This piece argues that U.S. immigration policy has long reinforced racial hierarchy rather than serving as neutral regulation. Drawing on Tichenor, Masuoka and Junn, Spiro, and Wong, it shows how measures like the Chinese Exclusion Act and the Immigration Act of 1924 transformed racial anxieties and eugenic ideas into legal rules governing entry and citizenship. Tracing the link between whiteness and belonging from the Naturalization Act of 1790 through the quota system, it demonstrates how law codified a racially preferred vision of Americanness. This piece concludes that contemporary immigration debates still reflect this legacy, as racialized assumptions continue to shape policy and citizenship in the United States.
This piece challenges the claim that dictatorships outperform democracies economically by avoiding gridlock. Drawing on North, Wallis, and Weingast’s framework, it argues that the real difference lies not in average growth but in stability. Authoritarian regimes may achieve rapid short-term gains, yet weak property rights and limited competition make growth volatile. Democracies, by contrast, foster durable prosperity through impersonal institutions, credible commitments, and competitive markets that support innovation and reduce severe downturns.
This piece examines whether a president can remove a Federal Reserve Board member or chair, using President Trump’s public threats toward Jerome Powell as a case study. It places the dispute within the principle of central bank independence and analyzes statutory and constitutional limits on removal power. Drawing on the Federal Reserve Act and Supreme Court precedent, including Humphrey’s Executor and Seila Law, it argues that a Fed chair may be removed only “for cause,” not over policy disagreements. It concludes that frustration with monetary policy alone is insufficient grounds for removal.