1982), 375–393.

64. Wolfstetter, E. Value, Natural Price, Duality, and Time. Metroeconomica, 32 (1980), 137–153.

65. Wolfstetter, E. Das Gesetz des Tendenziellen Falls der Profitrate in der Marxschen und Klassischen Wirtschaftstheorie. Jahrbuch f. Sozialwissenschaft, 28 (1977), 270–299.

66. Wolfstetter, E. Positive Profits with Negative Surplus Value. Economic Journal, 86 (1976), 854–872.

67. Wolfstetter, E. Surplus Labour, Synchronized Labour Costs, and Marx’s Labour Theory of Value. Economic Journal,  83 (1973), 787–809.

68. Wolfstetter, E. Wert, Mehrwert und Produktionspreis. Jahrbuch f. Sozialwissenschaft, 24 (1973), 117–144.

69. Wolfstetter, E. Die Betriebliche Arbeiterselbstverwaltung in Jugoslawien. Zeitschrift f. Betriebswirtschaft, 39 (1969), 737–752.

70. Wolfstetter, E. Verteilungstheorie, Lohnpolitik und Gewerkschaftliche Strategie. Heidelberger Blätter, 12/13 (1968), 33–60.

Books

1. Wolfstetter, E. Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives (Chinese Edition). Shanghai University Press, 2004.

2. Wolfstetter, E. Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

3. Wolfstetter, E. Wert, Profitrate und Beschäftigung. Campus Verlag, 1977.

4. Nutzinger, H. and E. Wolfstetter, eds. Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik. Vol. I. Herder & Herder, 1974.

5. Nutzinger, H. and E. Wolfstetter, eds. Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik. Vol. II. Herder & Herder, 1974.

Book Chapters

1. Lengwiler, Y. and E. Wolfstetter. “Corruption in Procurement Auctions”. In: Handbook of Procurement. Ed. by N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo. Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.412–429.

2. Wolfstetter, E. “Procurement of Goods and Services: Scope and Governance”. In: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, and Economic Growth. Ed. by Q. Su and X. Li., Beijing, Economic Science Press, 2006.

3. Lengwiler, Y. and E. Wolfstetter. “On Some Auction Rules for Amicable Divorce in Equal Share Partnerships”. In: Das Ethische in der Ökonomie. Festschrift für Hans Nutzinger. Ed. by T. Beschorner and T. Eger. Metropolis, 2005, pp.199–212.

4. Wolfstetter, E. “The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design?” In: Regulation, Competition, and the Market Economy. Festschrift for Carl Christian von Weizsäcker. Ed. by H. G. Nutzinger. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003, pp.281–293.

5. Wolfstetter, E. “Third- and Higher-Price Auctions”. In: Beiträge zur Mikro- und zur Makroökonomik: Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Ramser. Ed. by M. Braulke and S. Berninghaus. Springer Verlag, 2001, pp.495–503.

6. Wolfstetter, E. Koreferat zum Referat von W. Emons. In: Ökonomische Analyse von Verträgen. Ed. by W. Franz, H. Hesse, H. J. Ramser, and M. Stadler. Mohr Siebeck, 2000, pp.149–189.

7. Wolfstetter, E. “Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Bedeutung und Grenzen des Linkage Prinzips”. In: Ökonomische Theorie der Rationierung. Ed. by M. Tietzel. Vahlen Verlag, 1998, pp.139–161.

8. Wolfstetter, E. “Auktionen und Ausschreibungen”. In: Jahrbuch d. Berliner Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft. 1997, pp.93–110.

9. Lutz, P., U. Schwalbe, and E. Wolfstetter. “Takeover Games Without Dilution”. In: Geld, Banken und Versicherungen, Tagungsband 5. Ed. by W.-R. Heilmann. Springer, 1990, pp.589–601.

10. Wolfstetter, E. Contract Theory and Involuntary Underemployment: A Review. In: Recent Developments in Labor Economics. Ed. by H. König. Springer, 1990, pp.171–192.

11. Wolfstetter, E. Wage Component Behavior in Japanese Manufacturing Industries: A Comment on FitzRoy and Hart. In: Recent Developments in Labor Economics. Ed. by H. König. Springer, 1990, pp.85–88.

12. Wolfstetter, E. “Marxistische Werttheorie”. In: Handwörterbuch der Mathematischen Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Ed. by M. Beckmann, G. Menges, and R. Selten. 1979, pp.205–212.

13. Wolfstetter, E. “Substitution Along the Time Axis: A Comment”. In: Essays on Modern Capital Theory. Ed. by M. Brown, K. Sato, and P. Zarembka. North-Holland, 1976, pp.229–238.

Reprinted Articles/Books

1. Nutzinger, H. and E. Wolfstetter, eds. Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik.  Metropolis, 2008.

2. Grimm, V., F. Riedel, and E. Wolfstetter. “The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany.” In: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication. Ed. by G. Illing and U. Klüh. MIT Press, 2004, 223–246.

3. Brown, M. and E. Wolfstetter. “Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating”. In: Information and Incentives in Organizations. Ed. by S. Honkaponkja. Blackwell, 1989, pp.267–286.

4. Wolfstetter, E. “Surplus Labour, Synchronized Labour Costs, and Marx’s Labour Theory of Value”. In: Karl Marx’s Economics. Critical Assessment. Ed. by J. C. Wood. Routledge Critical Assessment of Leading Economists. Routledge, reprinted 1991, 1998, 1988, pp.338–360.

5. Wolfstetter, E. Plusvalia, Costes de Trabajo Sincronizados y Teoria del Valos-Trabajo de Marx. Revista Española de Economia (1975), 332–360.

6. Wolfstetter, E. “Mehrarbeit, Synchronisierte Arbeitskosten und die Marxsche Arbeitswertlehre”. In: Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik. Ed. by H. G. Nutzinger and E. Wolfstetter. Vol. II. 1974, pp.62–93.

7. Wolfstetter, E. “Surtravail, Côuts en Travail Synchronisée et Théorie de la Valuer Travail de Marx”. In: Ricardiens, Keynesians et Marxistes. Essais en Économie Politique Non-Néoclassique. Ed. by C. Berthomieu and J. Cartelier. 1974, pp.275–306.

Reports

1. Casartelli, G. and E. Wolfstetter. Study on the Quality of the Guidelines of Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2006.

2. Becker, C., S. Ekert, K. Blind, R. Bierhals, and E. Wolfstetter. Effizienzsteigerung bei der FuE-Projektförderung durch Wettbewerbliche Vergabeverfahren. Gutachten für das Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Bonn, 2004.

3. Nutzinger, H. and E. Wolfstetter, eds. Mitbestimmung in Deutschland. DAAD, Paris, 1970.

Discussion Papers/Submitted Papers

1. Jun, B. -H. and E. Wolfstetter. Edgeworth's Paradox Revisited: A Comment. Discussion Paper, 2024.

2. Fan, C. and B.- H. Jun and E. Wolfstetter. Equilibrium Cross-Ownership and Divestment. Discussion Paper, 2024.

3. Jun, B. H., E. Wolfstetter, and S. Zamir. Detrimental Information in a First-Price Private-Value Auction. 2022.

4. Engelmann, D. and E. Wolfstetter. A Proxy Bidding Mechanism that Elicits all Bids in an English Clock Auction. Working Paper. Department of Economics, Humboldt University at Berlin, 2009.

5. Jun, B.-H. and E. Wolfstetter. Signaling Equilibria in a Multi-Unit English Clock Auction, Working Paper. Department of Economics, Humboldt University at Berlin, 2004. 

6. Rowthorn, B. and E. Wolfstetter. On Marx's Scheme of Reproduction and Accumulation. Working Paper, Department of Economics, Cambridge University, 1972.

Recently in the News

1. Prinz, A. und E. Wolfstetter,  Eine gerechtere Altersbegrenzung in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung

2. Prinz, A. und E. Wolfstetter, Deutschland gehen die Arbeitskräfte aus. Was können wir dagegen tun? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10. Oktober 2022, S. 16

3. Wolfstetter, E. Efficient pooling in Covid-19 testing. January 2022.

4. Beck, H. and A. Prinz und E. Wolfstetter.  115 Euro pro Positiv-Test statt 11,50 Euro für jeden - so lassen sich Betrüger stoppen. Die Welt,  Dec. 13, 2021.

5. Wolfstetter, E. and H. Beck and A. Prinz. Betrügereien und die Finanzierung von Corona Schnelltests: Ein Vorschlag. Wirtschaftliche Freiheit: Das Ordnungspolitische Journal, June 28, 2021.