RESEARCH
DISSERTATION PROJECT
United By Nature: A Natural Rights Liberal Egalitarian Theory of Justice
In my dissertation, I present and defend a natural rights liberal egalitarian (NRLE) theory of justice. This theory conjoins two basic ideas. The first is that we all have natural rights to a sphere of private ownership where we may realize our own values. The second is that we all have rights to acquire a certain equal share of the world's resources. Many see these ideas as opposed, and so those who accept one often say the other is unjustified, and also say that accepting both is incoherent. My contribution is to state a form of NRLE which answers these criticisms more decisively than others have. I first argue that the principles of justice must be ones we can all in reason accept. I then justify private ownership rights by contending that we cannot in reason accept a principle which denies us any sphere where our own values hold sway – and I argue that such a sphere is one of private ownership. I also justify rights to equal resources by contending that we cannot all so accept a principle giving anyone the right to acquire so much as to unequally take away from what others may acquire for themselves in turn.
OTHER PROJECTS
Open Vindication: A Theory of Jural Duties and Rights (in preparation)
There has been a long debate in philosophy in jurisprudence about what rights are. Recently, parties to the debate have stressed that to understand rights, we must understand the duties in terms of which rights are defined, or jural duties for short. Jural duties are always directed toward some object: such duties must be duties to some person or other being. Rights are always located in some subject: any right must be the right of some person or other being. What divides the parties to these debates is the question: “What makes a jural duty one owed to me, and what makes a right mine?” Here, I take a stand on both debates, presenting an account of jural duties as well as an account of rights, and defending both against the leading alternatives on offer. My account of jural duties is the open theory, on which jural duties to me are those enforceable duties of others the ultimate reason for which is something about me. My account of rights is the vindication theory, on which my rights are those sets of incidents to which my side could appeal to prevail in a dispute over duties.
Property and Authority: A Theory of Ownership (in preparation)
The rights we associate with ownership are diverse and variable: they are of many different sorts, and they can differ widely from case to case. This fact has led many to doubt that there is any cohesive theory of ownership which can cover all the relevant rights in all the relevant cases. Here, I present a theory of ownership, and argue that this theory accounts for ownership's plurality while also finding some unity in the concept. This theory rests on a thought which is highly intuitive but which few have pursued thus far, namely that ownership is about authority. Authority, on the account I would defend, consists in rights to change the rights of others in some sphere, including by giving others duties. Ownership rights, I would argue, are the rights which come with authority over interactions with an object – which includes both the rights of authority themselves, and the further rights which follow from such authority. Moreover, to own objects, at least in part, is to have one or more of these rights over them. This theory covers all the rights and forms of ownership in a unified, cohesive way.