Willem de Vlaming, January 2026
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People trust each other when they know neither the strong nor the system can arbitrarily destroy them.
High-trust democracy is an equilibrium outcome, not a starting condition.
To move from dog-eat-dog to high trust:
Make domination costly
Make cooperation safe
Make systems predictable
Make fairness visible
Make participation meaningful
Give it time
Trust endures when citizens believe the system is powerful for them, not powerful over them.
# First principle: Trust is 'produced', not demanded
In low-trust contexts, appeals to “be more trusting” fail. People are behaving rationally given their environment.
Therefore: You must reduce the cost of trusting and increase the cost of predation before trust can rise. Trust follows *credible protection*, not moral exhortation. This means the early phase is less about ideal democracy and more about order with accountability.
# Phase 1 – Establish credible protection against domination
In dog-eat-dog contexts, the primary fear is: 'If I cooperate, I’ll be exploited'. The core requirement for trust is: No one can reliably get away with abusing power.
This requires a narrow but strong foundation:
A. Impartial enforcement of basic rules
> Rule of law that applies especially to the strong
> Clear, limited, enforceable prohibitions: Violence, Fraud, Coercion, Corruption
> Early wins must target elite impunity, not petty offenders
Trust grows fastest when people see the powerful restrained.
B. Independence of enforcement bodies
> Courts, inspectors, ombudsmen, anti-corruption units
> Protected budgets and appointment processes
> Visible consequences for violations
This is freedom as non-domination, not mere non-interference.
C. Embed the protection, fostering and enforcing of:
> the principles, institutions and representatives of the democratic rule of law, the pluriform open society, human rights
> the protection of citizens against coercion and domination by fellow citizens, organisations and states (concept of freedom)
> the collectivization of individual and minority vulnerability (social and economical security and safety)
#. Phase 2 – Make cooperation safer than defection
Once predation becomes riskier, institutions must actively reward (critical) cooperative behavior.
A. Predictable systems beat benevolent leaders
People trust systems more than intentions. Examples: Transparent procurement systems; Automated benefits delivery; Clear eligibility rules; Appeals processes that actually work Predictability → reduced fear → willingness to engage.
B. Create “small trust loops”
Trust does not emerge at national scale first. Start with: Local councils; Cooperatives; Participatory budgeting; Community mediation; Citizen juries. These create repeated trust based interactions, where: Defection is visible; Cooperation is rewarded; Reputation matters. This mirrors how high-trust norms emerge in game-theoretic settings.
# Phase 3 – Shift incentives from extraction to contribution
> LOW-TRUST societies reward: Rent-seeking; Hoarding; Patronage; Loyalty over competence
> HIGH-TRUST democracies reward: Reliability; Skill; Contribution; Fairness
Key levers:
A. Universalistic policies
Means-tested, discretionary systems breed mistrust.
Universal systems: Reduce stigma, reduce gatekeeper power, increase perceived fairness
Examples: Universal healthcare, child benefits, public education, basic social insurance
People trust systems they believe treat everyone fairly.
B. Social and economic security as a trust amplifier
Precarity makes people short-term and defensive.
> Income volatility → lower trust
> Strong safety nets → higher civic participation
Social and econiomic security enables long-term thinking, empathy, and risk-taking.
# Phase 4 – Norms, identity, and moral learning
Only after institutional trust becomes credible do cultural shifts become durable.
A. Civic education as practice, not propaganda
> Teach rights *and* responsibilities
> Teach how institutions actually work
> Train people to challenge authority constructively
B. Shared identity without exclusion
High trust does not require sameness, but it does require:
> Shared commitment to rules
> Shared understanding of “fair play”
> Shared belief that violations will be addressed
This is constitutional patriotism, not ethnic or ideological unity.
## 6. The role of transparency and accountability
Transparency alone does not create trust. Transparency plus consequences does.
> Bad formula: “We revealed corruption, nothing changed.”
> Good formula: “We revealed corruption, people were removed, rules changed.”
Trust is not believing institutions are perfect; it is believing they self-correct.
## 7. What fails (and often backfires, and sually deepen cynicism and elite capture )
Rapid deregulation in low-trust environments
Moralizing rhetoric without enforcement
Strongman “order” without accountability
Importing institutions without local legitimacy
Assuming markets or civil society will self-regulate
## 8. Historical pattern (very briefly) Note: there are no shortcuts!
Successful transitions (Nordic states, post-war Germany, parts of East Asia):
Strong, impartial state capacity
Anti-elite capture measures
Universal social policies
Gradual expansion of participation
Long time horizons (decades, not years)
Willemde Vlaming, January 2026
The Netherlands & the EU are high-trust systems under stress, not low-trust societies, main trust tasks to counter the stress, are:
NETHERLANDS: repair institutional trust by reducing bureaucratic / political incented distrust and domination and restoring proportionality, humility, and accountability.
EUROPEAN UNION: transform from a rule-enforcer into a visible protector against domination — by markets, states, and crises alike.
High-trust democracy in the Netherlands and the EUropean Union will survive only if: power remains contestable, mistakes are survivable, solidarity is predictable, institutions visibly restrain the strong.
Trust endures when citizens believe the system is powerful for them, not powerful over them.
# Baseline: Netherlands & EU are high-trust systems under stress, not low-trust societies
This matters, because the task is trust repair and adaptation, not trust creation from zero.
The Netherlands
Traditionally: very high interpersonal trust; strong rule of law; dense civil society; consensus-based governance (“polder model”)
Currently: Institutional trust fracture, not social collapse
Trust asymmetries between: citizens vs state; highly educated vs less educated; native vs migrant-background citizens, major legitimacy shocks (e.g. *toeslagenaffaire*) (zie ook hieronder)
The EU
Low emotional trust**, high functional dependence
Seen as: technocratic, distant, protective of markets more than people, yet relied upon heavily in crises (COVID, Ukraine, climate, trade)
So the core issue is: Perceived domination by systems that feel unaccountable and asymmetric.
# Phase 1 applied: Credible protection against domination
The Netherlands: The Toeslagenaffaire as a trust-destroyer:
This scandal was devastating not because of error, but because it revealed: presumption of guilt, automated suspicion, no effective appeal, legalistic cruelty, political denial for years
Key trust lesson: > The state became a dominating force, especially for vulnerable citizens.
What rebuilds trust here:
Legal right to proportionality (now re-emphasized)
Cultural shift in bureaucracy and legislation: dienstbaarheid over enforcement
Real accountability (not just apologies)
Institutionalized human-in-the-loop safeguards
Trust is rebuilt when citizens see: “The system will not destroy me if I make a mistake.”
EU: Domination without visibility
The EU rarely dominates directly, but: sets rules without felt representation; appears to discipline states (e.g. fiscal rules) more than protect people
Credible protection requires stronger enforcement of: Rule-of-law conditionality, Anti-corruption mechanisms, especially against member-state elites, not populations.
Trust increases when: EU power is visibly used against abuse BY and IN member states, not just to enforce markets.
# Phase 2 applied: Making cooperation safer than defection
Netherlands: From consensus to polarization risk
The Dutch model relies on: Voluntary cooperation, Institutional trust, Informal compliance
This breaks down when people believe: “Rules apply unevenly”, “I pay, others cheat”, “Elites are insulated”
Needed adaptations: Less reliance on informal compliance, More explicit fairness checks, Stronger ombuds functions, Better protection for whistleblowers
Paradox: High-trust societies need *more formal safeguards* once trust begins to erode.
EU: Cooperation without solidarity feels extractive
The EU excels at: Coordinating rules; Market integration; Crisis response (late but large)
But cooperation feels unsafe when: Burdens are uneven (e.g. migration, energy, austerity), Solidarity is conditional or delayed
Trust-building measures: Permanent fiscal stabilization tools (NextGenerationEU is a start); EU-level social floor (minimum standards, not harmonization); Crisis mechanisms that trigger *automatically*, not politically
Trust grows when states believe: “If I cooperate now, I won’t be abandoned later.”
# Phase 3 applied: Incentives — from compliance to contribution
Netherlands: Universalism under pressure
Historically strong: Universal healthcare, Education, Social insurance
But creeping erosion via: Conditionality, Fraud logic, Managerialism
Trust-preserving reforms: Reduce discretionary gatekeeping, Simplify benefits, Restore presumption of good faith, Measure success by *errors avoided*, not fraud detected
This directly addresses fear of domination by the welfare state itself.
EU: Market citizenship without social citizenship
The EU guarantees: Free movement of capital, goods, services, labor
But weakly guarantees: Social security portability, Housing access, Labor protection enforcement
This creates: Intra-EU resentment, "Race to the bottom” fears; National blame-shifting
Trust grows if the EU is seen as: Enabling fair mobility, Preventing social dumping, Protecting workers across borders
# Phase 4 applied: Norms, identity, and democratic meaning
Netherlands: From depoliticized trust to reflexive trust
Traditional Dutch trust was: Quiet, Technocratic, Delegated. That model is no longer sufficient.
Needed shift: 1) From blind trust → earned trust; 2) From deference → contestability
This means: Easier access to courts; Citizen panels; Participatory oversight; Political humility
Trust deepens when people feel: “I can challenge the system without being crushed.”
EU: The EU should grow from technocratic legitimacy to civic legitimacy.
The EU’s core weakness is not democracy per se, but agency --- the capacity to act or exert power.
Improvements that improve civic legitemacy and agency are:
Embed ded protection, fostering and enforcing of:
> the principles, institutions and representatives of the democratic rule of law, the pluriform open society, human rights
> the protection of citizens against coercion and domination by fellow citizens, organisations and states (core concept of freedom)
> the collectivization of individual and minority vulnerability (social and economical security and safety)
Stronger role of the European Parliament; clearer political choices at EU elections; fewer “there is no alternative” narratives, more visible and substantiated policy trade-offs.
It is important for the EU to be seen NOT as ruling over its people BUT as being there ruling for all its people. At the moment (except in emergencies) its focus and power is to much on protecting the level playing field of the common market.
In short: the EU should get more leverage over member states that don't respect the principles and institutions of democratic rule of law, the pluriform open society, and human rights --- in their own legislation and practice of governance.
European identity grows from shared political dialogue and conflict within shared principles and rules.
# What not to do (especially relevant now)
Netherlands: Treat distrust as populism alone; Over-automate governance; Assume social cohesion is permanent
EU: Respond to crises only ad hoc; Moralize compliance without sharing risk; Hide political choices behind expertise. These deepen the sense of domination by distant systems.
Willem de Vlaming, January 2026
De toeslagenaffaire (ca 2017) is misschien wel het meest recente en schrijnende voorbeeld van de vertrouwensbreuk tussen overheid en burgers. Het lijkt vooral een uitvloeisel van een geleidelijke verschuiving in de relatie tussen burgers en overheid. Voor de jaren 80 en 90 van de 20ste eeuw waren subsidieregelingen en toeslagen ongelimiteerd — hoe meer mensen aan de voorwaarden voldeden, des te meer werd er door de overheid besteed aan die regeling.
De overheid was er vooral op gericht om er voor te zorgen dat iedereen die aan de criteria van een regeling voldeed, ook werd bediend. Dat er daarbij ook mensen door de mazen van de regeling heenglipten die daar eigenlijk geen aanspraak op hadden was minder belangrijk. Misbruik en oneigenlijk gebruik stonden niet hoog op de politieke en ambtelijke agenda. Hierin kwam in de jaren 80 en 90 verandering. De overheid wilde regelingen beheersbaarder maken en daarnaast was er ook sprake van bezuinigingen. Het geld werd schaarser, ook voor subsidies en toeslagen.
Dit betekende ook een omslag in het denken over en kijken naar mogelijk misbruik en oneigenlijk gebruik van regelingen. Als het geld schaars was moest het niet alleen mij de beoogde burgers terecht ko0men, maar zeker niet bij degenen die daar geen aanspraak op hadden, Misbruik en oneigenlijk gebruik van regelingen werd een thema. (Er kwam ook een Interdepartementale Stuurgroep Misbruik en Oneigenlijk gebruik — ISMO) . De burger werd door de overheid steeds minder gezien als potentieel rechthebbende, en meer als een potentieel oneigenlijk gebruiker, of nog erger, misbruiker. En burgers gingen ook meer met een scheef oog kijken naar gebruikers van regelingen.
Het morele gewicht verschoof van het leed van de ten onrechte uitgesloten rechthebbende naar de verontwaardiging over de onterechte ontvanger.
Dit werd nog sterker toen misbruik en oneigenlijk gebruik in de politieke discussie, en in de media en het populistischer wordende maatschappelijk klimaat, werd gekoppeld aan etnische groepen. Incidenten van misbruik haalden de voorpagina’s en de kamer, werden gepresenteerd als potentiële patronen, en de ministers en het ambtelijk apparaat werden het vuur aan de schenen gelegd om hier wat tegen te doen. De politieke toon werd harder, de wetgeving scherper, en het ambtelijke toezicht strikter: ‘alles wat ten onrechte was toegekend, moet tot op de laatste cent worden teruggevorderd. Doel werd ‘geen cent onterecht uitkeren’, in plaats van ‘geen rechthebbende in de kou laten staan’, hard optreden en terugvorderen werden de norm, de menselijke maat, verwijtbaarheid, maatwerk en rechtvaardigheid verdwenen uit wet- en regelgeving, en uit de ambtelijke praktijk
Uitmondend in de toeslagenaffaire waar mensen werden aangepakt op grond van onterechte verdenkingen van fraude met toeslagen. En onderworpen werden aan een strikt terugvorderingsbeleid en een rigide uitvoering van wet- en regelgeving door bestuursorganen. Alles op wens van een meerderheid van de volksvertegenwoordiging. Het ging om een samenspel van meerdere factoren, op verschillende niveaus, in politiek, bestuur, rechterlijke macht, pers en maatschappij, waarbij jarenlang de structurele corrigerende mechanismen van de democratische rechtsstaat onvoldoende functioneren.
Dit patroon weer doorbreken waardoor burgers en overheid (en burgers onderling) elkaar weer gaan zien als partners, en waar burgers zich vooral gesteund en beschermt worden door hun overheid verdient de hoogste prioriteit.