Taro Kumano

Current Position

    Associate Professor, 
    Department of Economics and Graduate School of International Social Sciences, 



    tkumano [at] ynu.ac.jp
    tkumano2008 [at] gmail.com


Fields of Interest

    Microeconomic Theory, Market Design

Publications/Accepted papers:

    "Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities" (2017) link
        Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 230-240.

    "Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: an almost impossibility result" (2013) link
        Journal of Public Economics, 105, 23-29.

    "Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules" (2012) link
        with Masahiro Watabe, Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1), 428-434.

    "Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm" (2011) link 
        with Masahiro Watabe, Economics Letters, 112(2), 135-137.
Working Papers: 
  • Prioritizing Diversity in School Choice (2016), [joint with Aytek Erdil],
    • An earlier version was circulated with the title "Stability and Efficiency of the General Priority-based Assignment."
    • Extended Abstract of an earlier version is in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA 2011), LNICST 80, pp.60-61. Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (2012).

Old papers:

My great co-authors:
    Aytek Erdil (U Cambridge), Morimitsu Kurino (U Tsukuba), Masahiro Watabe (Rissho U)

2017 - 2018:     
    Public Economics (Undergrad)    October - February

    Public Economics (Grad)    April - July

    Market Design (Grad)    April - July
    Mathematics for Economics (Undergrad @ Seijo University)    April - February   

Undergrad Research Seminar:
  • My Great students
            Kyohei Marutani (BA 2015 @ YNU) 
                Bachelor thesis "Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted," accepted at a refereed journal
            Wataru Ishida (BA 2017 @ YNU)
                Bachelor thesis "How to find a stable and efficient matching: the Top Trading cycles mechanism for weak priorities"

Last Update: May 4, 2017