行動・実験経済学研究会

Past Events

AY2025 Fall Semester

October 27 (Monday), 5th period (17:00-18:30) 

Speaker: Andrea Isoni (Warwick Business School)

Title of talk: Self-Constraint and the Demand and Supply of Paternalism

Type of talk: Research Presentation

Language: English

Abstract:  People may approve of behaviourally informed public policies because these may help them avoid their own errors or judgment (demand for paternalism) or help others avoid such errors (supply of paternalism). In two pre-registered experiments involving delayed monetary rewards, we find extensive evidence of self-constraint and a large supply of paternalism, but very limited demand. Although people broadly believe others are like themselves, this projection does not induce them to demand the constraints they are so ready to offer.　Evaluating people’s acceptance of paternalism based on self-constraint or supply considerations may greatly overestimate people’s willingness to accept externally imposed constraints.

November 18 (Tuesday), 5th period (17:00-18:30) 

Speaker: Shohei Yamamoto (Rikkyo University)

Title of talk: Pre-Registration and Pre-Analysis Plans in Experimental Economics

Type of talk: AI-Accelerated Research Procedure

Language: English

Abstract:  

In other sciences, "Self-driving Labs" are emerging. In economics, we mainly use AI for ad-hoc tasks like proofreading, missing its strategic potential. This gap presents a critical window of opportunity. I propose we seize this first-mover advantage by building an AI-Native Research Team to systematically embed AI across our entire research lifecycle. This presentation will outline a potential model. The primary goal is to gather feedback from colleagues and recruit volunteers for an initial "pioneer team." Let's collaborate to build a framework that significantly boosts our productivity and positions our team as a leader.

December 23 (Tuesday), 16:00-18:15 ,

Room 909 of Building 3, Waseda Campus

Presentation 1

16:00-17:00

Speaker : Yaxin Liu (University of New South Wales)

Title of talk: A game of status: gender asymmetry in loss aversion

Language:  English

Type of talk:  Research Presentation

Abstract:

This study examines gender differences in loss aversion to status. Drawing on data from over 14,000 Grand Slam matches in professional tennis, I introduce a novel measure—the Net Tournament Balance (NTB)—which quantifies how far a player is, in ranking points, above or below the reference point at which their current world ranking is maintained. To identify causal effects of placement in the “loss” domain on performance, I employ a regression discontinuity design. The findings reveal a pronounced gender difference: male players exhibit strong status-based loss aversion. They become significantly more likely to win and adopt a more aggressive playing style when facing the threat of status decline, consistent with prospect theory. In contrast, female players show no comparable behavioral adjustment relative to this reference point. Additional analysis suggests that culture, social norms, and identity may contribute to male players’ sensitivity to status loss.

Presentation 2

17:15-18:15

Speaker: Wei James Chen (National Taiwan University)

Title of talk: “Will” it be Seen? Using Eye-Tracking to Reexamine the Future Tense Effect in Intertemporal Choices

Language:  English

Type of talk:  Research Presentation

Abstract:

The Linguistic-Savings Hypothesis (LSH) suggests that weak future tense marking in language promotes future-oriented behavior, though empirical evidence remains inconsistent. This study investigates the cognitive mechanisms underlying the LSH using eye-tracking and the Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM). In a double-blind intertemporal choice experiment with Chinese speakers, we manipulated linguistic presentation by introducing a future tense marker ("jiang") versus a neutral control. While aggregate behavioral data showed a non-significant trend supporting LSH, eye-tracking analysis revealed a critical attentional mechanism: increased fixation duration on the future tense marker significantly predicted a reduced likelihood of choosing delayed rewards. Computational modeling further indicated that the future tense marker alters the decision process by biasing the starting point toward immediate rewards. These findings suggest that linguistic markers influence intertemporal choices not merely through cultural association, but by capturing attention and inducing an immediate-reward bias during early cognitive processing, providing micro-level evidence supporting the LSH.

Jan 23 (Tuesday), 5th period (17:00-18:30)

Speaker 1: Etienne FARVAQUE

Title of talk: Experimental evidence on the role of primaries on strategic voting

Language:  English

Type of talk:  Research Presentation

Abstract: We analyze the extent of vote-buying in Pakistan, comparing its prevalence and impact under the authoritarian and democratic regimes the country has known. We

use household level consumption survey data from the Pakistan Social Living Measurement (PSLM), for the period 2004-2019, as well as data on local elections

from the Election commission of Pakistan (ECP). We first document the presence of vote-buying at the macroeconomic level, and then, using a difference-in-

difference on quasi-randomization by survey dates methodology, we compare the increase in consumption expenditures at the microeconomic level. We show that

consumption increases during electoral periods, but rather before the election in autocracy versus after the election in the democratic regime. 

AY2025 Spring Semester

April 29 (Tuesday), 5th period (17:00-18:30) 

Speaker: Kwon, Hyoji (University of Hyogo, School of Economics and Management) 

Title of talk: Democracy or In-Group Bias? Determinants of Cooperation in Sanctioning Systems

Type of talk: Research Proposal focusing on Experimental Design

Language: Japanese (日本語)

Abstract:  This research proposal presents an experimental study that investigates the interplay between democratic decision-making and in-group bias within sanctioning systems. Focusing on a public goods game framework, the study examines how cooperation is influenced when punishment mechanisms are determined by a democratic voting process rather than random assignment. Four experimental conditions are designed: (1) punishers selected via democratic election versus random assignment, and (2) punishers originating from either the in-group or the out-group. By comparing these treatments, the research aims to identify the conditions that most effectively promote cooperative behavior and to determine which factor—democratic legitimacy or in-group favoritism—exerts a stronger influence when the two are in conflict. The findings are expected to shed light on the challenges modern institutions, such as democracy and market economies, may face when implemented in societies with strong in-group ties, suggesting that cultural in-group biases might sometimes constitute a more significant barrier than the institutional design itself.  

May 20 (Tuesday), 5th period (17:00-18:30) 

Speaker: Yi Weicheng (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University)

Title of talk: Pre-Registration and Pre-Analysis Plans in Experimental Economics

Type of talk: Reading Presentation

Language: English

Abstract:  This is a reading presentation for a paper by Imai-san and his collaborators about the recent trend of pre-registration in Experimental Economics society. The paper is available via here.  

June 17 (Tuesday), 5th period (17:00-18:30) 

Speaker: Daijiro Kawanaka (Faculty of Commerce, Waseda University)

Title of talk: Gift exchange as psychological signaling

Type of talk: Research Proposal focusing on Theory

Language: Japanese (日本語)

Abstract:  

We study a gift exchange game in which a principal offers a fixed wage to an agent, who then chooses an effort level after observing the wage. To analyze reciprocal behavior in this setting, we apply a model of belief-based guilt aversion. In our model, the principal can induce higher effort from a guilt-averse agent by offering a higher wage. We show that, under certain assumptions about the agent's guilt function, there exists a unique separating equilibrium. Additionally, we discuss an experimental design to test the implications of our model.

July 15 (Tuesday), 5th period (17:00-18:30)

Speaker 1: Kazumi Shimizu

Title of talk: How Do Probability Biases Affect Ego Utility?

Language:  Japanese

Type of talk:  Literature review + a model

Abstract: This study examines how probability biases impact ego utility through belief distortions in Bayesian updating. Individuals frequently exhibit cognitive biases, such as the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy. Our model reveals that biased individuals (Freddy) experience over(under)valued ego utility due to distorted probability assessments. Findings may have significant implications for financial and labor markets.

Speaker 2:  HU Rongyu (doctoral student of Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University)

Title of talk: The Cost of Knowing: An Experiment on Ego Utility and Feedback to Self-performance

Language: English

Type of talk:  Literature review + Experimental design

Abstract: This study experimentally investigates how ego utility influences information-seeking behavior. While previous research has shed light on models of ego-driven information avoidance, empirical evidence remains scarce. This scarcity arises because ego utility—which is generated from beliefs themselves and leads people to avoid information to protect their self-image—is difficult to isolate and measure using naturally occurring data alone. We employ a three-stage experiment, consisting of an IQ test, belief elicitation, and a feedback choice task, intend to provide evidence of how ego utility creates psychological frictions and drives information avoidance.

AY2025 Spring Semester

AY2024

Research Seminar

Date：16:30- 18:00, 17(Mon.) March, 2025 

Place：Room 909 of Building 3 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.) 

Speaker：Duncan James (Fordham University) 

Title：Risky Choice and Boundary Conditions 

Language：English 

Abstract： We implement a multi-period individual choice problem, where the evolution of earnings across past rounds affects working capital available for the next round. In addition, we impose treatments which reinitialize working capital and/or hold out a bonus for not exhausting working capital (i.e. going bankrupt). This allows us to ascertain the effect of the proximity of the bankruptcy boundary on risky choice.