The alleged skull of René Descartes. I find Descartes much more enigmatic than Newton. The text on the Skull, says in Latin,
"‘Parvula Cartesii fuit hæc calvaria Magni, Gravius reliquias Gallia busto tegit. Sed laus ingenii toto diffunditur orbe, Mirisque in coelis mens pia semper ovat.’
Was Descartes a Philosopher of Physics?
I think there are, broadly speaking, two distinct postures in the philosophy of physics.
The first, which we might call the immersive posture, concerns the purposes, principles, and heuristics that help a theorist construct theories and an experimentalist design experiments. It gives the internal sense for why I, as an individual, do physics; how can I know that what I know can be trusted? It also gives an (often personal) sense for what doing physics means in the grand scheme of things. Descartes's aim to mathematize nature, Newton's hypotheses non fingo and careful experiments, Heisenberg's emphasis on restricting oneself to quantities that are, in principle, directly observable, and Einstein's desire to know the mind of God would fall into this category.
The second, which we might call the detached posture, concerns the principles and criteria that allow someone who is not necessarily involved in the actual process of theorizing or doing experiments to examine and scrutinize the process of theory construction and experimentation, without participating in it. Popper's criterion of falsifiability, as well as the criterion of asking what a new principle can achieve that existing ones cannot, would fall into this category.
The latter posture certainly has its uses, particularly in science policy, the evaluation of research programs, and the allocation of scientific funding. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is of relatively less direct relevance to the everyday practice of a working scientist: we rarely find ourselves consciously invoking such criteria in the course of doing physics. It also seems to me that these criteria are less universally applicable, since it is often relatively easy to find legitimate examples from the history or practice of science that serve as counterexamples to their general formulations. That is why, I think, Feyerabend's no-method view is more suitable for the detached posture.
There is also, at least from my perspective as a physicist, a difference in their emotional character. The first kind of philosophy of physics feels more evocative, even existential: it carries with it the sense that one might be discovering the keys to the universe's secrets, as well as a sense of why one is undertaking the search in the first place. The second, by comparison, feels rather dry and transactional. It is concerned less with the exhilarating pursuit of understanding nature than with assessing and judging the intellectual products of that pursuit.
I like to identify myself as a physicist and an immersive philosopher of physics.