"Conflict and Democratic Preferences" (with Nicole Stoelinga)

World Development 202 (2026): 107341

We investigate how exposure to conflict events shapes individuals’ democratic preferences, focusing on support for democracy in general and perceptions of governance within one's own country. We examine how ethnic affiliation–whether an individual belongs to an ethnic group with access to state power–influences democratic attitudes, reflecting differences in social standing and expectations about democratization. Using a rich data set covering more than 30 African countries over two decades, we exploit variation in the timing of conflict events relative to survey interviews to identify causal effects. Our findings show that conflict exposure, on average, increases support for democracy, but the effects vary by ethnicity and regime type. In autocracies, conflict triggers rally-around-the-flag effects: support for democracy rises, but so do perceptions of the state. Violence also increases trust in ruling institutions in autocratic regimes, an effect that is absent in more democratic settings.

"Populism and Ideological Convergence: Evidence from a Multiparty System" 

Journal of Public Economics 241 (2025): 105271 [Working Paper]

Populist parties have gained significant power in European politics in the last decades, raising concerns about the potentially contagious effect of populism. I study how populist party representation in local councils affects other parties' ideological positions. I use variation created by close elections to identify ideological shifts resulting from a change in party representation, holding voter preferences constant. I use candidate-level data from a voting advice application to estimate ideological positions, modeling candidates' responses using item response theory to obtain measures of ideology that are comparable across election years. The results show that increased populist representation causes the ideological spectrum among other parties’ candidates in the municipality to become more concentrated. One additional seat for the populist party reduces the interquartile range of candidate positions by 9 %. While there is initial ideological convergence between mainstream and populist parties, it does not persist as the populist party continues to gain more seats. These effects take place only on the liberal-conservative dimension, while positions on the economic dimension are unaffected. The results demonstrate that increased populist representation influences other parties and causes ideological convergence within the candidate base.

"Female Leaders and the Representation of Women in Government" (with Luisa Dörr, Klaus Gründler and Niklas Potrafke) 

Reject & Resubmit, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy [CESifo Working Paper][Current version] 

Does female political leadership increase women's representation in government? Using a difference-in-differences design on cross-national data, we find that the share of women in government rises after the first female leader takes office. Because electoral outcomes are endogenous, we turn to a unique case in which a woman assumed executive leadership without an election: the 1993 appointment of Germany's first female state prime minister. Using synthetic control, we show that this appointment increased women's share of top government positions by 6 percentage points. Our findings show that even one influential woman can help others ascend to high political office.

"Making the Cut: Close Elections and Local Welfare Policy" (with Thomas Walsh and Nikolaj Broberg) [Working Paper]

Conditionally Accepted, European Economic Review

This paper investigates how political alignment affects the implementation of punitive welfare measures in the UK. In particular, we examine whether a legislator's party affiliation affects the rate of sanctions to unemployment benefits in the MP's constituency. To address the endogeneity of winning party and constituency characteristics, we use a regression discontinuity design based on close elections to compare the sanction rates across constituencies that are marginally aligned or unaligned with the central government. We find that implementation of the sanction regime is significantly more lenient in constituencies won by the government-aligned parties. The RD estimate indicates a drop of 0.8 percentage points, implying on average 18 % lower sanction rates in central government controlled constituencies. Our findings show that legislators are able to influence local implementation of national, rule-based policies, even within a highly centralized system. Such political influence undermines institutions that should be neutral to local partisan considerations.

"Childhood Environment and Adult Political Behavior" (with Aino Kalmbach and Liam wren-Lewis)

"Blame Shifting" (with Niklas Potrafke and Stefan Smutny)

"Do Firms Benefit from Political Connections?" (with Tuomas Kari, Jeremias Nieminen, Janne Tukiainen and Juho Vesa)

"Business Ties and Political Selection" (with Lucas de Melo, Tuomas Kari, Jeremias Nieminen, Janne Tukiainen, Mika Vehka and Juho Vesa)