Wataru Ishida

@Finger lake in Rochester

(Last update: Nov 10, 2024)

My CV is here .

Ph.D. @ University of Rochester (Advisor: William Thomson)

Current Position

Senior lecturer @Yokohama National University, Japan

*In Japan, ``Senior lecturer'' is referred to as ``Tenure track assistant professor.''

ishida-wataru-dz (at) ynu.ac.jp (primary)

wataru.ishida1203 (at) gmail.com

Mechanism design, Matching Theory, Social choice, Revealed preference

``Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences'', Economic Theory Bulletin (2023). Link
``Compatibility of efficiency and stability in priority-augmented object allocation problems with weak priorities'' , Proceedings of 2022 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (2022), p.g. 3256-3262, joint with Yusuke Iwase. Link

*Every paper below is available on request:

``Group Incentive-compatible Allocation of Discrete Resources When Ownership Is Partitioned,'' (2024), joint with Chang Woo Park, Games and Economic Behavior (Accepted with minor revision)
``Efficient and (or) fair allocations under market-clearing constraints'', (2023). joint with Yusuke Iwase and Taro Kumano

-old version: ``Stability in matching markets with quantitative constraints''

``When are stable correspondences are Nash implementable under distributional constraints?'' (2022), joint with Ryoken Nagashima and Chang Woo Park
``Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts,'' (2022), joint with Taro Kumano
``Matching with contracts: Equivalent conditions on choice functions for implementing the stable correspondence in Nash equilibria,'' (2021) joint with Yusuke Iwase
``On two competing rules for a prioritiy-augmented object allocation problem with weak priorities,'' (2017)

``Efficiency and free from envy with infinitely many agents'', (2024) joint with Seiko Kitahara

``The top trading cycles rule in a priority-augmented object allocation problem with multi-unit demand'' (2019)