Taro Kumano

Current Position

Associate Professor,

Department of Economics and Graduate School of International Social Sciences,

Yokohama National University



kumano-taro-sp [at] ynu.ac.jp

tkumano2008 [at] gmail.com


Fields of Interest

Microeconomic Theory, Market Design

Publications/Accepted papers:

"Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties" (2019) link

with Aytek Erdil, Journal of Economic Theory, 184, 104950.

    • An earlier version was circulated with the title "Prioritizing Diversity in School Choice"

    • Extended Abstract of an earliest version is in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA 2011), LNICST 80, pp.60-61. Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (2012).

    • There is an error:

"Corrigendum to "Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties" [J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019) 104950]" (2022) link

with Aytek Erdil, Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura, Journal of Economic Theory, 203, 105470.

"Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities" (2017) link

Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 230-240.

"Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: an almost impossibility result" (2013) link

Journal of Public Economics, 105, 23-29.

"Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules" (2012) link

with Masahiro Watabe, Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1), 428-434.

"Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm" (2011) link

with Masahiro Watabe, Economics Letters, 112(2), 135-137.

Working Papers:

  • Fertility decline and school choice (2022), [joint with Kyohei Marutani and Seiji Takanashi]

  • Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts (2022), [joint with Wataru Ishida] available upon request

  • Matching with interdependent choices (2021), [joint with Kyohei Marutani]

  • Quota Adjustment Process (2019), [joint with Morimitsu Kurino] available upon request

  • Designing the Market Structure in Matching Problems (2019), [joint with Morimitsu Kurino and Kyohei Marutani]

Old papers:

  • Acyclicity, Robust Stability and Nash Implementation (2010), [joint with Masahiro Watabe]

  • Efficient Resource Allocation under Acceptant Substitutable Priorities (2009), SSRN


2022 - 2023:

Public Economics (Grad) April - July

Public Economics (Undergrad) April - July

Undergrad Research Seminar:

Kyohei Marutani* (BA 2015 @ YNU)

Bachelor thesis "Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted," published! link

Currently, a post doctoral fellow @ University of Tokyo

Yusuke Iwase (BA 2017 @ YNU)

Bachelor thesis "Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts," published! link

Currently, a lecturer @ Kyoto University

Wataru Ishida* (BA 2017 @ YNU)

Bachelor thesis "How to find a stable and efficient matching: the Top Trading cycles mechanism for weak priorities"

Currently, a grad student @ University of Rochester

Akina Yoshimura* (BA 2020 @ YNU)

Shoya Tsuruta (BA 2020 @ YNU)

Currently, a grad student @ University of Tokyo

Asuka Hirano* (BA 2022 @YNU)

Bachelor thesis "A strategy-proof and ex post efficient probabilistic assignment mechanism on the full preference domain"

Currently, a grad student @ University of Tokyo

Ryoken Nagashima* (BA 2022@YNU)

Bachelor thesis "Nash implementation of weakly stable matchings with distributional constraints"

Currently, a grad student @ Kyoto University

Last Update: May. 22, 2022