Willem de Vlaming, januari 2026
A hegemon is a dominant state, country, or group that holds significant political, economic, and military power, allowing it to exert leadership and influence over others. The concept comes from ancient Greek city-states, but today it's used for global powers like the 20th-century United States, which shaped the world order through its strength and ability to steer international systems.
With a stampeding Hegemon:
The realistic objective is damage containment, by preventing normalization of dissolving the international order.
Refuse the Hegemon’s narrative, without confrontation.
Keep everything boring, legalistic, and relentlessly factual.
Increase friction, not force.
Hollow out the Hegemon’s leadership.
Feed and support internal ‘brakes’ and counter forces in the hegemon.
BE PERSISTENT WITHOUT ILLUSION
Not all conflicts are resolved through direct confrontation; in international politics, the most consequential struggles are often fought indirectly — through institutions, law, economics, and legitimacy — where power is constrained, delayed, and redistributed rather than openly contested.
What to do when a Hegemon:
1) wants to destroy the institutional framework of international rule of law;
2) tries to extort other countries, including its allies;
3) has lost internal checks and balances to control its executive.
Note: International rule of law matters not because it always prevents violations, but because it defines what counts as lawful, legitimate, and acceptable conduct in international relations. Without it, international order reverts toward coercion, instability, and permanent uncertainty.
Note: An unequal relationship becomes abusive when the power imbalance is used to control, harm, or remove the other person’s autonomy. An unequal alliance starts to resemble an abusive relationship when the stronger actor uses its power to systematically reduce the weaker allies’ autonomy or security. Key warning signs:
1) Coercion: threatening withdrawal of protection, sanctions, or economic harm to force compliance
2) Instrumentalization: treating allies as tools rather than partners
3) Punitive behavior: punishing dissent instead of negotiating
4) Unilateralism that creates risk: making major security decisions without consultation that expose allies to danger
5) Dependency traps: encouraging dependence while blocking alternatives, then using that dependence as leverage
And a Genuine Question for those in favor for 'the right of the strongest':
For those that argue that the strongest has the right to decide what is right and may dominate the weak.
If you were robbed and beaten by a group stronger than you, would you defend them in court on the grounds that this is simply how the world works — that they were justified because they proved themselves stronger?
Is strength, by itself, a source of legitimacy?
And would you accept this same principle being applied to your partner, your children, or your grandchildren—that anyone stronger than them has the right to impose their will through force?
Stampedes end — not because they’re confronted head-on, but because the terrain stops it.
Prevent normalization of precedents that dissolve international order itself.
The response must be collective, legalistic, and personal — not military, not rhetorical, and not deferential.
You Cannot “Fix” It from Outside
External actors cannot restore internal constitutional order, domestic rule of law, or democratic norms. Attempts to do so usually backfire: feeding nationalist narratives, justifying further executive consolidation
What Doesn’t Work (and Often Makes It Worse)
Appeasement: Concessions reinforce the belief that pressure works. This accelerates coercive behavior.
Moral shaming alone: A stampeding power that has abandoned rule-of-law norms is often immune to normative criticism, especially if domestic propaganda reframes it as external hostility.
Pure isolation: Strengthens hardliners internally; Pushes the power toward alternative blocs; Eliminates remaining points of leverage
What is Needed: A Multi-Layered Strategy
Collective Balancing (Without Formal War Posture)
Reduce the superpower’s ability to pick off states individually, by informal alignment on: trade standards, technology controls, financial transparency, sanctions enforcement, etcetera
Immediate Collective Response: Norm defense: joint diplomatic expulsions; suspension of legal cooperation; coordinated travel restrictions on officials involved; formal resolutions in UN bodies — even if vetoed — to fix the narrative
Personal Cost Imposition on Decision-Makers (personal risk)
Because the behavior is executive-driven: targeted sanctions on: prosecutors, judges, security officials; asset freezes; international arrest exposure (reciprocity logic).
Protective Measures for Leaders and Officials
Restricting travel to the abducting state and aligned jurisdictions. Using secure transit agreements. Increasing reliance on neutral venues. Avoiding extradition-prone airspace
Institutional Countermove: Reclaiming Legitimate Justice
Strengthen multilateral courts (ICC, ad hoc tribunals). Create joint investigatory mechanisms. Push for conditional universality: jurisdiction only via multilateral consent. Justice without consent is domination, not law.
Institutional Resilience, Not Replacement
Build parallel mechanisms inside existing frameworks: arbitration clubs, plurilateral treaties, conditional access regimes. This avoids conceding to “rules no longer matter.”
Deterrence by Denial, Not Punishment (don’t provoke escalation):
Reduce the effectiveness of coercion: supply-chain rearrangement, energy independence, rearrangement of financial channels, shared cyber defense, etcetera.
Strategic Patience Toward the Domestic Situation
External actors should avoid legitimizing the executive personally and narrative. Instead maintain ties with: subnational governments, civil society. professional bureaucracies, and academic and cultural institutions.
If the stampeding Hegemon is overwhelmingly dominant, militarily and economically, the analysis becomes more uncomfortable — but also more precise.
Power asymmetry changes what is possible, not what is sustainable.
The Hard Bottom Line: If the USA becomes a stampeding superpower: no state can stop it outright, military balancing is fantasy, and moral appeals are insufficient. In the end the US can be made to choose between raw domination and functional leadership — because it cannot have both.
Strip Away Illusions: When the hegemon is the USA, some normal assumptions fail:
“International law will constrain it” — only partially, and only indirectly
“Allies can balance it militarily” — they cannot, even collectively
“Naming and shaming will deter it” — it won’t
“Retaliation symmetry is possible” — it isn’t
What Changes When the Strongest Power Breaks the Rules
Courts, sanctions, and norms are used downward, never upward
This creates a hierarchical order, not an anarchic one: “Rules apply to others; discretion applies to us.”
A. Law Becomes Instrumental, Not Binding: If the US threats other states, including allies, and abducts foreign leaders and claims jurisdiction: international law does not disappear, it becomes selective and asymmetric.
B. Allies Face a Prisoner’s Dilemma: Each ally must choose between: collective resistance (risky, costly, uncertain), or quiet compliance (safer individually, corrosive system-wide). Rational short-term behavior is defection, but with as long-term outcome: norm collapse.
Use Friction, Not Force: You cannot stop the US — but you can make rule-breaking: slower, more expensive, less reliable, less legitimate even domestically. By: 1) terminating or suspending legal cooperation treaties; 2) refusing evidence and intelligence sharing; 3) overwhelming US courts with jurisdictional challenges; 4) forcing cases into procedural purgatory
Weaponize Loss of Legitimacy (Domestically, Not Internationally): The most important audience is the American system itself. US power depends on: allied cooperation; dollar centrality; judicial credibility; elite buy-in; internal belief that “we are the lawful actor”. Foreign governments should: meticulously document violations, file cases even knowing they’ll lose, force US allies, judges, and legislators to confront contradictions, keep everything boring, legalistic, and relentlessly factual.
Alliance Hedging Without Formal Rupture: No dramatic break. Just thousands of micro-adjustments. This doesn’t punish the US immediately — but it hollows out leadership: 1) reduce intelligence sharing; 2) Build alternative payment rails; 3) diversify reserves away from USD at the margin; 4) avoid extraditable travel routes; 5) shift diplomacy to neutral venues.
Deny Precedent Recognition: (This is subtle but vital). Even powerless states can refuse to ratify the story. International order survives as long as the narrative is contested. Never acknowledge US jurisdiction. Treat abducted leaders as kidnapped, not prosecuted. Continue recognizing them diplomatically where possible. Refuse successor legitimacy if it appears coerced.
You cannot stop a stampeding hegemon — but you can make trampling the rules slow, costly, contested, and ultimately unattractive. For the EU and the Netherlands, the effective response is: Legal resistance without confrontation; collective action without escalation; persistence without illusion.
The objective is containment and norm defense, not escalation or “punishment.” The EU cannot coerce the USA militarily or economically. The Netherlands cannot confront the USA bilaterally without unacceptable costs. But both can meaningfully constrain behavior by: denying cooperation; increasing legal and political friction; protecting sovereignty and precedent; leveraging the USA’s dependence on legitimacy and allied compliance.
Immediate Collective Framing of importance of ‘rule of law’: The EU must fix the narrative early and formally, to: prevent normalization, create a paper trail for future litigation, signal US institutions (courts, Congress, media) that legitimacy is contested.
Suspension of Judicial & Law-Enforcement Cooperation: Temporary suspension or narrowing of: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs); Evidence-sharing agreements; Joint task forces involving DOJ/FBI. Effect: US prosecutions become procedurally fragile; US courts face evidentiary and jurisdictional dead ends; Costs are legal, not military or economic
EU “Protective Jurisdiction” Doctrine: The EU should assert a counter-principle: EU officials and recognized foreign leaders are immune from unilateral third-state jurisdiction absent multilateral mandate. This mirrors how the EU already protects against secondary US sanctions. Concrete steps:
Council Decision: Prohibiting EU member states from cooperating with such prosecutions
EU-wide travel protection guidance
Legal defense fund for targeted officials
Quiet but Systematic Hedging: Without drama accelerate: 1) Euro- denominated trade settlement: 2) Independent sanctions enforcement mechanisms; 3) Non-US payment rails (incremental, not declarative); 4) Intelligence compartmentalization
The Netherlands is not just another EU state here. It hosts: International Court of Justice (ICJ); International Criminal Court (ICC); OPCW; Europol (The Hague). This gives the Dutch state unique asymmetric tools.
Absolute Protection of ‘The Hague’ as Neutral Legal Space. The Hague must remain procedurally boring and legally pristine.
Dutch red lines: No cooperation — formal or informal — with unilateral US prosecutions. Explicit refusal to assist in: arrests, evidence transfer, detention logistics
If violated: Immediate diplomatic escalation; Parliamentary inquiry; Public assertion of Dutch neutrality obligations
Parliamentary Lock-In (Critical for Credibility) The Dutch government should secure a cross-party Tweede Kamer resolution stating:
Non-recognition of unilateral extraterritorial jurisdiction
Protection of foreign leaders against abduction
Obligation to challenge such acts legally
Legal Counteroffensives (Even If They “Lose”): The Netherlands should support cases before: ICJ (state responsibility), ECHR (if jurisdictional hooks exist). File amicus briefs in US courts challenging jurisdiction.
Winning is not the goal.
Procedural friction and legitimacy erosion are.
Travel, Airspace, and Transit Measures (Subtle but Powerful).
Tighten transit rules for: US aircraft carrying detainees, Law-enforcement charters
Increase documentation requirements
Enforce existing aviation and customs law to the letter
This raises operational costs without declaring retaliation.
What if the strongest superpower (USA) chooses to exit the international rule of law power balancing act — chosing a high stake gamble to topple the system and starts extorting smaller enemies and Nato allies alike.
Short answer: “the system does not immediately collapse”, but it changes character in ways that ultimately constrain even the strongest power. The gamble is rational in the short term and destabilizing in the long term, with outcomes that depend on how other actors respond. A superpower can gamble on extortion, but in doing so it converts power into resistance and trades long-term dominance for short-term leverage.
If the United States deliberately exits the cooperative equilibrium — treating international law, NATO commitments, and institutional constraints as instruments of coercion rather than mutual restraint — it is choosing “systemic defection” in a repeated, asymmetric game. This is not ordinary rule-breaking; it is an attempt to:
Convert structural power into direct leverage
Replace rule-based cooperation with hierarchical extraction
Turn alliances into protection rackets
In game-theoretic terms, this is a high-stakes deviation from an iterated equilibrium, betting that others cannot coordinate an effective response.
Short-Term Payoffs
Smaller allies may comply due to security dependence
Legal and institutional constraints weaken
Costs of defection are delayed
Power asymmetry masks reputational damage
Historically, hegemonic powers often misread this phase as proof that law and institutions were unnecessary rather than merely subordinate to power.
Medium-Term Systemic Response
The crucial variable is coordination among others.
A. Allies hedge, not obey
NATO allies increase strategic autonomy
Defense diversification and regional security pacts emerge
Legal commitments remain rhetorically intact but hollowed out
B. Rivals exploit legitimacy loss
Competing powers position themselves as defenders of order
Normative leadership shifts, even if material power does not
Institutional forums become arenas of resistance rather than compliance
C. Institutions adapt against the defector
Law becomes selectively enforced *against* the defector
Proceduralism is weaponized (courts, trade regimes, standards)
The system “hardens” in unexpected places
This transforms the game from hierarchical coercion into multi-player balancing.
Why This Strategy Ultimately Fails
Even for a superpower, systemic extortion is unstable.
Power converts into opposition
Coercion increases incentives for coalition-building
Smaller states accept short-term costs to escape dependency
Information and trust collapse
Allies stop sharing intelligence and technology
Coordination costs for the hegemon increase sharply
The defector loses agenda-setting power
The US moves from rule-maker to rule-breaker
Others write rules in domains the hegemon cannot fully control (trade standards, tech norms, finance)
The system does not disappear — it re-routes
International rule of law survives, but without the hegemon at its center.
Paradox: The strongest power can damage the system,
but cannot monopolize it without recreating systemic constraints it sought to escape.
Historical Parallels (Cautious, Non-Deterministic)
British decline: when coercion replaced consent, balancing followed
Interwar U.S. isolationism: weakened institutions but empowered rivals
Post-hegemonic orders: law persists in fragmented, regionalized forms
No hegemon has successfully replaced a rule-based order with permanent extortion without either:
institutionalizing authority (empire), or
triggering counter-balancing that restores constraints
Bottom Line
If the United States chooses systemic defection:
It can extract short-term gains
It cannot sustain a stable order through coercion alone
It accelerates the erosion of its own structural advantages
International rule of law mutates rather than collapses
The fact that some international rule-like order will re-emerge says nothing about its quality, its values, or its protections. Order is not the same as justice, liberal legality, or human dignity. The collapse of liberal leadership does not end international order, but it degrades its moral and institutional quality, replacing a rights-based system of constraint with a power-based system of managed stability.
Order vs. Liberal Rule of Law: International relations theory often treats “order” as: predictability, stability, manageable violence. But liberal international rule of law adds substantive content: democratic rule of law & accountability, individual rights, pluralism and openness; constraints on arbitrary power. A post-defection system may still have rules and enforcement Institutions. Yet lack rights-based protections, due process beyond state interest, or constraints on coercion.
A rules-based order can exist without being a rule-of-law order in the liberal sense.
What Happens When the Hegemon Defects Normatively
If the strongest power abandons not just cooperation but liberal commitments, three shifts follow:
Normative downgrading: human rights become optional or rhetorical; sovereignty and “non-interference” dominate; procedural compliance replaces substantive justice; this favors authoritarian legalism: law as control, not constraint.
Institutional hollowing: Institutions persist, but: enforcement becomes selective; rights regimes weaken first; power vetoes principle; this produces law without liberalism.
Value bifurcation: The system fragments into: illiberal spheres with tight control; liberal enclaves with limited reach; no universal pluralist order remains.
Why Quality Declines Faster Than Order: Stability is cheap; liberal legality is expensive. Democratic rule of law requires: trust, transparency, shared epistemic standards, willingness to self-bind. When power politics dominate: self-binding looks irrational, rights look exploitable, openness looks dangerous. Thus liberal norms collapse before institutions do.
The Tragedy: Path Dependence and Lock-In: Once liberal IRL erodes: new actors socialize into lower standards; rights regress become normalized; restoration costs increase exponentially. This is a ratchet effect: it is far easier to destroy liberal legality than to rebuild it; even if power later re-balances, the normative baseline has shifted downward.
The Hard Conclusion: Yes, a new international order will emerge—but it may be: Less democratic, Less rights-protective, Less pluralist, More coercive, More tolerant of repression. In other words: Order may survive, but liberal international rule of law may not.
This is the real systemic risk — not chaos, but authoritarian normalization under the cover of legality.
What will happen economically to the USA if the United States simultaneously:
1. Abolished income taxes and replaced them primarily with import tariffs
2. Raised the defense budget to $1.5 trillion annually
3. Shifted foreign policy to explicit power-based intimidation, including allies
Replacing income taxes with import tariffs
Revenue reality:
Income taxes currently fund a very large share of federal revenue.
Import tariffs — even extremely high ones — cannot reliably replace that scale of revenue without: Massive price increases and large reductions in trade volume (which reduces tariff revenue)
CORE PROBLEM: Tariffs shrink the tax base as they rise. Income taxes scale with GDP; tariffs scale with imports, which fall when tariffs rise.
Immediate economic effects:
Consumer prices rise sharply, especially for: electronics, energy inputs, machinery, pharmaceuticals, clothing
Tariffs act as a regressive tax: Lower-income households spend a higher share of income on goods
Inflation spikes unless demand collapses
Industrial response:
Some domestic manufacturing returns, but: at higher cost; with lower productivity; with **capital-intensive, not labor-intensive processes
Supply chains become less efficient and more fragile
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$1.5 trillion defense budget
Fiscal impact
$1.5T would likely exceed 30–40% of federal spending.
Without income taxes: deficits explode unless tariffs are extreme or services are cut drastically.
Economic effects
Short term: GDP bump from military spending; defense contractors boom; high-skill engineering and weapons sectors expand.
Medium term: Crowding out: civil infrastructure, education, R&D outside defense. Higher interest rates as debt rises. Dollar strength initially, then instability
Long term: Militarized economy with declining civilian productivity. Innovation becomes defense-centric rather than general-purpose
Power-based intimidation foreign policy (including allies)
Trade retaliation
Allies respond with: counter-tariffs, regulatory barriers, currency coordination against USD dominance, global firms reduce U.S. exposure to political risk.
Capital flows
Initially: Capital still flows to the U.S. due to military dominance and dollar inertia
Over time: Capital diversification accelerates (more trade in non-USD currencies; parallel financial systems emerge); U.S. loses its “exorbitant privilege” gradually, not instantly
Short term (0–3 years): inflation surge; consumer welfare drop; defense and energy sectors boom; stock market volatility; dollar initially strong; rising deficits masked by confidence and inertia
Medium term (3–10 years): trade volumes fall, tariff revenue underperforms; structural inflation persists; debt servicing costs rise; allies quietly decouple economically; U.S. firms lose export markets
Long term (10–25 years): lower real GDP growth; more unequal society; militarized but less innovative economy; dollar no longer dominant, just “one of several”;
Structural contradictions make the model unstable over time:
Tariffs need high imports to generate revenue, but intimidation reduces trade.
Military power requires alliances, but intimidation destroys them.
Dollar dominance requires trust, not fear.
High defense spending requires broad tax capacity, not narrow tariffs.
Since 27 April 1951, Denmark and the U.S. have had a bilateral treaty on the defense of Greenland. Its purpose is collective defense under NATO, recognizing Greenland’s strategic position in the North Atlantic and Arctic.
Under this treaty the U.S. can:
> Use and operate military facilities in designated defense areas (most importantly Thule Air Base, now called Pituffik Space Base) for defense purposes.
> Station personnel, maintain facilities, and operate equipment connected to defense cooperation.
> Have rights of movement and access for U.S. military forces and assets in support of NATO defense planning.
Denmark retains full sovereignty over Greenland — the treaty explicitly respects Danish authority and requires cooperation with Danish and Greenlandic authorities