From the premises "Rome is north of Naples" and "Pisa is north of Rome" we draw the conclusion "Pisa is north of Naples". From the premise "it rains" we conclude "it is not the case that it does not rain". This is obvious. But why is it obvious? Why are these inferences obvious? A possible answer is: if we use the words "north" and "not", to accept the aforementioned inferences is part of grasping the meanings of these words. Every speaker who understands the words knows that the inferences in question are legitimate. Inferentialism (a term coined by Robert Brandom) is the view that to know the sense of a word is to know, implicitly, that if we use the word, certain inferences involving that word must be accepted. Those inferences are meaning-constitutive. Meaning is not explained in terms of a relation of representation between linguistic entities and an independently structured reality, but in terms of use of words in reasoning and argumentation. Since the nineteen-thirties, when Wittgenstein, Carnap and Gentzen in different ways proposed the idea, versions of inferentialism have been advocated by many philosophers. After a historical introduction, Cozzo shall give a general picture of inferentialism and of the main problems that a supporter of inferentialism has to deal with. Cozzo shall also say something about his favorite version of inferentialism.
Topics related to this course can be found here. Here are the slides.