Dealer Quid Pro Quo in the Municipal Bond Market, with Casey Dougal and Daniel Rettl.
Last Draft: December 4, 2024
Dealers intermediate trades in OTC markets through trading networks. In the municipal bond market, we document greater complexity than the typical core-periphery structure. Analyzing dealer reciprocity-the tendency to repay favors-we find reciprocity generally reduces markups. Dealers trade lower markups today for future liquidity. However, in small trading communities, reciprocity can foster collusion via quid-pro-quo agreements, inflating transaction chain markups. Among high-centrality dealers in large communities, high reciprocity lowers average markups by 80 basis points, while among low-centrality dealers in small communities, it raises markups by 72 basis points. Although only around 2% of transaction chains suggest collusive behavior, these significantly affect regression results, highlighting the importance of controlling for such outliers to accurately estimate centrality premiums or reciprocity discounts.
Presentations:
2025: Virtual Municipal Finance Workshop, 14th Annual Municipal Finance Conference at Brookings, Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, German Finance Association Annual Meeting, Southern Finance Association Annual Meeting
2026: Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting
Media Footprint:
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/dealer-quid-pro-quo-shapes-bond-price-markups-paper-says
Awards and Nominations:
Best Microstructure Paper (Semifinalist) - 2025 Financial Management Association Annual Meeting
Table below:
Average transaction markups, transaction chain length, and network size based on the chain-initiating dealer's degree of centrality and reciprocity
Last Draft: December 10, 2025
This paper examines how shifts in banks’ exposure to repo markets and the expansion of deposit franchises have influenced their financial performance and balance sheet strength before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis. Using linear models, vector autoregressions, and a theoretical framework, I show how the monetary policy transformations shifted banks' equilibrium behavior based on risk preferences, collateral constraints, and the cost of funding. The lending and financing strategies diverged before the crisis, with risk-seeking banks prioritizing the maximization of their interest income and risk-averse banks benefiting from favorable repo terms by maintaining strong balance sheets. After the crisis, strategies converge as risk-seeking banks shift toward safer short-term funding, while risk-averse banks extend more credit amid diminishing repo market advantages, both of which are connected to the post-crisis policy environment.
Presentations:
2025: University of Georgia Brownbag Seminar
2026: Case Western Reserve University Brownbag Seminar
Figure below:
Effects of changes in repo dependency on the long-term net interest margins for risk-seeking banks
Bonds and Bargains: Effect of New Dollar Stores on Municipal Bonds, with John Hund
Presentations:
2025: University of Georgia Fall Finance Conference Early Idea Rapid Session
Figure below:
Left: Number of dollar stores per 1,000 residents, by county
Right: Net number of business closures in the counties that experience the net outflow of the local businesses following the opening of a dollar store within a 10,000-foot radius, per 1,000 residents
The Fed Speaks, the Market Listens, the Machine Predicts, solo-authored
Lower Your (Synergy) Expectations, with Greg Eaton, Feng Guo, and Tingting Liu
Municipal Bond Smithereening, with Casey Dougal and Richard Ryffel
Wildfires and Municipal Bond Trading, with Daniel Rettl