Willem de Vlaming, december 2025
Europe:
Freedom is secured by protecting individuals from socio-economic domination, while the state and social institutions actively facilitate the conditions for individual fulfilment.
MAGA:
Freedom is secured by removing regulatory and institutional constraints, rejecting state-mediated socio-economic protection, and denying any collective responsibility for individual fulfilment.
In Europa veronderstelt vrijheid een faciliterende staat en bestuursvorm die regulerend bescherming biedt aan individuen en minderheden, tegen: autoritarisme, overmatige staatsmacht, dictatuur van een meerderheid, machtsongelijkheid tussen burgers, bedrijven en instanties, misbruik van individuele rechten.
In de Verenigde Staten is een belangrijke voorwaarde voor (individuele) vrijheid: minimale staatsinvloed in de samenleving, en vrijwel absolute bescherming van individuele rechten.
In Europe, (individual) freedom presupposes a facilitating state and system of governance that, through regulation, provides protection to individuals and minorities, against: authoritarianism, overreach of state power, the tyranny of the majority, power imbalances between citizens, corporations, and institutions, and the abuse of individual rights.
In the United States, an important condition for (individual) freedom is minimal state regulation of society, and near-absolute protection of individual rights.
Comparisons of European (Dutch) and American views on freedom often focus on levels of state intervention, but this obscures a more fundamental difference. The fundamental difference is how they see and value state power and social and economical power imbalances.
In a society power not only exercised by the state but also through economic and social power inequalities, social and group norms, and (implicit or explicit) social disciplining. Europeans (The Dutch polder model and the Rhineland model) seek to domesticate all these forms of power through regulation, empowered neo-corporatist dispersion of power and cooperatice strutures, and provide security on an individual level through social and economical welfare provisions. The United States, focuses primarily on limiting the power of the state, leaving many other mechanisms of coercion intact — freedom from government here does not necessarily translate into freedom from domination by others in everyday life.
In the Netherlands, freedom is maintained primarily through restraint.Tolerance functions through non-interference backed by institutional protection. Freedom is maintained through what may be termed non-interfering tolerance. Difference is accepted primarily through restraint rather than affirmation. The state functions as an institutional buffer that limits the capacity of private actors to impose disproportionate costs on individuals. Labor law, welfare provision, and administrative regulation reduce dependency and thereby weaken informal coercion. Individuals need not assert their identity or mobilize allies to remain protected; tolerance operates by lowering the stakes of deviation.
In the United States, freedom operates through confrontation. Rights are expansive on paper, especially against the state, but they must often be actively claimed, defended, and enforced. When individuals are strong — economically, socially, or politically — this system allows remarkable self-expression and reinvention. When they are weak, however, formal rights offer little shelter. Protection tends to come not from impersonal institutions, but from attaching oneself to powerful individuals, groups, or movements. Freedom becomes conditional on strength. Rights are defined primarily as protections against the state, while social and economic power is largely left unregulated. While this permits wide expressive latitude, it also exposes individuals to retaliation by private actors. Those lacking resources or social capital may remain formally free but practically constrained.
The U.S. constitutional model prioritizes procedural democracy and individual liberty against state power, including:
extremely strong protections for speech, association, and political organization;
deep skepticism toward government authority to define “anti-democratic” ideas;
reluctance to restrict political movements absent concrete unlawful acts;
It tolerates greater ex post correction (after harm occurs) rather than ex ante exclusion.
The U.S. fears limits without democracy
Militant democracy prioritizes the survival of substantive, rule-of-law–based constitutional democracy, including:
entrenched fundamental rights;
protection of individuals and minorities;
limits on political actors who seek to abolish these principles.
It accepts pre-emptive constraints on political participation to defend these foundations.
Militant democracy fears democracy without limits
Historically, the greater danger has been the insufficient protection of the principles and practices of the democratic rule of law, rather than abuse by a well-designed, militant, rule-of-law-based democracy.
This holds provided that militant democracy is embedded in:
strong neo-corporatist dispersion of power;
consensus-oriented institutions;
social partnership and corporatist mediation
(for example, the Dutch Polder Model and the Rhineland Model).
In such systems, democratic self-defense constrains power through a legal framework and governance model that deeply embeds:
neo- corporatist, dispersion, and separation of power;
participation and ownership by citizens and social stakeholders within neo-corporatist dispersed governance structures.
Within this framework, the state’s role is not to dominate society, but to guard the dispersion of power and to facilitate participation.
The different European and American views of freedom are mirrored in their attitudes toward international and supranational governance. The central issue is not sovereignty as such, but how regulation is understood: first, as a basis for protecting individuals and groups against domination and social pressure, thereby constituting a precondition for individual freedom; or, second, as a threat to unconstrained individual autonomy, insofar as it limits the capacity to assert, contest, and prevail over others.
In the European view, regulation is normatively justified when it reduces asymmetries of power and stabilizes the conditions under which individuals can act without fear of coercion. In the American view, regulation is more readily perceived as an external constraint that restricts the scope of legitimate struggle, even when such struggle produces unequal outcomes. The resulting divergence shapes not only domestic political arrangements but also contrasting approaches to supranational rule-making and international cooperation.
In the European model, vulnerability is anticipated and collectivized; in the USA model, it is accepted and individualized. At the international level, this translates into a willingness, on the European side, to embed states within legal and regulatory frameworks that limit unilateral action, and a corresponding USA reluctance to submit national discretion to external authority.
One sees regulation as a safeguard ensuring freedom; the other sees regulation as threath to freedom.
In the Western European model, supranational cooperation is generally perceived as an extension of institutional buffering. Just as the state is expected to mitigate domestic power asymmetries, supranational institutions are tasked with mitigating cross-border asymmetries—between states, corporations, and individuals. European integration, particularly through the European Union, reflects a belief that unregulated competition at the international level reproduces the same vulnerabilities seen at the domestic level. Coordination and regulation are therefore justified as mechanisms to prevent domination by larger states, markets, or private actors. This logic aligns with a non-interfering tolerance framework: rules imposed at a higher level are legitimate insofar as they reduce coercive pressure and stabilize expectations. Sovereignty is understood functionally rather than absolutistically. Pooling authority is not seen as a loss of freedom, but as a means of preserving it under conditions of interdependence.
The USA perspective reflects a contrasting agonistic conception of liberty. Supranational constraints are often viewed with suspicion because they resemble external interference rather than protective insulation. Just as domestic freedom is realized through resistance to centralized authority, international freedom is framed in terms of national autonomy and strategic flexibility. Power asymmetries are addressed not primarily through binding regulation, but through competition, bilateral negotiation, or hegemonic influence. This outlook assumes that actors—whether individuals or states—must retain the capacity to defend their interests through strength and leverage. Binding supranational rules are therefore perceived as potentially constraining the ability to act, adapt, or prevail. The preference is for voluntary cooperation rather than enforceable governance.
Willem de Vlaming, january 2026
Across all models, four variables determine the meaning of freedom:
Where vulnerability is located: Systemic structure (Marxist), State (Europe), , Family / community (Confucian, Indigenous), Individual (MAGA),
Who restrains power: Law (ordoliberal), Community norms (communitarian), State (social democracy), , No one (libertarian)
What cohesion relies on: Solidarity, Participation, Identity, Competition.
What is feared most: Dependence (MAGA), Domination (Europe/republican), Disorder (Confucian), Injustice (emancipatory)
Contrasting this is not “Europe vs USA,” but two deeper traditions of freedom:
A. Freedom as Security / Non-Domination (European social-democratic lineage)
Freedom = not being exposed to arbitrary power
Threat = domination, dependency, vulnerability
Moral emotion = fairness, dignity, solidarity
Political task = contain power, stabilize life chances
This draws on: Roman republicanism (non-domination), Christian social thought, Social democracy / Rhineland capitalism, EU legalism and proportionality
B. Freedom as Contest / Self-Assertion (MAGA-intensified frontier libertarianism)
Freedom = unimpeded struggle
Threat = constraint, regulation, “weakening”
Moral emotion = pride, resentment, honor
Political task = remove obstacles, test strength
This draws on: Frontier mythology, Social Darwinism, Moralized market competition, Honor cultures + evangelical voluntarism
Already this reframes the debate away from policy and toward what kind of human vulnerability counts as legitimate.
These models do not merely disagree on institutions, but on whether vulnerability is a social failure, a moral test, a civic responsibility, or a developmental necessity. Political conflict arises not because one side values freedom and the other does not, but because they locate freedom in fundamentally different relationships: to power, to risk, to others, and to the future self.”
1. European Social Freedom (security-based)
2. MAGA / Frontier Libertarianism (contest-based)
3. Republican Civic Freedom (virtue + voice)
4. Developmentalist / Communitarian Freedom (East Asian–style)
A. Security vs Contest
Model > Core Logic
European social > Security is a precondition for freedom
MAGA > Contest *is* freedom
Republican civic > Contest is legitimate only within shared rules
Communitarian > Contest subordinated to collective advancement
MAGA treats insecurity as morally formative. Europe treats it as morally corrosive.
B. Rules vs Virtue
Model > Moral Anchor
European social > Rules, procedures, institutions
MAGA > Personal virtue, toughness, faith
Republican civic > Civic virtue cultivated through participation
Communitarian > Duty, discipline, role-based virtue |
Europe distrusts moral heroism; MAGA distrusts bureaucratic neutrality.
C. Autonomy vs Belonging
Model > Selfhood
European social | Autonomous individual protected by institutions |
MAGA | Sovereign individual embedded in moral tribe |
Republican civic | Citizen defined by active belonging |
Communitarian | Relational self defined by obligations |
MAGA offers belonging without protection; Europe offers protection without thick belonging.
D. Voice vs Exit (Hirschman)
Model> Primary Mode
European social > Voice (unions, courts, social dialogue)
MAGA > Exit (markets, guns, secessionist rhetoric)
Republican civic > Voice through deliberation
Communitarian > Loyalty prioritized over both
This explains why MAGA distrusts unions and courts: they institutionalize voice over exit.
E. Protection vs Transformation
Model > Orientation
European social > Protect against harm
MAGA > Transform through struggle
Republican civic > Transform through collective action
Communitarian > Transform through discipline and growth
Europe focuses on 'damage prevention'; MAGA on 'character formation' through hardship.
F. Individualization vs Collectivization of Risk
Model > Risk Logic
European social > Risk pooled socially
MAGA > Risk privatized morally
Republican civic > Risk shared through civic duty
Communitarian > Risk absorbed by family/state nexus
MAGA moralizes risk; Europe socializes it.
G. Individual vs Embedded Self-Fulfilment
Model > Flourishing
European social > Self-development within safety
MAGA > Self-overcoming through adversity
Republican civic > Flourishing as civic excellence
Communitarian > Flourishing as role mastery
This avoids the false dichotomy between “selfish” and “collective.”
H. Freedom From Constraint vs Freedom From Power
Model > Enemy
European social > Arbitrary power
MAGA > External constraint
Republican civic > Corruption of common power
Communitarian > Disorder, fragmentation
Europe fears domination; MAGA fears emasculation.
European social: A life where dependency does not humiliate.
MAGA: A life where no one shields you from proving yourself.
Republican civic: A life where you matter because you participate.
Communitarian developmental: A life where you fulfill your role in a larger trajectory.