Current Position
Professor of Economics,
Department of Economics and Graduate School of International Social Sciences,
CV
Contact
kumano-taro-sp [at] ynu.ac.jp
tkumano2008 [at] gmail.com
Research
Fields of Interest
Market Design, Microeconomic Theory
Publications/Accepted papers:
Quota Adjustment Process with Morimitsu Kurino, link
American Economic Review forthcoming
Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts (2025) with Wataru Ishida, link
International Journal of Game Theory, 54, 44.
Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties (2019) with Aytek Erdil, link
Journal of Economic Theory, 184, 104950.
An earlier version was circulated with the title "Prioritizing Diversity in School Choice"
Extended Abstract of an earliest version is in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA 2011), LNICST 80, pp.60-61. Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (2012).
Corrigendum to "Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties" [J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019) 104950] (2022) with Aytek Erdil, Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura, link
Journal of Economic Theory, 203, 105470.
Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities (2017) link
Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 230-240.
Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: an almost impossibility result (2013) link
Journal of Public Economics, 105, 23-29.
Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (2012) with Masahiro Watabe, link
Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1), 428-434.
Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm (2011) with Masahiro Watabe, link
Economics Letters, 112(2), 135-137.
Working Papers:
Existence of a stable matching (2026), [joint with Kyohei Marutani]
The main theorem is here (available after SSRN's approval)
Fair enrollment dilemma (2026)
Comparing distributional policies in priority-based matching problems (2025), [joint with Kyohei Marutani and Seiji Takanashi]
Efficient and (or) fair allocations for market-wise admissible sets (2024), [joint with Wataru Ishida and Yusuke Iwase] available upon request
Designing the Market Structure in Matching Problems (2019), [joint with Morimitsu Kurino and Kyohei Marutani]
Old papers:
Stability and Local Substitutability (2022), [joint with Kyohei Marutani]
Acyclicity, Robust Stability and Nash Implementation (2010), [joint with Masahiro Watabe]
Efficient Resource Allocation under Acceptant Substitutable Priorities (2009), SSRN
Book (in Japanese)
"Market Design Souron" link
with Morimitsu Kurino
Teaching
2025 - 2026:
Public Economics (Grad) April - July
Undergrad Research Seminar:
Kumano Seminar (in Japanese)
Risk Loving students ( * main advisor)
Kyohei Marutani* (BA 2015 @ YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted," published! link
Currently, a lecturer @ Kwansei Gakuin University
Yusuke Iwase (BA 2017 @ YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts," published! link
Currently, a senior lecturer @ Nihon University
Wataru Ishida* (BA 2017 @ YNU)
Bachelor thesis "How to find a stable and efficient matching: the Top Trading cycles mechanism for weak priorities"
Currently, a tenure-track lecturer @ Yokohama National University
Akina Yoshimura* (BA 2020 @ YNU)
Shoya Tsuruta (BA 2020 @ YNU)
Currently, @ Japan Finance Corporation
Asuka Hirano* (BA 2022 @YNU)
Bachelor thesis "A strategy-proof and ex post efficient probabilistic assignment mechanism on the full preference domain"
Currently, a grad student @ Penn State University
Ryoken Nagashima* (BA 2022@YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Nash implementation of weakly stable matchings with distributional constraints"
Currently, a grad student @ Kyoto University
Yuki Adachi* (BA 2025@YNU)
Currently, a grad student @ University of Tokyo
Taiyo Inamura* (BA 2025@YNU)
Bachelor thesis "Pareto-dominant stable matchings under distributional constraints and indifferent priorities"
Currently, a grad student @ University of Tokyo
Yuji Matsutani* (BA 2028@YNU expected)
Last Update: Nov. 11, 2026