Work in Progress:
Courtroom Surveillance: Evidence from a State Intervention in the Courts [Job Market Paper]
Abstract: Judicial independence stands as the cornerstone of any democratic nation. How does state intervention, specifically through the monitoring of judges, affect the judiciary? To study this question, I collect and transcribe novel case-level administrative complaint and judgment texts from criminal courts in Thailand during the autocratic government period of 2015 to 2020. I analyze the effects of the 2017 constitutional reform mandated by a military coup. This reform requires draft verdicts for severe and politically sensitive cases to be reviewed by a superior court before judgment delivery. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find large and significant impacts on judge behavior: judges became more stringent in cases subject to superior court review. The effect does not fully emerge until 2019 when extra monitoring and enforcement is introduced, and is primarily driven by previously lenient judges. This indicates that the reform increased the uniformity of verdicts as intended. However, heterogeneity analyses revealed that while severe drugs and social stability offenses received longer prison sentences, cases involving politicians and public officers' malfeasance received significantly more favorable treatment. Additionally, these effects are more pronounced in regions that are more politically aligned with autocratic rule.
Punished Beyond Her Crime: Evidence from Women in Drugs Offenses
Fast-tracked Officers: Promotion, Corruption, and Policing
Publications (Pre-PhD.):
with Pym Manopimoke
Economic Modelling. Volume 65, Pages 75-94 (September 2017)