Whatever the physical theory, whether quantum or classical, it must abide by the laws of thought as George Boole recognized them and must be describable in a "common language". This constraint itself is a feature of nature, since there is no other way left to operationally talk about nature (and there is no more to nature than what we can operationally study). This constraint was recognized by Niels Bohr under the term "classical concepts".
As Bohr noted:
It is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is simply that by the word “experiment” we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics.
This project examines the role of classical concepts in the use and interpretation of quantum theory and explores its operational consequences. Previous work has shown that Bohr’s notion of “classical concepts” is conceptually distinct from “classical mechanics”: whereas classical mechanics concerns dynamical laws, classical concepts concern the epistemic and linguistic preconditions for describing experiments and communicating their results (see, for example, Faye’s reconstruction of Bohr).
In the first part of the project, I investigate how these epistemic and linguistic preconditions might be formalized. In particular, they involve (i) the capacity to describe experimental outcomes as definite occurrences in ordinary language and (ii) the capacity to communicate these occurrences intersubjectively.
In the second part, I explore how this formalization can be applied to concrete physical scenarios and what logical and conceptual consequences follow for the quantum–classical transition and for interpretations of quantum theory.
This project investigates quantum mereology—the relation between parts and wholes in quantum systems—using an operational approach that minimizes historically inherited metaphysical assumptions whose applicability may be limited.
Since Descartes, the dominant explanatory mode in physics has been reductionist: a system’s behavior is taken to be nothing more than the aggregate behavior of its constituent parts, which are presumed to exist independently and to be distinctly identifiable. In classical physics, this picture works well: a heap of sand can be treated as the sum of its grains, each with independent and well-defined existence, and classical statistical mechanics fits comfortably within this framework.
This project revisits this underlying mereological assumption, because the practice of quantum mechanics complicates it. An operationally rigorous part–whole relation in quantum systems must account for the probing mechanisms through which “parts” are defined and accessed. This point has been demonstrated in the extensive literature on entanglement in identical particles, for example, in Paolo Zanardi et al.’s “Quantum Tensor Product Structures Are Observable-Induced” (Physical Review Letters 92, no. 6, 2004).
Furthermore, this mereological assumption, when applied to quantum many-body theory, amounts to this conclusion: macroscopic objects are composed of particles; particles obey quantum theory; therefore, macroscopic objects obey quantum theory. This conclusion, however, is not a logical necessity of quantum theory per se, but rather the manifestation of a metaphysical assumption concerning mereology.
Revisions to this mereology, motivated by a desire to maintain closer alignment with experience, do not affect whether quantum theory is universal but instead affect the sense in which it is universal.
I am interested in studying the various mathematical objects in quantum mechanics that evolve over time, as well as the bounds on their evolution, which can illuminate different characteristics of quantum theory. Familiar examples include states, observables, entanglement, means, variances, and so on.
For example, quantum speed limits (QSLs) place bounds on the evolution of quantum states and observables. Classically, the principles of relativity impose limits on the speed at which physical objects can travel. In quantum systems, additional types of fundamental speed limits can arise. Recently, in collaboration with a colleague, I have been studying how fundamental upper bounds constrain the fluctuations of quantum-mechanical observables. This work, as Hamazaki has also pointed out, has important implications for the foundations of nonequilibrium behavior in open quantum systems.
Quantum speed limits are on the opposite end of effects such as the quantum Zeno effect, where the goal is to nearly stop the quantum state from evolving.
More broadly, this line of research may also shed light on quantum analogues of various insights from special and general relativity concerning inertial motion and acceleration.
This is also a project that aims to get a closer look at the familiar-sounding but basic concepts such as "system", "state", "state-space", "interaction, "properties", "change", and "cause-and-effect".
The information theory with which we are familiar from many information theory textbooks concerns what may be called syntactic information. Syntactic information is agnostic to the meaning of sentences. In several applications, however, both in physics and in other sciences, concepts such as function and meaning become relevant, in addition to the informational properties of states and transformations of physical systems.
To see the significance, consider a bacterium moving through an environment. Its sensory states might be correlated with the availability of nutrients. Shannon mutual information quantifies those correlations.
But this quantity does not distinguish between two kinds of information:
Information about the environment that actually helps the bacterium survive.
Information about the environment that is correlated with its state but makes no difference to its survival.
The distinction is functional and causal.
In my PhD thesis, I studied the role of language in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Although my thesis was not aimed at developing a mathematical theory of semantic information—my goal was instead to investigate the role of ordinary-language descriptions in quantum theory and their physical consequences—the work suggested to me a possible approach to unambiguously quantifying semantic information.
Let me provide some intuition in this direction.
The underlying idea is analogous to how we think about intervals of time. In classical clocks, the definition of a time interval depends on a convention and is therefore not universally reliable. In quantum systems, however, we have access to universal standards of time, such as the transition frequency associated with a cesium atom, which is the same everywhere in the universe.
I believe an analogous distinction can be made in the case of meaning. Classically, meaning is often defined in terms of the actions agents perform. For example, the meaning of a pencil might be defined in terms of the action of writing. Such definitions, however, may be ambiguous and therefore may not provide a sufficiently universal basis for a mathematical theory of semantic information.
By contrast, consider the specification of a protocol for measuring the polarization of a photon. Such a specification is universally recognizable (after suitable translation of the specification language), since photons are the same everywhere, and polarization observables are likewise universal. This suggests that actions performed in quantum laboratory settings could provide an unambiguous basis for defining semantic information. More specifically, one might characterize semantic information in terms of such universally recognizable actions, thereby developing a quantitative measure with units analogous to bits in the case of syntactic information.
The above approach may complement David Wolpert's characterization of observers in terms of systems that act to remain out of equilibrium and optimize an objective function, with persistence over time playing a central objective (in defining the objective function). This can provide a top-down characterization of agency and meaning.
The quantum-operation-based approach can also suggest a bottom-up way to build meaning into the fundamental physical description, since in a purely Newtonian point-particle mechanics obeying a Laplacian worldview, there is no inherent fundamental physical way to define meaning.
Broadly, there are two approaches to formalizing semantic information. The first is top-down, in the sense that it takes entities we already regard as agents, such as cells and organisms, as case studies for formalizing agency. This is Wolpert’s approach. The second is bottom-up, in the sense that it seeks to understand how a fundamental physical description—the basic physical constituents and fundamental physical laws, even without assuming biology—may (or may not) accommodate agency.
So the two approaches may provide a complementary bottom-up and top-down characterization of meaning.
More broadly, I am interested in contributing to the mathematical characterization of the physics of meaning, as well as to the formalization of semantic information theory and its applications beyond quantum physics, including in biology.