Explore some of The Centre for Ethics' past events below.
Watch select recordings on our YouTube channel here , and discover upcoming events here.
2026 EVENTS:
WED
4
Wednesday, February 4, 12:30 - 2:30PM
This paper reads Frederick Douglass as a theorist of recognition and examines one of the counterintuitive ways that he navigates what I call the “motivational problem.” Struggles for recognition encounter the motivational problem when there is no clear desire or need on the part of powerful individuals or dominant groups to confer affirmative recognition to those struggling for recognition. While most studies of the political and moral salience of recognition focus exclusively on the misrecognition of the oppressed, Douglass confronts the motivational problem by orienting the attention of his readers and audiences to a form of misrecognition experienced by white slaveholders: a recognition of a humanity that is falsely assumed to remain intact and undistorted as a result of slaveholding. Douglass rhetorically leverages this discrepancy for an abolitionist politics of shame. By demonstrating how slaveholders alienate their humanity, Douglass seeks to not only shame slaveholders but erode their external sources of recognition and persuade his white northern audiences to dis-identify with the slaveholders and thereby implicitly recognize their own misrecognition of the master’s humanity. Douglass sought to make slaveholding appear to white Americans (among others) as unappealing as it is in reality and thereby persuade his white audiences to adopt abolitionist principles.
View a recording of the event here!
THU
29
Thursday, January 29, 4:00 - 8:00PM
The public sphere is currently dominated by a handful of social media platforms—for example, X, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, and Reddit—all built on centralized networks. Centralized networks concentrate decision-making and infrastructure in a single entity that manages user identity, data storage, policy enforcement, and content curation. This concentration of control grants platforms enormous power over online communication and public discourse. Yet these platforms are operated by unelected actors accountable primarily to shareholders rather than the public. I argue that operators of platforms built on centralized networks can’t legitimately exercise power over the public sphere. By contrast, platforms built on decentralized networks—which distribute control over identity, data, and policy across independent nodes interoperating through open protocols—can in principle exercise their power legitimately. The upshot is that legitimate platform governance requires migrating to decentralized architectures.
WED
28
Wednesday, January 28, 3:00 - 5:00PM
Polarization remains an unresolved, existential threat in the AI Age. However, history shows us that new, relatively unregulated technologies have a history of being used to accelerate strategic divisions. In the 1930s and early 40s, Nazi Germany quietly blanketed North America with subtle, pro-German propaganda. A wealth of scholarship shows us that Axis forces used media formats that could fly under the radar in North America, including musicals, romantic comedies, and “cultural” programming in radio and film. Their goal was to sew division and prevent Canadians and Americans from entering into a war against Hitler.
History also shows us that our forebearers established innovative new ways of dealing with the social media crisis of their own day. Could some of the answers to the modern crisis around polarization and bias acceleration be found in the past? This talk shows how a small group of North American officials developed an innovative system to fight back. By embracing new media, they built groundbreaking, early anti-racist and anti-polarization campaigns that targeted the existing biases and divisions in North American populations that were being exploited by Third Reich. More than contributing to the end of the war, evidence suggests that these often overlooked campaigns also helped pave the way for major anti-racist and human rights legal victories in the following decade.
Could we retool the strategies of historical anti-polarization campaigns for our own age? Drawing from the anonymous open history classroom for social media built with this model (55m views), L.K. Bertram discusses how algorithmic tools and critical, humanities-engaged algorithmic literacy can help us build and scale more engaging, public facing academic knowledge mobilization campaigns.
FRI
23
Friday, January 23, 5:00 - 7:00PM
AI companions have become increasingly popular. A recent study estimates that around 70% of teens in the US has tried an AI companions in the past year. But is their impact on our lives overall positive? Can they provide true friendship or fulfill any of social our needs? With their popularity on the rise, what are the social and political implications they carry?
Come discuss these and other questions with us at the Centre for Ethics, in partnership with the Algorithm Bias in Canada project.
WED
21
Wednesday, January 21, 12:30 - 2:30PM
Most, if not all, systems of education in advanced industrial societies fail to give all participants within them fair chances of achieving certain educational outcomes. They are, in this respect, unfair. What makes them unfair? And what would it take to give all participants a fair chance? According to a standard egalitarian approach—an approach I call the improper influence approach—they are unfair because some differences in educational outcomes within those systems of education are due to differences in things like social class background—things that are illegitimate or improper influences on outcomes. To give all individuals a fair chance, on such an approach, would be to eliminate, or at least mitigate, such influences. This presentation is about why the improper influence approach is the wrong approach to equality of opportunity, and about why we need a different approach to fairness in education. I point to some difficulties with the improper influence approach and introduce a new approach to fairness in education: the fair chance approach. I argue that the fair chance approach provides a better explanation of what makes systems of education unfair when they are and of what it would take to give all participants within them a fair chance of achieving certain educational outcomes.
View a recording of the event here.
WED
14
Wednesday, January 14, 3:00 - 5:00PM
I argue that when probability claims are used in decision contexts involving persons, they often undergo a systematic shift in how they are interpreted - from reports of population frequencies to ascriptions of individual or kind-level dispositions. This shift offers a more general explanation than those existing accounts provide for why the use of accurate statistical information can nonetheless wrong or demean people in ways amounting to discrimination.
View a recording of the event here.
WED
7
Wednesday, January 7, 12:30-2:30 PM
Recent work in the metaphysics of pregnancy tells us that foetuses are best conceived as body parts which will transform into independent organisms after birth. This picture raises several philosophical questions. One question is whether birth is as morally or politically relevant as it is biologically relevant. Another relevant question is: what, exactly, is the status of foetuses before birth? Are they moral persons with rights? Are they citizens? Or are they merely morally considerable—that is, appropriate subjects of moral concern? In this presentation, I will attempt to make progress on these difficult yet pressing questions.
2025 EVENTS:
THU
4
Thursday, December 4, 3:30 - 5:30PM
I discuss what I call ‘reactive luck’: luck that befalls us as bearers of reactive attitudes (such as shame, resentment, pride, or gratitude). Our reactive attitudes play significant roles for our constitution, relationships, and lives overall. Likewise, their weight on us can be significant. Yet we are often lucky with respect to bearing them, in that the objects and circumstances warranting them, and with these our reactive attitudes themselves, are often outside our control.
I here discuss the nature and philosophical significance of reactive luck, its relationship to moral luck, and consider ways of addressing problematic forms of reactive luck.
View a recording of the event here.
WED
3
Wednesday, December 3, 12:30 - 2:30PM
There has recently been a burst of human rights-based climate advocacy, i.e., advocacy appealing to the idea that climate change threatens human rights.
I argue that this recent advocacy is fruitfully understood as an effort to accommodate the fact that climate change is a structural threat to human rights. I give a working account of the relevant features of structural threats to human rights, drawing on neighbouring literatures on structural injustice to illuminate the distinctive features of the human rights case.
I engage the philosophy of human rights literature to argue that there are plausible reasons of human rights theory to evolve international human rights law better to recognize and respond to structural threats to human rights.
MON
24
Monday, November 24, 2025, 9:00AM - 12:00PM
"Corporations are legal bodies with duties and powers distinct from those of individual people. Kant discusses them in many places. He endorses universities and churches; he criticises feudal orders and some charitable foundations; he condemns early business corporations' overseas activities. This Element argues that Kant's practical philosophy offers a systematic basis for understanding these bodies. Corporations bridge the central distinctions of his practical philosophy: ethics versus right, public versus private right. Corporations can extend freedom, structure moral activity, and aid progress towards more rightful conditions. Kant's thought also highlights a fundamental threat. In every corporation, some people exercise the corporation's legal powers, without the same liabilities as private individuals. This threatens Kant's principle of innate equality: no citizen should have greater legal rights than any other. This Element explores the justifications and safeguards needed to deal with this threat. "
On Monday 24 November, we will hold a symposium to discuss the work. After a short overview by Garrath, there will be responses by Lucy Allais, Carla Bagnoli, Jordan Pascoe, and Arthur Ripstein.
View a recording of the event here.
FRI
21
Friday, November 21, 2025, 12:00 - 2:00PM
We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it ‘to value’ something?
The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first-order or a second-order desire towards it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of all these mental states. In our paper, we raise some objections against all these accounts and defend a new affective account of valuings. Unlike standard affective accounts, according to which the term ‘valuing’ refers to a single type of affective state, such as care, we hold that ‘valuing’ refers to the members of a class of affective states, namely, the class of sentiments. On our view, to value something is to have a particular sentiment towards it. Since sentiments can be of different types, our account implies that there are as many ways of valuing things as there are types of sentiments.
View a recording of the event here.
WED
12
Wednesday, November 12, 2025, 3:00 - 5:00PM
Artificial Intelligence ethics is often framed in universal terms, yet such framings obscure how cultural and material practices shape fundamentally different relationships with data. In many parts of the Global South, communities interact with AI not only as users but also as repairers, annotators, and mediators of fragile infrastructures, producing forms of engagement that Western discourses on AI ethics frequently miss.
Based on my long-term ethnographic and design work across Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Canada, and other contexts, I will show how AI systems extend colonial legacies by imposing Western neoliberal values, how epistemic injustices emerge when local ways of knowing are rendered unintelligible, and how community practices such as informal data repair in Dhaka or immigrant struggles over data legitimacy in Canada reveal alternative ethical concerns. I will also highlight the growing data annotation industries in countries such as Bangladesh, India, and China, where labeling labor is promoted as a path to development but raises distinct worries around exploitation, recognition, and long-term sustainability. These accounts demonstrate that AI ethics cannot be disentangled from situated practices of data and labor, and that any attempt to globalize AI ethics must bring these lived realities to the fore in order to avoid reproducing the very exclusions it claims to resist.
View a recording of the event here
THU
6
Thursday, November 6, 2025, 4:00 - 6:00PM
There is perhaps no piece by Martin Luther King, Jr. that is more widely read or more beloved than the “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” Countless articles and books have been written about its generation and meaning. Despite this, its broader philosophical significance has for the large part been missed.
The Emotions of Nonviolence offers a novel interpretation of the Letter: it is not merely a discussion of civil disobedience – as is usually thought – but is also and perhaps even primarily an essay on political motivation. On this reading, the Letter seeks to answer a central question in democratic theory: namely, how can and ought we motivate the racially oppressed to engage in civil disobedience – in what King called nonviolent direct action? King’s answer is that we must appeal to and encourage the political emotions, both positive and negative. Fear, courage, faith, dignity, indignation, and love can together motivate nonviolent action and nonviolent action can reciprocally motivate, channel, and sustain these same emotions. It is through this continuous loop that nonviolence has the potential to transform society and its structures.